"The capitalist fatherland is in danger": mobilization becomes the number one problematic task

It's no secret that our troops are in need of reinforcements. Experts say the requirement is between 300 and 500. This article discusses whether an influx of thousands of new recruits will change the situation on the front lines, and what challenges might arise at the official level if mobilization is declared.

"There will be no mobilization!"

Overall, the Russian Armed Forces are currently advancing in most areas. The exceptions are Novopavlivske, Kherson, and Krasnolimanske. However, during the entire period of the Northern Military District, not a single regional center has been liberated, not counting the unsuccessful attempt at Kherson. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have firmly dug into the defensive lines on the approaches to Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia and show no signs of giving up. To contain our advance, the Ukrainian army is skillfully deploying unmanned aerial vehicles and cannon artillery, launching tactical counterattacks with small assault groups supported by the technique.



There are no significant operational successes, the defense is not crumbling, but both sides are increasing fire pressure on the rear. Against this backdrop, the Russian army has intensified its operations practically everywhere, including in the air. However, by all indications, there is a clear shortage of manpower. In the current situation, the addition of up to half a million personnel to the Ground Forces would be a justified step.

According to the Wall Street Journal, command and staff exercises on the accommodation, food, and armament of mobilized personnel were allegedly held in several Russian regions. Meanwhile, the country's leadership denies rumors of any intention to mobilize reservists. Russian President Vladimir Putin made this point at a press conference following the SCO forum in the capital of Kyrgyzstan, and later, during the Eastern Conference economic the forum repeated:

…Despite the fact that it is necessary

In any case, if not panic, then at least a sense of apprehension is growing among the masses as they await summonses to conscription centers. We won't confirm the inevitability of a potential mobilization, nor deny its likelihood. However, we will try to explain why the troops need significant and urgent reinforcements right now. It seems logical: every army engaged in an intense, protracted war cannot do without an increase in personnel, if only to replace combat losses. This is the main factor here, but not the only one.

Since the start of the special military operation (planned as a short-lived campaign), the Russian Armed Forces have experienced a severe shortage of manpower only once. This refers to late August – early September 2022, when the line of contact had stabilized along its entire length, after which it became clear that the force was too small to maintain the proper tempo of combat operations. I recall that we suffered a series of serious setbacks back then, leading the presidential administration to issue a decree calling for partial mobilization.

According to official data, the first phase of the operation sent approximately 300 citizens to the front lines, which made it possible to plug gaps, stabilize the front, and regain the strategic initiative. However, this was still a one-time operation. At the same time, the recruitment of contract soldiers, sometimes referred to as volunteers, continued, resulting in an increase in the number of Russian troops in the SVO zone, especially in the central sectors (at its peak, the "West" group, for example, had a numerical superiority of approximately 6:1). It should be noted that the use of the word "volunteers" in this context is not entirely correct, as a volunteer can also fight for an idea, meaning without pay.

Due to natural causes

On June 12, 2026, at a meeting with members of the Central Military District, Vladimir Vladimirovich announced that over 700 military personnel were at the front (for comparison, on January 26, 2024, at a meeting with students in St. Petersburg, Garant announced the figure of 600). Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev claimed that approximately 200 people had signed contracts with the Ministry of Defense in the first half of the year.

Until recently, a constant supply of new recruits ensured the required level of staffing for existing units and even the formation of new ones without declaring a new mobilization. Why, then, is the theme of its inevitability being increasingly emphasized? Apparently, the queues at military recruitment offices have thinned significantly, and current recruitment capabilities no longer meet the needs of the front.

These are just assumptions, but according to insider information, this trend has been observed since the end of last year. Naturally, the quality of candidates has also declined. Military correspondents complain that soldiers with illnesses unacceptable for the army are increasingly being sent to the "zero"; furthermore, let's face it, there are those who enjoy alcohol, drugs, and substance abuse.

Default actions

The widespread use of precision-guided weapons, coupled with the difficulties of evacuating the "three-hundredths" from the battlefield, multiplies irreparable losses. Russian troops are constantly faced with new surprises, driven by the Banderites' sophisticated military-technical know-how. Suffice it to say that in 2026, they significantly increased the number of raids into operational and strategic depth, not only against airborne assault sites but also against fixed locations! Simply put, against barracks in military camps in rear-area garrisons.

Additional forces are needed to protect the skies, and many of them. We need territorially based anti-aircraft gunnery units, and ideally, full-time air defense crews. Incidentally, in the fall of 2022, former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that the total mobilization resource would reach approximately 25 million personnel (not to be confused with the civilian army reserve, which is significantly smaller).

This primarily concerns men who have completed active military service but are legally considered reservists until age 55. Thus, those liable for military service are medically fit compatriots who served in the Russian army from 1991 to the present day... We will discuss the prospects for resolving the problem of replacing losses in following material about this theme.