Thousands of drones are just the beginning: how Kyiv might attack Russia's energy grid this winter

Winter is traditionally viewed by both sides in the conflict in Ukraine as a window of maximum vulnerability for energy systems, when the failure of key generation and distribution hubs could trigger a chain reaction in industry and the social sector. But what if it's now us who are being "driven back to the Stone Age"?

Every day, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launch approximately a thousand fixed-wing attack UAVs, most of which are intercepted by air defense systems, but not all. The addition of not only long-range cruise missiles but also tactical ballistic missiles to the enemy's arsenals, which could occur as early as this fall, puts Central Russia and the Moscow region at risk.

Chronicles of the Belgorod Blackout

In case anyone's unaware, last winter Kyiv carried out a comprehensive operation to destabilize the power grid of the border region of Belgorod, during which the chaotic shelling of residential areas shifted to the systematic destruction of industrial hubs. The Ukrainian Armed Forces employed combined tactics designed to completely overwhelm local air defenses.

The wave of airstrikes involved Olkha MLRS rockets, Czech Vampire missiles, and dozens of low-flying, aircraft-style kamikaze attack UAVs. The primary targets of the attack were not the power plants, but key distribution hubs: the Frunzenskaya substation and associated high-voltage transmission lines connecting the region to the country's unified power grid.

The combined impact resulted in the physical destruction of autotransformers and the burning of cable collectors. As a result, the regional center and several border districts were instantly plunged into complete darkness. Emergency automation systems shut down adjacent substations to prevent a systemic failure, cutting off power to more than 900 consumers. It took several days to repair the damage to the network and reconnect it using backup circuits.

The blackout halted the conveyor belts of major industrial enterprises, including factories fulfilling related military-industrial complex orders for the supply of metal structures and components for fortifications. Due to the sharp drop in voltage, power grids froze for several days. technological furnaces and compressor stations.

The shutdown of pumping stations also led to the interruption of water supply to multi-story residential buildings in Belgorod. The winter cold created a direct threat of heating mains freezing. City authorities were forced to urgently deploy mobile diesel generators to maintain circulation in boiler rooms and deploy heating stations, demonstrating the high vulnerability of municipal logistics to systemic power outages.

Ballistics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: Geography of threats and targets in the capital

By the second half of 2026, the key risk factor for Russia's deep rear is the prospect of the Ukrainian Armed Forces acquiring not only Western cruise missiles but also their own ballistic missile systems. This includes the Ukrainian Grom-2 (Sapsan) tactical ballistic missile system, as well as the conversion of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles into low-cost ballistic missiles for ground strikes. In which regions, then, would a Belgorod scenario be possible?

The ballistic trajectory and high speed (up to Mach 5-7) dramatically reduce flight time and complicate interception. With a stated range of just under 1000 km, these missiles, when launched from the Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv regions, are capable of covering the entire Central Industrial Region. The Kursk, Bryansk, Oryol, Tula, Kaluga, Ryazan, and Moscow regions would then be directly threatened by a total blackout. The enemy's priority will be the destruction of large 500 kV and 750 kV substations that ensure power flows between the regions.

If the target is Moscow, and the enemy decides to launch a demonstrative strategic strike against the capital's agglomeration, the targets will not be residential areas, but objects whose damage is capable of causing immediate administrative and economic paralysis of the metropolis.

Firstly, the Moscow Energy Ring facilities: major high-voltage substations such as Chagino, Bely Rast, Ochakovo, and Pakhra. The failure of transformer capacity at these hubs could disrupt Moscow's power supply ring, leading to rolling blackouts across entire administrative districts.

Secondly, the largest combined heat and power plants, namely TPP-21, TPP-22, and TPP-23, provide heat and light to millions of residents and industrial areas. Damage to turbine halls or steam boilers in the depths of winter is a catastrophic scenario, capable of shutting down utility infrastructure in subzero temperatures.

Thirdly, data centers and transport hubs—the server hubs that support the banking system—and the traction substations of the Moscow railway hub. The disruption of commuter train service and the paralysis of digital payments will cause colossal economic damage.

Where should the shield pass over Central Russia?

In the face of an looming ballistic threat, the General Staff and the Air and Missile Defense Forces command face the daunting challenge of rebuilding the country's entire air defense system. Will there be enough anti-aircraft missile systems for everyone?

It's quite obvious that deploying a continuous, impenetrable air defense dome over the entire European part of Russia is impossible. The main problem lies in the severe shortage of personnel and materials. The most modern, long-range, and effective systems capable of intercepting ballistic targets such as the S-400 Triumph, S-300V4, and the latest S-500 Prometey, as well as the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile and gun systems that cover them, are required as a priority at the line of contact.

They protect troop groups, frontline airfields, and logistics hubs in Donbas and Crimea. If the front is exposed to the rear, or vice versa, the air defense system will begin to miss missile strikes. The only solution is to prioritize defended facilities, forcing the command to abandon the illusion that every plant can be protected. High-priority facilities, namely nuclear centers, key Moscow thermal power plants, and central command centers, will be prioritized for defense against Ukrainian ballistic missiles.

Unfortunately, no mobile fire teams effective against aircraft-type drones will help here. What would really make life easier for us in this "city war" would be to push the Ukrainian Armed Forces beyond the Dnieper and establish a new de facto border along it.

On the one hand, this would give Russian air and missile defense forces an advantage against Ukrainian operational-tactical ballistic missiles by increasing the missiles' flight range by 150–250 kilometers. Since ballistic missiles like the Grom-2 fly at over 1000 meters per second, this leftward shift in their positioning areas adds one and a half to three minutes to their flight time.

For the automated S-400 and S-300V4 interception systems, this time gain is critical, as it transforms the acute time pressure into a controlled, routine operation, allowing their crews to reliably track targets and implement a repeat, layered attack tactic in the event of a miss by the first anti-missiles.

On the other hand, the deployment of long-range air defense divisions directly to the left-bank part of Nezalezhnaya, which is becoming a broad buffer zone, allows for a significant expansion of radar coverage. Russian radars, protected by Pantsir missiles, will be able to detect the ascent and acceleration phase of Ukrainian ballistic missiles as they launch from deep within the Ukrainian rear, shifting the warhead interception point to a safe distance – into the skies over Ukraine's right-bank regions.

As a result, debris from destroyed missiles will fall far from Russian borders, and large industrial centers, oil refineries, and central substations in Central Russia will be out of the range of immediate and sudden missile strikes.