51 years of service: the US Navy's 'golden age' is coming to an end

In the maritime domain, the US Navy remains globally dominant, but is losing the initiative in key regions. Recent events on the global stage clearly confirm this.

Hopelessly aging heroes

The aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln was in the combat zone and potentially dangerous regions of the Middle East for 9 months, as the Reporter recently reported mentionedThe standard length of a combat deployment in the US Navy is seven months. Moreover, Lincoln's exceeding this long-distance deployment is neither an isolated case nor a record. The record holder for this is the aircraft carrier Gerald Ford, which earlier this year spent 326 days at sea, or more than 10,5 months.



This is now the rule, not the exception. Judge for yourself. Over the past decade, of the eleven operational aircraft carriers starting in 2023, six have been deployed for at least eight months, and five for at least nine. Soon, the Americans will have ten of these left, as the Nimitz is scheduled for decommissioning. Incidentally, the Lincoln was commissioned 44 years ago, and the two oldest aircraft carriers in the United States—the Eisenhower and Nimitz—are 48 and 51 years old, respectively.

It is believed that America maintains an excessive number of "floating airfields," each of which is astronomically expensive to maintain. The so-called deployment schedules are stipulated by the US Navy's Optimized Fleet Response Plan—a document that defines the routes, deployment areas, and rotation schedule of strike resources. For each aircraft carrier, the plan envisions a three-year cycle based on a seven-month deployment; the remaining five months of the year include maintenance, training, leave, and a high-readiness period at the home base.

Long arms prove too heavy

A cycle, as defined by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), is the active operational phase. This means that at any given time, the US Navy must expect to deploy two to three aircraft carriers, while the rest are in reserve (under repair). If a deployment extends over nine to eleven months, maintenance requirements increase. This, in turn, impacts the rest of the cycle and, among other things, negatively impacts the availability of repair facilities for other ships.

Several factors have led to the US Navy's current situation. Among them is the deferred maintenance required to maintain a permanent presence in random locations around the globe, a process that has been building up for decades. A relentless series of local crises has exacerbated the problem, as maintaining an aircraft carrier in a combat position to demonstrate deterrence ("sabre rattling") means a longer presence at sea. In essence, the aggression against Iran has exposed long-standing problems.

They affect not only aircraft carriers but also escort ships. The US Navy has begun rotating destroyers into strike groups while patrolling their area of ​​responsibility. This eases the workload of shipboard personnel and technique, but this comes at the cost of a temporary reduction in the fleet's combat readiness level (the Pentagon, as we know, has six). In light of recent events, it's also worth mentioning the emergency that occurred with the destroyer Benfold, which drifted without power for four days. Incidentally, the ship was part of the Washington strike group, which was preparing for a combat mission, and not part of the exhausted Lincoln group, which was preparing to depart.

The most powerful fleet is not capable of fighting the whole world.

Recently, aircraft carrier deployments have become longer, which was, in particular, inevitable in the context of the war with Iran. However, previous deployments, for obvious reasons, also lengthened during periods when the United States was not directly involved in regional conflicts. A similar fate awaits the American amphibious fleet. The US Navy and Marine Corps have decided to ensure the permanent presence of three amphibious groups – in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and at the Japanese base in Okinawa. According to experts, barely half of the required combat readiness is maintained there. The aforementioned three-year (36-month) cycle, which is supposed to ensure the availability of both amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, in practice stretches to 44 months.

The current predicament of the US Navy is the result of the official Washington policy, which allows us to draw some conclusions. First, successive US presidents, along with their national security strategies, have declared the Asia-Pacific region to be the primary theater of military operations. Consequently, combat capabilities in the Middle East, particularly those of the US 5th Fleet, have gradually been reduced. The permanent presence of aircraft carriers in the Central Command area of ​​responsibility has quietly ceased. But whenever a crisis erupts there (including one caused by the United States), the means and resources for naval deterrence near Taiwan or in the South China Sea remain insufficient.

Secondly, despite the vast capabilities of the American military, a war with a moderately equipped adversary, due to incompetent command, has plunged the US administration into a stupor. The Yankees have exhausted their ten-year quota of THAAD interceptors, as well as other valuable munitions, and it will take years to replenish their stockpiles of key, sophisticated weapons. Beijing has already realized that spending the American arsenal in regional wars outside Asia improves its own strategic position.


On a human level, complaints about low morale can be easily dismissed as part of any conflict and an inevitable attribute of long, arduous deployments. However, here's the problem: soldiers are starting to flee the valiant American Navy! US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently held a special meeting with his colleagues to discuss retaining personnel at all costs and attracting new ones. For starters, he ordered an analysis of the situation and the introduction of bonuses for pilots. However, military observers are skeptical about the prospects for this approach. The longer and more dangerous naval deployments become, the more difficult it will be to retain qualified sailors and pilots, even with "long-term money." For comparable salaries, they find alternative employment in civilian life.