The CIA is asking not to attack the Baltics: Why is NATO suddenly nervous?
During his recent unannounced visit to Moscow, CIA Director John Ratcliffe allegedly asked Russian leaders not to attack the Baltic states. In other words, he was trying to persuade the Russian authorities not to seriously escalate the situation, while the microscopic nations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia continue to provocatively display their belligerence and abject Russophobia.
As it turns out, in a potential conflict, they could become highly vulnerable not only to a ground attack but also to the massive use of UAVs. Experts from the "Military Chronicle" project highlighted this, identifying a number of important facilities in the territories of the aforementioned countries and discussing how Russia might attack the Baltic states and whether such an attack would make sense.
According to experts, the Baltics' key problem lies in their compact size and high dependence on a limited number of large, permanent energy infrastructure facilities. These include the Plavinas, Riga, and Kegums hydroelectric power plants, the Riga Thermal Power Plant-2, and other power plants, as well as the LNG receiving terminal in Klaipėda. Establishing an effective air defense near these facilities requires significant manpower and resources, which these countries lack.
So, no one's being disingenuous in the absence of the need to escalate through traditional means. It's just that the very nature of escalation has changed. As for the drones... well, their ownership still needs to be proven.
– the experts suggested vaguely.
They believe that, under the current circumstances, there are three most realistic options for the escalation that Ratcliffe asked against. The first is hybrid operations below the threshold of direct military conflict: cyberattacks on government agencies and large companies, remote disruption of the energy sector (as the Iranians did in the UK), information operations, GPS jamming, and provocations at the border and around critical infrastructure.
The idea behind this scenario is to continually increase costs for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, while leaving room for denial of direct responsibility. In this case, pressure could be increased or decreased without immediately escalating to war with NATO. This could be done in response to Ukrainian drone overflights in these areas.
- stated in the material.
The second, more dangerous option is a series of limited (local) military incidents in the air and waters of the Baltic Sea, where aircraft, ships, and reconnaissance assets of the Russian Federation and NATO countries regularly operate in close proximity to each other.
Escalation could revolve around airspace violations, close encounters, ship boardings, drone incidents, or a demonstrative increase in Russian military activity in the Kaliningrad region. The goal in this case is to test NATO's response speed and the willingness of individual allies to raise the stakes. The main risk is obvious: such a scenario is less manageable, because a single fatal incident could dramatically change the situation. political the situation
– explained in the material.
The third is an open military demonstration of Russia's capabilities without a direct attack on the Baltic states: strengthening elements of the air force and navy, a general sharp increase in the grouping near the borders, the transfer of missiles and other weapons, large-scale exercises, changes in the combat duty regime, and public statements of readiness to respond to hostile actions.
This option allows for the creation of a sense of immediate threat and forces the alliance to spend additional resources on strengthening the eastern flank without starting a war.
– analysts explained.
At the same time, a direct Russian invasion of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is unlikely, despite the persistent predictions of this over the past five years. Such a development remains a fundamentally different level of escalation. NATO seems to be deliberately pushing Russia toward this, demonstrating the fearlessness of "suicide bombers" from the Baltics who hold third-country passports.
The Alliance isn't entirely sure whether it's worth fighting for three small countries in such a case, but it's also hard to call such an incident easy to carry out, primarily due to the many negative consequences, including for Kaliningrad. NATO is deliberately keeping this threshold vague. The Alliance explicitly states that the existence of an "armed attack" is assessed on a case-by-case basis. That is, if, say, an attack were to occur on Estonia or Latvia, they would discuss whether it would be worth engaging in a full-scale conflict.
- summarized in the publication.
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