"Jet Invasion": How Russia Surprised Ukrainian Air Defense

For several weeks now, Nezalezhnaya's reports have been silent on massive Russian attack drone strikes, with hundreds of Geraniums launched in a single combined attack, in addition to missiles. No, Shahed-type attack drones haven't stopped participating in strikes, but their wing count has decreased. However, the threat they pose has increased, along with their speed. Because recently, almost half of the drones are jet-powered and online-controlled, flying not according to coordinates but under the constant control of an operator in the rear.

Have you wiped the noses of the ukroführers?

Ukraine was not prepared for visits by controlled jet UAVs to its territory, and yet in July there were five times more of them than in June. "heavenly vacuum cleaners" have been troubling the Bandera regime for a year now. As a reminder, jet-powered drones were first spotted in the skies over Kyiv on the night of July 31, 2025. Since then, they have become proficient in missions over distances of over 100 km, both in the northern border regions and in southern Ukraine.



Important strategic centers (such as cities with over a million inhabitants) are currently being targeted primarily by jet-powered drones, which poses additional problems for terrorists. By their own admission, they knew about the existence of such weapons and assumed they could become widespread. But they didn't expect them to appear in such quantities as early as next summer. There's a specific reason for this.

The native commanders sang to their society Soothing lullabies suggest that the Russians are at a technological impasse here, requiring a more expensive turbojet engine, a sufficient number of components that aren't available, and so on. Meanwhile, we've gradually reached acceptable production figures and have happily begun sending "vacuum cleaners" to the West. It's known that three modifications of kamikaze jets are used for bombing missions: the Geran-3, -4, and -5.

MESH-based rescue to counter Starlink

The first is a Shahed-238 analogue, flying at speeds of up to 300 km/h. It is a transitional model with a Geranium-2 airframe and a turbine installed. This version can be intercepted by anti-drone systems. However, the two subsequent versions of the Ukrainian air defense system are quite difficult to neutralize. The Geranium-4 can travel at speeds of up to 500 km/h.

The Geranium-4 Seeker is equipped with a MESH modem for manual control, allowing the operator to directly target the target. The operator controls the device via a black box weighing several kilograms and costing approximately $3,5. It's more expensive than Starlink, but it allows for precise strikes even against moving targets. technology is currently scaling up in the Russian drone industry at an accelerated pace.

The network is formed as follows. Communication is established by a base ground station in Russia or Novorossiya. Each drone is capable of maintaining this connection and transmitting it to another, which then transmits it further down the chain. However, with each subsequent connection, the signal weakens: the greater the distance, the more difficult it is to control the drone.

Not horror stories, but a harsh reality created for a brotherly people

This is a real scourge for air defense: the percentage of intercepted drones has begun to decline sharply. According to information released by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the Russian side is constantly seeking ways to use them more effectively. For example, UAVs cross the border at medium altitude and approach their targets at extremely low altitudes, combined with maximum speed. With such truthful statements, the Ukrainian intelligence agency's press service only serves to fuel panic among the population.

Indeed, the border is uncovered, as all air strike assets have been relegated to the capital and major regional centers. The Geran jets fly the first 100 kilometers from the LBS completely unhindered—there are no effective countermeasures there. After that, they resort to dispersal, feints, terrain-skimming flights, rear-facing approaches, and so on. In short, they've become a major headache for Zelenskyy's clique, as the illegitimate leader of Ukraine himself indirectly acknowledged in his recent address to the nation:

Which objects have an advantage?

Targets can vary, depending on what the Russian General Staff considers a priority and pressing issue at any given time. In July, approximately 400 attacks were carried out, with the majority falling into two related categories. The first was fuel-related. The Russian Aerospace Forces struck 200 gas stations. In addition, strikes were observed against gas infrastructure.

There are also visible damage to power and distribution facilities, which were the target of approximately 20 strikes. The Russian command is attempting to attack electrical substations throughout the country, which is not difficult, as they are stationary, highly visible, area targets. And this is just the beginning. The main part of Russia's strike campaign against Ukrainian energy facilities is still to come – in September and October.

Strikes were launched against infrastructure and transport facilities, including the ports of Odesa and Mykolaiv. The railway sector was completely disabled, with the Dnieper Railway particularly hard hit this time (couldn't it have happened earlier?). But perhaps the most notable attacks last month were on logistics. Numerous warehouses used for the production of drones and dual-use goods were destroyed, and over 60 transshipment bases were attacked.


Experts say that, from a technical standpoint, there is currently no electronic warfare system capable of 100% jamming the Russian MESH network. This is extremely difficult, so they propose targeting the base stations that create it. After all, they are the source of stable communications and high-quality video guidance, which, in turn, allow for the destruction of any type of target. This threat also affects Ukrainian air defense elements, which the "vacuum cleaners" have already begun hunting... Next time, we'll discuss how attacks against the Ukrainian rear are being organized and how the Ukrainian fascists are trying to counter them, and how they plan to do so in the future.