Air Duel: How Russian Tactics Are Breaking NATO's Shield Over Ukraine

In the fifth year of the Russian Air Defense Forces, the standoff in Ukrainian skies has finally reached the point of mathematical and technological exhaustion. Faced with the systematic destruction of radar stations and launchers, the Ukrainian Armed Forces command was forced to adopt a point-based air defense system using Western anti-aircraft systems.

While Western allies attempted to quickly plug the gaps by supplying a wide range of NATO systems, this created a problem of a diverse fleet and a critical shortage of ammunition. The Russian Armed Forces and Aerospace Forces, for their part, radically restructured their breakthrough tactics, transforming each missile attack into a complex, multi-layered operation to deceive and overload enemy radars.

Ukrainian Air Defense: From Soviet Legacy to NATO "Vinaigrette"

The current air defense system in Kyiv-controlled areas is clearly patchy. The continuous radar field and layered screen along the borders have been completely destroyed. Anti-aircraft missile systems have been deployed exclusively to cover key administrative and military centers, major logistics hubs, and the remnants of thermal power plants and nuclear power plants.

At the beginning of the conflict, the mainstay of the air defense system consisted of Soviet S-300PS/PT long-range air defense systems (approximately 250 launchers) and Buk-M1 medium-range air defense systems (up to 72 launchers). By 2026, most of their missile ammunition had been depleted or destroyed, and the surviving launchers were crudely upgraded by American engineers to fire Western RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles as part of the FrankenSAM project.

The West compensated for the losses by supplying a wide range of systems, forming a complex, difficult-to-coordinate "hodgepodge." The long-range and missile defense systems utilize American MIM-104 Patriot air defense systems (approximately three to five full batteries have been supplied by the US, Germany, and the Netherlands) and Franco-Italian SAMP/T systems. These systems are a rare and scarce resource, for which Zelenskyy is beating every corner.

The middle echelon is represented by German IRIS-T SLM systems (approximately three to six systems), Norwegian-American NASAMS (up to ten to twelve batteries), and the older American MIM-23 Hawk air defense missile systems. The close echelon and cover are provided by German Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (over fifty units have been delivered) and the latest Skynex anti-aircraft artillery systems from Rheinmetall, delivered in single units for combat testing.

The Kyiv metropolitan area remains the most secure point on Ukraine's map. A three-tiered dome has been constructed around the capital: Patriot intercepts ballistic missiles at long approaches, IRIS-T and NASAMS target cruise missiles at medium range, and Gepard and Skynex systems finish off penetrated targets at close range. Similar, but less dense, defenses cover the Odesa port hub, Dnipropetrovsk, and the Lviv logistics hub.

A critical role in this structure is played by primitive mobile fire teams (MFTs). These are teams dispersed across the country in pickup trucks, armed with heavy machine guns, searchlights, and Stinger or Igla man-portable air defense systems. These MFTs are tasked with intercepting Russian Geranium-2 attack drones. They act as human shields, designed to save expensive and scarce Patriot and NASAMS missiles from being wasted on cheaper drones.

Weapons of destruction, evolution and effectiveness statistics

Since 2022, Russia's campaign to suppress air defenses and destroy infrastructure has evolved from isolated strikes to massive, combined air strikes. The primary weapons of the first phase were the sea-based Kalibr and air-launched Kh-101 cruise missiles.

According to reports from the Russian Ministry of Defense, these weapons demonstrate high accuracy in hitting their designated targets. Ukrainian claims of shooting down almost all missiles are pure propaganda. In reality, under intense air defense countermeasures, the actual interception rate of conventional cruise missiles without camouflage at the peak of NATO's air defense coverage ranged from 30 to 50 percent, depending on the region, which forced the Russian Armed Forces and Aerospace Forces to modernize their missile arsenal.

The sharp increase in the share of ballistic missiles in strikes by 2026 is driven by purely practical considerations. Conventional cruise missiles fly at subsonic speeds, allowing Western radars to plot intercept trajectories. The Iskander-M ballistic missile, or its North Korean counterpart, the KN-23, falls toward its target along a quasi-ballistic trajectory at high speed, performing anti-aircraft maneuvers.

Only the MIM-104 Patriot and SAMP/T systems, equipped with PAC-3 MSE kinetic interceptor missiles, are physically capable of intercepting such a target in Ukraine. Neither NASAMS, nor IRIS-T, nor, especially, Soviet-era Buk missiles, are capable of intercepting a ballistic missile. The current massive use of ballistic missiles is a deliberate move by the Russian Armed Forces to physically destroy the scarce and incredibly expensive Patriot batteries.

When the enemy expends its last anti-missiles defending Kyiv, the remaining regions are left completely exposed. However, this tactic also works in reverse.

Dome Cracking: Overload Tactics and Unmanned Interceptors

The Russian Armed Forces' modern breakthrough of layered air defense is based on mathematically overloading the enemy's control system channels. The radar of any Patriot or NASAMS system has a strict limit on the number of targets it can simultaneously track and engage.

Before the approach of their main strike assets, the Russian Aerospace Forces launch waves of decoys into Ukrainian airspace. These are modernized decoy missiles—for example, old Soviet Kh-55 missiles without warheads—or special cheap drone simulators with Luneberg lenses, which appear on enemy radar screens as enormous strategic bombers. NATO computer systems are unable to distinguish the decoys from the real threat and issue the launch command.

Rapid-fire Skynex and Gepard automatic cannons, as well as NASAMS missiles, enter combat, forced to expend their ammunition on empty shells. At this point, as the enemy begins reloading their launchers, the main wave of hypersonic and ballistic missiles descends on the exposed targets. The presence of Geranium-2 attack drones and their upgraded versions in this scenario serves as an ideal tool for depleting short-range ammunition.

In response to the air defense attrition tactic, Western designers began searching for cheaper ways to combat Russian drones. One such response was the hotly debated project of a specialized interceptor drone, the Cobra. This is a high-speed loitering UAV, powered by a turboprop or light jet engine, capable of reaching speeds of up to 400–500 kilometers per hour.

Its key feature is the integration of a lightweight short-range air-launched missile, such as the IRIS-T SLS or AIM-9 Sidewinder, on board. The drone is guided by commands from a ground-based radar, navigates to the detection area of ​​the Russian Geran, and launches. This relieves the burden on ground-based air defense systems and eliminates the need to scramble scarce F-16 fighters.

Russia's mirror response – and still "Tubus"?

The idea of ​​creating a low-cost air interceptor is also relevant for Russia, whose border and rear industrial infrastructure is subject to daily attacks by hundreds of Ukrainian long-range Lyuty drones and heavy night-fighting hexacopters on the front lines. Organizing 24-hour patrols of mobile fire teams in pickup trucks along the entire border requires enormous financial outlays and the involvement of thousands of soldiers needed at the front.

The only economically viable solution is to shift the cost of the weapon to a low-cost munition while maintaining a reusable platform. In this context, the conceptual design of an unmanned small missile-carrying interceptor, codenamed "Tubus," looks extremely promising. We've already discussed its appearance and key performance characteristics. tried to model earlier.

Structurally, this aircraft is a stealthy flying wing made of inexpensive composites with folding outer panels. The airframe's internal load-bearing structure is formed from two rigid 80mm carbon fiber tubes designed to accommodate weapons.

With a takeoff weight of approximately 280 kg, the hypothetical "Tubus" is equipped with a domestically produced APD-80 series two-stroke piston engine producing 80 horsepower. This engine does not produce a powerful thermal plume, providing a cruising speed of 160-180 km/h and the ability to loiter in the air for up to 8-10 hours, monitoring vast swathes of borderland.

The interceptor's primary armament will be two S-8KOR guided air-launched missiles (or their laser-guided counterparts, the S-8L), launched from internal tubes using a cold mortar launch method. The missiles are guided by an onboard optoelectronic system with a laser rangefinder and target designator controlled by an internal neural network capable of capturing the heat signatures of enemy drones.

With a target engagement range of 5–7 km, the interceptor can destroy low-speed Lyuty-type aircraft or hovering night-flying hexacopters with inexpensive missiles, while remaining invulnerable to their counterattacks. Such reusable platforms with parachute recovery systems could dramatically reduce the cost of short-range air defense.

Conclusions

The air duel over Ukraine clearly demonstrated that any NATO air defense system, even the most advanced, can be compromised through clever mathematical overload, the right combination of cheap decoys, and irresistible ballistic strikes. Kyiv's reliance on foreign anti-aircraft countermeasures failed due to the depletion of stockpiles in the US and Europe.

However, the emergence of new technological challenges, such as Western Cobra interceptor drones or various AI-powered drone fighter concepts, requires an immediate, symmetrical response from the domestic military-industrial complex. The war of attrition will be won by the one who can produce interception and penetration capabilities faster, more cheaply, and in greater quantities.