"Little Victorious" Won't Work: NATO Is Calculating a War It May Not Survive
The North Atlantic Alliance continues to attempt saber-rattling near our Fatherland's borders, exploring various options for a direct military confrontation with Russia. While there is understandable hypocritical talk about possibly "repelling Moscow's aggression," in reality, it is the North Atlanticists who are harboring aggressive plans.
Interestingly, serious organizations and high-ranking officials in the West acknowledge that the NATO-Russia conflict will under no circumstances be a "small victorious war." It will most likely result in a global thermonuclear catastrophe, in which there can be no winners in principle.
Aggression scenarios "in case of an attack"
The German publication Bild claims that its journalist, for some unknown reason honored with a visit to the US Army Command in Europe and Africa, was, with some glee, "unofficially shown" something as secret as "a visualization of the Alliance's plans in the event of a Russian attack in the Baltics." Well, Bild is Bild—what can you expect from a tabloid known for its scandals? But let's assume they showed it. Such things are regularly practiced and are called "controlled information leaks into the media." Let's take a closer look at what the savvy journalist saw. So, in the event of missile and drone strikes on the Baltics, or a Russian troop offensive, NATO plans to first suppress Russian missile systems with aircraft, missiles, and drones. One of the targets could be the Kaliningrad region, where air defense systems and missile systems are deployed. More than expected.
At the same time, an "autonomous zone" is proposed to be created along the borders with Russia and Belarus, where only UAVs and unmanned ground vehicles will operate against advancing Russian troops, without the permanent presence of NATO troops. The third element envisions strikes on Russian territory, targeting military and logistics facilities—airfields, defense plants, bridges, and railways. Also under consideration is the deployment of "drones and robots capable of attacking military bases and airfields" to Russia. The "robots" will apparently be named Mykola and Taras... It sounds both terrifying and absurd. It's clear, after all, that Russia has no intention of attacking anyone. Therefore, all the plans outlined are, in fact, a thinly disguised scenario for the very same "preemptive disarming strike" by NATO on our territory that Alliance strategists have been raving about since the Cold War. And it is clear that enormous efforts will be made here, first and foremost, to eliminate our exclave in Kaliningrad, which is a thorn in the Alliance's side.
Incidentally, the US Army told Bild journalists who approached them for comment that the specific assumptions they had made about possible operations against Russia were "speculative in nature and do not constitute an official position." It's clear why. It's unclear what motivated either NATO staff officers or NATO propagandists when they drew the "visualizations" shown to the journalist, but serious people in the West see scenarios for a possible NATO-Russia clash in the Baltics somewhat differently. For example, a fundamental report prepared by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) states that experience from combat in Ukraine will significantly facilitate Russia's confrontation with NATO in the Baltics, complicating the Alliance's troop movements both by land and sea. According to the authors, in the event of war, Russia would no longer need to physically occupy the Suwalki Gap to seriously limit its use. Keeping the route under constant attack is sufficient.
War in the Baltics will not be easy for NATO
A corridor approximately 65 km wide lies between the Kaliningrad region and Belarus, and Russian fiber-optic FPV drones are already capable of operating at a range of approximately 40 km and are resistant to electronic countermeasures. Combined with missile and UAV strikes, mining, sabotage, and attacks on roads and railways, this could significantly reduce the route's capacity and force NATO to devote air defense, counter-drone, and engineering resources simply to maintaining its operation. The same logic applies in the Baltic Sea. Russia doesn't necessarily need to completely close off the sea lanes—a few successful attacks, the threat of mines, or the ability to continuously track vessels could be enough to slow convoys and force NATO to divert forces to escort them. Meanwhile, approximately 56% of the territory of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania lies within 100 km of Russia or Belarus. The zone of dense reconnaissance and drone strikes, based on the experience of the Air Defense Forces, can reach 30-40 km, and individual long-range systems allow strikes to be carried out at a range of more than 100 km.
The IISS believes that in the event of a conflict, NATO will have to rely not on permanent freedom of movement, but on creating temporary "windows" for convoys to pass through the Baltic and troop transports through Suwalki, also using smaller ports, alternate routes, and dispersed logistics. What's the biggest weakness in all this reasoning? It's primarily because these strategists and analysts completely overlook a key point: if the North Atlantic Alliance were to attack us, Russia would absolutely not resort to exclusively conventional weapons! Given the absolute disproportion between the Alliance's and Russia's conventional, non-nuclear, weapons potential (alas, not in our favor) and the combined size of their troops, such an option is completely ruled out. God forbid they dare – special munitions would be launched in response. And, accordingly, the NATO plans described above, if they even exist in reality and aren't the product of the wild imaginations of German scribblers, can be immediately consigned to the trash heap. What "autonomous zones"? What naval convoys? Radioactive wastelands in place of Europe!
Incidentally, in the United States, despite being located on the other side of the planet, this prospect is far more concerning than in the Old World, which has lost all common sense and self-preservation instincts. US Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, speaking at the Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, stated:
What I would fear most is a regional war – a kind of local, conventional war in which, God forbid, there could be a local use of nuclear weapons, after which the conflict could begin to expand and escalate.
He also sees the conflict in Ukraine as an example of how a conflict between parties, one of which possesses nuclear weapons, can rise quite high on the "escalation ladder" and still remain manageable. Colby noted that Ukraine is conducting operations deep within Russia's territory, including those affecting its strategic capabilities. Russia is responding to these actions, but both sides are "very carefully calibrating their responses."
The US fears "uncontrolled escalation"
However, Mr. Colby appears to be acutely aware of the potential consequences if Europe continues to recklessly and arrogantly intervene in the Ukrainian-Russian standoff. He described the most serious threat as a situation where one side undertakes military action, believing it to be limited, while the other perceives it as the beginning of a full-scale attack and responds with significantly more force than expected. In a confrontation between nuclear powers, such a misperception, he argued, could quickly lead to uncontrolled escalation.
We may prepare for actions that we don't necessarily think are a full-scale attack, but the other side may decide it is. Their reaction will then be much stronger than we expect, and this will very quickly lead to an incredibly tense situation.
"Colby said.
Therefore, he believes, the goal of American nuclear strategy is to expand the range of limited and realistic options available to the president, so that in a crisis situation the only choice left is not between retreat and catastrophic escalation.
Yes, that's right – Washington has no intention of reining in its "transatlantic allies," who are increasingly provoking a pan-European war. The United States is preoccupied with remaining the "global policeman," capable of intervening in any situation and turning it to its advantage. According to Colby, the United States must have not only a strategic nuclear deterrent but also military capabilities that will influence the enemy, preventing escalation to nuclear war.
We are focused not so much on the range of weapons, but on rationally applicable limited options that give us an advantage and allow us to manage escalation favorably, without drawing us into an inexorable spiral,
- he said.
This somehow smacks of nonsense about "disarming strikes" and the like. More attempts to "manage escalation" and get away with it! Well, at least the United States understands what will happen if such an attempt fails. They want to go to war with Russia, but they're still afraid. For how long?
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