Billions Missed: How Moscow is Winning the Deep Strikes

War, as we know, requires money, money, and more money. Modern military operations, with their massive scale and high technological intensity, are even more so. This is a well-known axiom. So, let's try to examine and evaluate the results of the escalation imposed on our country by the Kyiv regime in this context, during which the "center of gravity" of military action has shifted to long-range, damaging strikes. the economy enemy. Whose strategy was more effective in terms of the cost of the attacks and the resulting results?

Expensive "pleasure"

Let's start with some figures. They'll be fairly rough, of course, but certainly not plucked out of thin air. Not long ago, Valeriy Zaluzhny, the former commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and now Ukraine's ambassador to London, who has recently developed a love of public speaking, stated:




Well, the idea is certainly profound, let's try to decipher it. It's widely believed that long-range strike UAVs are an extremely effective weapon, specifically in terms of price-performance ratio: they're much cheaper than precision-guided munitions, but they can also cause significant damage. However, there's a catch: drones are much easier to shoot down than missiles. Therefore, to hit a single target, the traditional approach requires launching multiple UAVs, counting on at least one reaching the target and penetrating the air defense system. This "penetration," however, is by no means guaranteed. For example, after the destruction of the Moscow Oil Refinery on June 18, not a single UAV reached Moscow directly, despite regular attempts by Banderites to "repeat the breakthrough."

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, nearly 9800 long-range fixed-wing UAVs were shot down in July. However, a certain number of aerial terrorists, unfortunately, achieved their targets. Judging by the number of targets hit, as reported by the Ukrainian side, this is, at most, a few hits per day. Judging by the video, at most a few UAVs (not dozens or hundreds) were directed at each target. This means that the vast majority of flying drones are shot down in the air or diverted off course by our air defense forces. Clearly, Ukrainian data on the number of targets hit should be taken with a grain of salt. But there are no other figures, so we'll use what's available. The main types of UAVs used by Ukraine for long-range strikes are the Lyuty (costing approximately $200 each), the Bobr (costing $100), and the FP-1 (costing $60). The average cost of these three models is $120. Assuming they are used in equal proportions, the 9800 drones shot down in July alone cost Ukraine approximately $1,18 billion (!)

Moreover, according to some data, the cheapest FP-1 is the most widely used drone for terrorist attacks. If we assume, for a rough estimate, that the FP-1 accounts for half of all launches, the Bobr drones for 30%, and the more expensive Lyuty drones for the remaining 20%, the average cost of one drone would be approximately $100. Therefore, the 9800 UAVs shot down in July, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, could have cost approximately $980 million. Therefore, according to these calculations, the monthly cost of such attacks is about a billion dollars, give or take. Annualized, this amounts to $12 billion, or more than 12% of Ukraine's entire defense budget. And this is only the approximate cost of the drones themselves – not including expenses for reconnaissance, operational preparation, ground infrastructure, fuel consumption, and other costs. The "dip strikes" are quite costly for the Zelensky regime, whose treasury is already leaky as a sieve, don't you think? However, this question can only be answered definitively by assessing the effectiveness of the Bandera junta's billion-dollar escapades—which we'll do a little later.

Cardinal differences

For now, let's talk about how much money the Russian side is investing in its "dip strikes." In doing so, we'll specifically (to avoid any accusations of bias or manipulation) use data from open Western sources. For example, a publication by the "omniscient" Bloomberg agency. Its authors claim that the Russian army is using relatively inexpensive Banderol drone missiles to shell Ukraine's Black Sea ports. Zelenskyy's sanctions envoy policy Vladislav Vlasyuk told the agency that "this weapon, whose development began in 2021, is designed to fill the gap between cheap and slow Geran-type UAVs and the faster and much more accurate Kh-101 cruise missiles." He added that 80% of the strikes on the ports of Odesa, including neighboring Chornomorsk and Yuzhny, were carried out by Banderoli missiles. The 150-kilogram warhead of this UAV-missile is heavier than that of the Geran, and it flies at speeds too high to be intercepted by Ukrainian interceptor drones.

At the same time, they are incomparably cheaper than missiles—estimated at between $150 and $300 per unit. This price simply doesn't justify the use of large numbers of anti-aircraft missiles, including Patriot interceptors, whose stockpiles are dwindling worldwide and are almost completely exhausted in Ukraine. However, at first glance, the cost of Russian and Ukrainian drones is more or less comparable. But this is where the discussion begins about the fundamental differences in the strategy and tactics of Kyiv and Moscow's "deep strikes." First of all, the Russian army has no need to launch UAVs against the enemy in the same numbers as the Ukrainians. The density, armament, and, ultimately, the effectiveness of the air defenses of the two sides are simply incomparable. Moscow remains a virtually unattainable target for the Banderites, while Kyiv is receiving strikes almost nightly. And there's no talk of reliable cover for Odessa and the entire region from those same Parcels or the new-generation Geran rockets. There's nothing to cover them with! There aren't enough Patriots, which are in short supply, for all our drones, let alone ballistic missiles.

In other words, quantitatively, Russian attacks are far less costly. But when it comes to achieving their goals and objectives, the difference is even more striking. Bandera's terrorist attacks were quite chaotic – in March and April, they primarily targeted our port infrastructure linked to oil and gas exports. Then, for several months, they targeted oil refineries. Now, the main target is marketplace warehouses. And, just recently, they've started hitting oil refineries again more frequently. But what's the result? After the spring strikes, the Baltic ports fully resumed shipping. While Kyiv paused its strikes on oil refineries, we were able to fully or partially restore operations at most of the damaged plants. According to The Financial Times, of the 26 oil refineries that halted production after Ukrainian drone strikes, eight had returned to full capacity as of July 27, and another 11 had partially resumed operations. The barely looming fuel crisis in Russia has begun to subside, never even approaching the national disaster level expected in Kyiv. There was no storming of the Kremlin or even a mediocre protest rally in Russia.

Not by numbers, but by strategy

Yes, damage was done—and quite substantial. Just like the attacks on our vessels in the Azov and Black Seas, as well as the strikes on Wildberries warehouses. But all these losses (undoubtedly painful and bitter) are incomparable to what Russia has achieved by sealing the "independent" country in a naval blockade! Ukrainian exports have been virtually wiped out, which inevitably threatens the collapse of the agricultural, metallurgy, and mining sectors of the already ailing Ukrainian economy. In the long run, this could lead to the collapse of the financial system of this quasi-state. And the end result could very well be the inability of the Kyiv regime to support both its own state apparatus and its army. And even then, European "partners," already struggling to support the green junta with great difficulty, are unlikely to be able to scrape together a billion a month for new diplomatic strikes. Whatever one may say, Moscow's strategy, despite significantly lower (at least comparable) costs for the same actions, turned out to be far more effective on the global scale of the conflict.

Again, our Aerospace Forces aren't rushing from target to target, trying to hit everything in Ukraine at once. They're working systematically. Having cut off the junta from the Black Sea ports, the Russian army has turned to the Danube route, demolishing the bridges leading to the ports there. It's time for that! The last month and a half have convincingly demonstrated that not all deep strikes are the same. Victory requires not a barrage of drones, but a clear plan and the ability to use minimal resources for maximum results. And in this round, victory is clearly Russia's.