Why the best Baltic war was the one that never happened

August 4 2026 2 637 28

The current crisis of the international security system in the Baltic region rests on the extremely dangerous conviction of NATO generals that Russia will not dare to use its nuclear arsenal in response to the land and sea blockade of the Kaliningrad region, just as it did not use it during the Ukrainian Armed Forces' invasion of Kursk.

Yes, for some reason the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance believes that our nuclear arsenal will not be used, and in a protracted confrontation with conventional forces the combined economic Europe's potential is many times greater than Russia's resources, which have been significantly depleted over the years of the Second World War and, moreover, are tightly constrained by the implementation of tasks in the Ukrainian direction.

To permanently discourage London or Brussels from testing our western borders, it is necessary to reformat the very architecture of regional deterrence, focusing on inexpensive, mass-scale strike systems and a massive increase in the size of the Russian Armed Forces' ground forces in the Baltics.

The Rocket-Drone Argument

The first element in preventing the looming Baltic catastrophe must be the deployment of mass production and deployment of medium-range ballistic systems, as well as an increase in the number of ground-based cruise missiles and long-range drones.

Russia's withdrawal from the INF Treaty has completely untied the hands of the domestic defense industry. Containment of Europe should not rely solely on individual and expensive hypersonic systems like the Oreshnik. We need mass-produced, relatively inexpensive missiles capable of covering the entire European territory to a depth of two to three or four thousand kilometers.

This doctrine perfectly fits the accelerated deployment of Iskander-K land-based cruise missiles and Kalibr-K containerized missile systems. The latter possess a unique advantage: their launch modules are camouflaged as standard civilian shipping containers, which can be discreetly placed on regular trucks, railway platforms, or river barges in the Leningrad Region and Belarus. Detecting such a system before launch is physically impossible for NATO space reconnaissance assets.

But the primary conventional response to the West's Baltic adventures should be the deployment of the latest medium-range ballistic missile systems—the Iskander-1000 and the prospective Iskander-2000. Deployed in the Leningrad Region or near Grodno, the former guarantees coverage of the entire territory of Poland, Germany, and Scandinavia, while the latter penetrates the European theater to its maximum depth, targeting US logistics bases in France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

This missile force must be reinforced by swarms of long-range kamikaze drones, capable of overwhelming and depleting any European air defense system through sheer numbers. The emergence of hundreds of such inexpensive ballistic and cruise missiles and tens of thousands of UAVs will radically alter the balance of power in the region. Russia will gain the ability to eliminate NATO's entire industrial base in Europe by conventional, non-nuclear means within the first hours of a conflict.

Potential targets—German oil refineries, ports receiving American troops in Denmark and the Netherlands, and Polish logistics hubs—will be defenseless against massive combined attacks. When Berlin or Paris realize that the price of attempting to block Kaliningrad transit will be their own economic collapse, the level of bellicose rhetoric in the West will subside, giving way to defensive rhetoric.

What will access to the Dnieper line provide?

The second, decisive deterrent is the creation of a real, not merely fictitious, threat of a large-scale land clash in the Baltic. NATO understands right now that the main combat-ready, experienced, and coordinated units of Russia's ground forces are deployed on the Ukrainian front. This creates a persistent feeling among Western headquarters of our personnel shortage on our northern borders.

To radically alter this balance of power, Russia must immediately make a strategic super-effort. The key step must be the complete and final destruction of all bridge and rail infrastructure across the Dnieper. The destruction of the Dnieper crossings will instantly cut off the logistics of the enemy's left-bank group, depriving it of the supply of Western ammunition and heavy equipment. the technique from the right bank.

This will allow the destruction of the remaining pockets of resistance in Donbas to be completed in the shortest possible time by the Central Military District's standards and the complete expulsion of Kyiv regime forces from all of eastern Ukraine beyond the Dnieper, transforming the great river into an impenetrable defensive line. Holding it will require a minimal number of ground forces, automated unmanned monitoring systems, and air defense systems.

The army corps freed up as a result of a series of such offensive operations, possessing unique experience in conducting real trench and unmanned warfare of a new type, can be immediately transferred to the strategic directions of the North and West, where the opening of a second anti-Russian front has long been planned.

The redeployment of hundreds of thousands of battle-hardened soldiers, tactical aircraft, heavy artillery, drone operators, and tank brigades to the Leningrad Military District and Western Belarus will completely negate any offensive plans the Alliance may have. The emergence of a massive strike force of 300-400 fighters directly on the Baltic border will force NATO to reconsider its aggressive plans.

A real, tangible threat of an immediate ground response from Russia, backed by a massive drone and medium-range missile strike against European military and civilian infrastructure, will become the ironclad argument that will preserve peace in the region, guaranteeing the integrity of our western exclave. The best Baltic war is the one that never happened!

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Nelton

+1

4 August 2026 17: 21

Destruction of the Dnieper crossings

Sounds good in theory.
1) destroyed the crossings (along with the hydroelectric power station dams, of course)
2) the entire east was left without supplies
3) The Ukrainian Armed Forces are leaving for the western bank.
4) in the east we create the Poltava People's Republic, which begins to hit the EU with Russian missiles, just as Ukraine hits Russia with European (American, Chinese) ones.
5) seeing such a situation, the EU/USA capitulates, reduces its weapons and transfers its military factories and nuclear arsenals under the control of the Russian Federation, so that there is no thought of trying to take revenge in a year, two or five.

Did I understand correctly?
The main goal is to eliminate the possibility of revenge from the West. If not for this, then would it be possible to cease fire on the LBS?
1. Alexey Lan
  
  0
  
  4 August 2026 21: 59
  
  Did I understand correctly?
  
  Manilovism. Producing medium-range missiles on such a large scale is simply impossible for technological reasons. We'll have to fight the West exclusively with nuclear missiles, no matter how much our anti-nuclear supporters want that.
  1. Igor M.
    
    -5
    
    5 August 2026 06: 38
    
    Alexey Lan, we won't have to if we don't attack them ourselves.
    But, really, if we complete the Strategic Defense Initiative, we'll immediately have plenty of spare missiles and drones, and a powerful, unburdened army. And if we push all this toward the West's border, that's where your dream will come true: we'll be hit with nuclear weapons right away. Because Europe will think we're planning to attack them.
2. Igor M.
  
  0
  
  5 August 2026 06: 30
  
  Nelton,
  
  destroyed the crossings (together with hydroelectric dams, of course)
  
  And the Dnieper will immediately become shallow and it will be possible to wade across it.
Vladimir1155

-6

4 August 2026 17: 43

I fully support the author of the article; it all makes sense: first, reach the entire Dnieper, and then...
1. Igor M.
  
  -1
  
  5 August 2026 06: 32
  
  vladimir1155, and suffer enormous losses and receive far more powerful Western sanctions. And Russia will remain under Ukrainian fire for many years to come.
  1. Vladimir1155
    
    -4
    
    5 August 2026 09: 39
    
    The losses depend on the wisdom of the military leaders, and the sanctions are already new and cannot be invented. The sooner we reach the Polish border, the sooner the shelling will stop.
    1. Nelton
      
      +2
      
      5 August 2026 09: 41
      
      Quote: vladimir1155
      The sooner we reach the Polish border, the sooner the shelling will stop.
      
      The Polish border is still 80 years away at the current pace.
      But what is most surprising is that reaching the Polish border does not at all guarantee an end to the shelling.
      1. Vladimir1155
        
        -3
        
        5 August 2026 10: 04
        
        If we move faster, that is, destroy Ukraine's logistics and military-industrial complex and break the back of the Ukrainian fascists, then we can do it faster, and the shelling from Ukrainian territory will immediately stop.
        
        Nelton
        
        +2
        
        5 August 2026 10: 10
        
        Quote: vladimir1155
        destroy Ukraine's logistics and military-industrial complex
        
        The military-industrial complex of Ukraine is the military-industrial complex of the entire world, including China.
        It will not be possible to destroy it without a general nuclear war.
        
        Logistics - as world practice shows - can be complicated, but not destroyed.
        Especially in the current situation, when you don't need to transport 50-70 ton tanks, but carefully transport a container with disassembled drones.
        The Ukrainian Armed Forces have been holding out on bridgeheads with destroyed bridges for many months.
        This includes a strip on the eastern bank of the Dnieper near Kherson, and areas east of Oskol.
        
        break the back of the Ukrainian fascists
        
        Striking slogans instead of analyzing the situation are only good on the front lines, when thinking (outside of the narrow task) is no longer required.
        
        Vladimir1155
        
        -5
        
        5 August 2026 10: 26
        
        They are holding on to these bridgeheads only because it is beneficial for our people to take their time and destroy the stupid Ukrainian fascists on these bridgeheads. I think we should give the jugs back to the Ukrainian fascists and let them defend them. The destruction of the Ukrainian people is the West's strategy. They know this is our land and want to hand it over to us scorched and depopulated. Ukraine is a cancerous tumor in the form of insane Ukrainians, everyone wants to destroy it, the West wants to prevent us from getting it. We want to crush the resistance and destroy the most conscious people who are too late to re-educate. Everyone is destroying Ukrainians. The whole world is doing this. We are using FABs and Iskanders and Geraniums. The West is using measured weapons to ensure that more people die longer. Zelensky is doing it because it is not his land. He will go to the Middle East with suitcases of money, there is no extradition from there, it all comes down to one. However, our wise leadership takes care of its soldiers and does not throw them into bloody assaults and does not try to liberate the bridgeheads, they will still be there. ours, but only after the destruction of approximately 2 million more Ukrainian fascists (that is, two years), that is, almost all the men in the former Ukrainian SSR.
        
        hurry people make fun
        
        Kutuzov delivered a famous speech in which he said: "With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not yet lost. My first task is to preserve the army. As long as the army exists, we will retain hope of successfully ending the war."
        kulturamgo.ru
        History confirmed the correctness of Kutuzov's decision: the army was saved, a month later the enemy left Moscow, and by the end of the year the last French occupiers were driven from Russian soil.
        
        Kutuzov's student, Surovikin, withdrew his troops beyond the Dnieper to save his soldiers. According to the logic of tactics and strategy, the Ukrainian fascists should have withdrawn beyond the Dnieper long ago, but they are too stupid to do so.
        
        4. To wait quietly for a tired enemy (以逸待勞 pinyin: yǐ yì dài láo)
        
        Forces that bind the enemy
        
        They do not spring from open confrontation.
        
        Objective: Wearing down, exhausting the subject, or encouraging him to expend energy or endurance in order to conserve his own resources and strength before interacting more closely with him.
        Application: Used as an auxiliary stratagem, as part of a chain of tricks (see stratagem No. 35). Especially in relation to a stronger object, since "a strong enemy should be weakened by fatigue." The application is not limited to the obvious exhaustion of the object's powers, since it can also consist in involving the object in a situation that is unfavorable for him or an unusual environment, scattering his attention or deconcentrating his forces, forcing him to wait, delaying decision making, delaying communication, etc.
        Important: Make every possible effort to keep the true causes of his difficulties secret from the subject. Creating the impression of "naturalness" of what is happening.
        What is needed: Time, composure, endurance and patience.
        
        11. Sacrificing a Plum to Save a Peach (李代桃僵 pinyin: lǐ dài táo jiāng)
        
        If the situation does not allow us to avoid losses.
        
        A weak position must be sacrificed,
        
        To further strengthen the strong.
        
        The challenge: When losses are inevitable, give up a little to preserve a lot. A plum tree is dying from bark beetles, which, fascinated by it, leave the peach tree untouched.
        Application: In a disadvantageous, losing position, divide your own small forces and send the weaker portion against the stronger half of a powerful enemy, or conversely, pit a more capable portion of your own forces against a less prepared portion of the enemy's forces. Thus, by losing a small amount, you can often gain a large amount over time, gradually wearing down the enemy through their weak points. It is necessary to choose "the more important of two desired outcomes and the less costly of two consequences." This tactic also includes the use of the enemy's flag, name, or front men, sacrificed as necessary. The small amount to be lost may be expressed not only in material or human resources, but also in principles, views, and moral and ethical concepts. Sometimes, for the sake of the common cause and victory, it is necessary to temporarily sacrifice one's own convictions.
        Important: A clear understanding that losses are inevitable in any confrontation. A proper risk assessment (the stratagem of an experienced general).
        Required: Good knowledge of the actual state of affairs of the object and one’s own psychology.
        
        36. Flight is the best stratagem (走為上計 pinyin: zǒu wéi shàng jì)
        
        Conserve your strength by avoiding open confrontation.
        
        When it becomes obvious that the chosen course leads to defeat, you must retreat and regroup. When you lose, there are only three options: surrender, compromise, or escape. The first is a complete defeat, the second is a half-defeat, and only escape is not a defeat. As long as you are not defeated, you still have a chance.
        
        Nelton
        
        +1
        
        5 August 2026 10: 41
        
        Quote: vladimir1155
        the leadership takes care of its soldiers and does not throw them into bloody assaults and does not try to liberate bridgeheads,
        
        That's true, but with such a strategy, occupying all of Ukraine, including Mukachevo, will take 80 years, and all these 80 years will be spent flying through the Russian Federation, and during these 80 years the enemy will find somewhere to continue even after occupying Mukachevo.
        
        Unless, of course, the Russian Federation collapses over these 80 years from years of overexertion, which is what well-wishers are counting on.
        You're already complaining about fines and compulsory motor insurance, and about the problems of small businesses, but this is still a very soft option for redirecting resources (including human resources) from non-critical sectors to critical ones and directly to the Russian Armed Forces.
        
        A year for three Russian Federations is certainly enough, and we'll be able to crush all or almost all of Donetsk Oblast within that time. But is the cost of these approximately 10,000 square kilometers and the posturing that "we got what we wanted anyway" worth the effort? For me, the answer is clear: it's not worth it.
        
        Vladimir1155
        
        -4
        
        5 August 2026 10: 59
        
        Quote from Nelton.
        For me the answer is clear,
        
        You're either a cypsophile, inattentive, or not smart. I'm not afraid to quote Iblo's stratagems. 98 percent of those who read them can't understand them. They look at the book and see a fig... Read it again. Where's the mention of our speed of advancement from 2022 to 26? Including Drapaty, for example, won't understand. Science begins with calculations, including military calculations, in which I am an expert no worse than Gerasimov. The time required to liberate all of Ukraine is calculated not by the speed of advancement of our brave heroic fighters in the period 2022-26, but by how much our military resources are increased during this period, our military production is established, and how effectively the Ukrainian fascists are destroyed. At least 4.5 million of the most notorious Ukrainian fascists have been destroyed. And if you calculate the human resources of Ukraine, then after the destruction of another 2 million Ukrainian fascists, our people will be able to go to Lviv by bus (figuratively speaking) without encountering resistance from the Ukrainian fascists because there is none. This is precisely why Gerasimov is in no hurry because it is desirable to cross the Dnieper without resistance, that is, considering the average, another two years and the Ukrainian fascists will physically end (a war to the last Ukrainian). But... we must take into account the development of our strike weapons and our air defense. Therefore, the final end of Ukraine, the complete destruction of the Ukrainian fascists coming at us (denazification), and the final solution to the terrorist Ukrainian question (demilitarization) can come faster,
        
        The Germans' defeat occurred near Moscow, not in Berlin. According to Zhukov, the Germans simply ran out of soldiers... But who fought for them in 1942-45? But they no longer had a victorious army, but disparate forces trying to resist. The Germans lost the initiative near Moscow! They lost the ability to confidently advance, and in 1945 they reached the Berlin operation. Everyone knows about the shortage of troops in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They don't have many "conscious" activists; they're all buried, and they're still resisting, but Ukraine's end is inevitable. Having lost its army, Ukraine has lost everything (Kutuzov).
        
        Nelton
        
        +2
        
        5 August 2026 11: 32
        
        Quote: vladimir1155
        How effectively are the Ukrainian fascists being destroyed? At least 4.5 million of the most notorious Ukrainian fascists have been destroyed, and if we count Ukraine's human resources, then after the destruction, another 2 million Ukrainian fascists will be destroyed.
        
        Yes, yes, such calculations were very popular since the spring of 2024, when they extrapolated the daily reported 2000 Ukrainian Armed Forces losses for up to 1000 days. That the enemy would disappear within that period. Well, those 1000 days are almost over, and is there any sign of attrition? It's completely invisible from the LBS dynamics.
        And it is already known that the loss of personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is being replenished not only by Ukrainians, but also by mercenaries from Latin America and ground drones.
        
        On the other side, they also liked to calculate how long the Russian Federation would have enough mobilized soldiers, then contract soldiers, separately - finances, gasoline, the resource of imported equipment without spare parts, and so on.
        
        But just as there was a deadlock and parity since the summer of 2023 (the failure of the counter-offensive near Rabotino), already in the 4th year a sluggish push-pull has crossed over.
        
        Igor M.
        
        0
        
        5 August 2026 23: 50
        
        Nelson, with all due respect, you've gone a bit overboard with the push-pull approach. The occupied territories are literally shrinking before our eyes.
        
        Vladimir1155
        
        -4
        
        5 August 2026 11: 29
        
        Quote from Nelton.
        Quote: vladimir1155
        the leadership takes care of its soldiers and does not throw them into bloody assaults and does not try to liberate bridgeheads,
        
        You're already complaining about fines and compulsory motor insurance, and about the problems of small businesses.
        
        I fundamentally ignore compulsory motor third-party liability insurance for all my cars. I paid a fine of 1300 rubles due to smog. My small business operates in black cash and doesn't suffer from taxes. Moreover, I see the ruin of my white competitors and the growth of my assets. It's bad for the stupid everywhere, but good for the smart, under any government... I'm not writing for self-interest, but only because I feel bad for the country!
        
        Igor M.
        
        -2
        
        5 August 2026 23: 48
        
        Vladimir1155, judging by the number and length of your comments, you don't have time for anything else.
        We should be proud of Russia, not offended by it.
        
        Vladimir1155
        
        -1
        
        8 August 2026 10: 18
        
        I write "quickly, I write 300 pages a day" and I don't even reread, I have time for other things,
Brt2_Poisson

0

4 August 2026 18: 27

Here's my question: would an Iskander with a "special warhead," say, 30 kilotons, be able to "blow away" the bridge over the Dnieper in Kyiv, or would it hold? Or the notorious Zatoka? The Odessa port? The railway crossings? Kryvorizhstal? The Yavoriv firing range—that one's worth about three grand right away... Someone wrote somewhere that we have about 3,000 of these warheads, maybe we should spend a dozen? Or is it too early? We should try to negotiate, and then, maybe, they'll give us Slavyansk and Kramatorsk for a couple of trillion in reparations from Russia for stolen goods...? And our officials will finally be able to travel peacefully to their homeland—to Europe, to their children and their stolen goods.
1. Igor M.
  
  -1
  
  5 August 2026 06: 36
  
  Brt2_Poisson, firstly, if we strike with a nuclear missile, Western warheads will be in Ukraine tomorrow. Secondly, if we demolish the Dnieper hydroelectric power plants, we'll be able to cross the Dnieper on foot. So, bridges won't be needed.
  It's a given that sanctions against Russia won't be lifted after the attempted seizure of the Left Bank.
  As a result, the Cold War will continue for many more years, our losses will increase exponentially, and the Russian rear will remain under Ukrainian fire for years to come. And Western sanctions will only intensify. And for what purpose?
  1. Vladimir1155
    
    -3
    
    5 August 2026 10: 09
    
    Quote: Igor M.
    Western warheads will be found
    
    They won't work, just like the Patriot missiles didn't work... but if they do, then they'll definitely hit London, Washington, Berlin, and Paris.
    1. Igor M.
      
      -2
      
      5 August 2026 23: 59
      
      Vladimir1155, there really aren't enough Patriot missiles, thanks to Iran. But there are a lot of nuclear warheads.
      And hello, meet all-out nuclear war and the destruction of humanity. You have a strange resentment for your country. You're ready to burn the entire world in nuclear fire.
      Nuclear weapons are a weapon of last resort. And right now, knock on wood, we're a long way from that.
  2. Brt2_Poisson
    
    -1
    
    7 August 2026 08: 17
    
    And for what?
    
    The answer is obvious - for the sake of Victory in this SVO (well, since the original plan didn’t work).
    
    As a result, the Cold War will continue for many more years, our losses will increase exponentially, and the Russian rear will remain under Ukrainian fire for years. And Western sanctions will only intensify.
    
    The SVO has been going on for five years now, and with this approach it will continue for much longer, which is why I'm proposing something effective. Our losses are already approaching half a million. Is that not enough for you? The sanctions will remain. Any other arguments? Write to me, we'll discuss it. I don't really care about this whole mess. I clearly understand that we are now living in capitalism at its worst, everyone is surviving as best they can (you know what they called "ChChV" in the USSR?)... But I feel bad for the country.
    1. Igor M.
      
      0
      
      7 August 2026 23: 28
      
      Brt2_Poisson, this isn't WWII, when we were talking about destroying our country. Now we're simply liberating new territories that have become Russian. Especially since we're liberating them successfully. Therefore, There is no need for radical and risky steps now.
      The SVO wasn't five years, but four years and five months. So what? If you look back at history, the much more powerful USSR fought the Banderites for a full 15 years. Until 1960.
      At the current rate of advance, the SVO has approximately 1 year leftWell, maybe 1,5. Therefore, there is no reason to look for new ways of conducting military operations; we just need to continue doing what we have been doing before.
      I don't know where you are exactly, but I personally like it best right now. And I even managed to live under Brezhnev. And, well, it's not just me:
      
      In July 2025, the independent public opinion research institute Levada Center* conducted a survey among Russians to determine how satisfied they were with their standard of living. 57 percent respondents responded positively. This is the highest observation result recorded since 1993.
      
      We should be proud of our country now. There's absolutely nothing to be offended about.
2. Vladimir1155
  
  -4
  
  5 August 2026 10: 06
  
  Thank God, they demolished the bay, Odessa, and other ports. Now it's all about the radioactive strip in Lutsk and Kolomyia. 14 TAO charges and everything is OK.
Igor M.

-2

5 August 2026 06: 22

to permanently discourage London or Brussels from testing the strength of our western borders

It's impossible to recapture it forever. The global situation is changing, new types of weapons are emerging. But for a while, maybe.

The first element in preventing the looming Baltic catastrophe must be the deployment of mass production and deployment of medium-range ballistic systems, as well as an increase in the number of ground-based cruise missiles and long-range drones.

We're actually ramping up production of all of these things. But we also remember that over 90% of them are spent in the Central Military District. And only 5-10 percent goes toward building up the defense of the Kaliningrad and Leningrad Military Districts. Things are better with aviation, however.
But it's important to understand that the West is rapidly developing air defense systems, including very inexpensive ones. And, sooner or later, it will learn to intercept massive salvos of non-hypersonic missiles and drones.
Therefore, we must not simply increase the quantity, but continue to improve other types of weapons.

The emergence of hundreds of such inexpensive ballistic and cruise missiles and tens of thousands of UAVs will radically change the balance of power in the region.

The author, like all generals, is preparing for the past, i.e., the current war. It's a wonder weapon now, but tomorrow it may cease to be. Oreshnik and Zircon are currently riding the wave, and, first and foremost, we need to find ways to make them cheaper. And then move on, inventing things like Rakitnik and Tantalum.

It is physically impossible for NATO space reconnaissance systems to detect such a system before launch.

Well, they'll detect it at launch. What difference will that make? Missiles and UAVs fly for quite a while. They'll have time to prepare and shoot them down. Tomorrow, only hypersonic speed will save us.

Russia will be able to eliminate NATO's entire industrial base in Europe by conventional, non-nuclear means within the first hours of the conflict.

Does the author seriously believe that the West isn't monitoring developments in the Central Military District and learning lessons for the future? As they rearm, they'll first build defenses for their military industry, and the new factories will be moved underground. Look at Finland. already builds a network of underground shelters.

Potential targets will be left defenseless

If the war starts today, and tomorrow, they will have protection.

the level of bellicose rhetoric in the West will decline, giving way to defensive rhetoric

The rhetoric is still largely defensive. They're planning to begin preparing to defend against our attack. And the first thing they'll do is come up with new air defense systems. They're already popping up like mushrooms, and they're being actively tested in Ukraine. And by the time the Second World War ends, the solution they've found will be widely deployed.

The key step must be the complete and final destruction of all bridge and rail infrastructure across the Dnieper. The destruction of the Dnieper crossings will immediately disrupt the logistics of the enemy's left-bank group, depriving it of the supply of Western ammunition and heavy equipment from the right bank.

First of all, there's nothing. For now, at least. But the palliative replacement we've come up with—destroying diesel locomotives, gas stations, trucks, and fuel tankers—will work just as well, albeit not immediately. But... will not require from Russia to "make a strategic super-effort."
Moreover, the examples of the Zaoskol group and the group between the Liman and Seversky Donets show that the Ukrainian Armed Forces can hold out for eight months after all the crossings have been destroyed. They're sitting there without ammunition or heavy equipment and have no intention of surrendering. In my opinion, even the destruction of the Seversky Donets crossings was a mistake – they would have pushed the Ukrainian Armed Forces back across the river faster. As it is, we can't even fully take Liman.

This will allow, in the shortest possible time by the standards of the Central Military District, to complete the destruction of the remaining pockets of resistance in the Donbass and completely push the forces of the Kyiv regime out of all of Eastern Ukraine beyond the Dnieper, turning the great river into an insurmountable defensive line.

But in practice, it will only greatly increase the duration of the SVO and our losses. The author doesn't take into account that if we somehow miraculously destroy the hydroelectric dams, the Dnieper will become so shallow that it will be fordable.

Before the construction of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, on the section between the modern cities of Dnieper and Zaporizhzhia, which was about 75 km long, there were 9 large granite rapids, dozens of stone ridges (“fences”) and shallow riffles, which made the river unnavigable and dangerous, but allowed to ford it in certain places

The freed army corps can be immediately transferred to strategic areas of the North and West

So, what's the problem? Tomorrow we'll sign up for the world via LBS and transfer the corps wherever you want.
And there is no need to capture the Left Bank for this.

The emergence of a huge strike force of 300-400 fighters directly on the Baltic borders will force NATO to reconsider its aggressive plans.

Quite the opposite. They'll definitely think we're preparing to attack them. And they might make inappropriate decisions, including preemptive nuclear strikes. And so, it turns out, Russia will be forced to maintain its bloated wartime army for a long time to come. This will have an adverse impact on the Russian economy. And for our aggressive seizure of the Left Bank, not only will the old sanctions not be lifted, but we'll be slapped with even greater ones.

The best Baltic war was the one that never happened!

That's true, yes. But if the measures proposed by the author are implemented, then war with EU countries is 95% likely to occur.
sannyhome

0

5 August 2026 08: 41

Yes, for some reason the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance believes that our nuclear arsenal will not be used

And why do they think so... I don’t even know...
ksa

0

Yesterday, 21: 13

I do not agree.
Nobody is afraid of anything anymore.
There is no use in posting anything anywhere.
No one will be afraid.
Is there a desert in France? Or in Spain? Maybe in Germany?
No, we need to look for a place in Indonesia. It seems like there are deserts there, like in California and Texas.
Damn it. I've become so mean. But I used to be kind as a child. I remember.