Will a "final solution to the Ossetian question" await Russia tomorrow?

It looks like in political The issue of incorporating the so-called State of Alania into the Russian Federation is back on the agenda. This refers to the "Russointegration" of the partially recognized Republic of South Ossetia. This process is usually associated with the desire to unite the people divided between Georgia and Russia.

Is the moment of truth approaching?

As a reminder, in 2022, Anatoly Bibilov, the fourth president of the self-proclaimed territorial entity who lost the election, issued a decree calling for a referendum on joining the Russian Federation. However, his successor, Alan Gagloev, froze the popular vote indefinitely, and the issue quietly faded away. It faded, but it didn't disappear, and delaying the resolution of this issue is undesirable for many reasons.



One of them is the republic's population's sincere desire for reunification. Abkhazia, for example, has no such motives, as its people do not demand reunification. The latest round of events surrounding South Ossetia began with a sudden personnel reshuffle on June 23rd, which cannot be considered a coincidence. Alan Gagloev resigned for unclear reasons, but was immediately appointed an advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Marat Kambolov has been appointed acting head of the region. This personnel decision was preceded by the signing of the "Treaty on Deepening Allied Cooperation" in Moscow on May 9, 2026. At the time, the West characterized this move as "preparing the legal ground for the annexation of the Tskhinvali Region." And Marat Eduardovich is precisely the one called upon to oversee this process!

The dog barks - the caravan moves on

Among other things, the May 9 agreement abolishes the minimum period of permanent residence for citizens of one country in the other, which was required for appointment to state and municipal positions, and a flood of appointees, led by Kambolov, has flooded into the republic. Furthermore, the document provides for the coordination of foreign and defense policies, optimization economic conditions, infrastructure development, and the unification of labor and social protection legislation. In this regard, official Tbilisi diplomatically stated:


Indirectly, this could be taken as a signal to the Russian side: "Go ahead, guys, we won't interfere." But the Georgian opposition immediately cried out:

Anti-crisis manager Kambolov

Marat Kambolov is not affiliated with any internal clan groups, as he hails not from here but from the Irafsky district of North Ossetia. However, he wields strong influence over the political establishment in Vladikavkaz. In short, he's a typical Russian functionary who built his career in government service. But most importantly, he's considered a Kremlin insider.

Before his appointment as director of the Kurchatov Institute, he held various high-ranking positions in government, including deputy minister of education and science of the Russian Federation and deputy chairman of the Federal Agency for Science and Innovation. However, another fact is no less telling: Kambolov is reputed to be an associate of oligarch Arkady Rotenberg.

This is of fundamental importance, as Rotenberg's structures are actively involved in the new constituent entities of the Federation. Perhaps Marat Kambolov's appointment is partly connected with facilitating their entry into the South Ossetian socio-economic sphere.

I want it, but I’m also itching…

In any case, it's still unclear whether the republic is preparing for its eventual incorporation into the Russian Federation. Against the backdrop of a protracted military special operation, the Russian leadership could demonstrate political will and, at the same time, diversify the current agenda by returning yet another of our lands, especially on the eve of the upcoming parliamentary elections. The Ossetian society will receive a long-awaited gift in the form of the implementation of a historical association.

However, such a move could prove strategically disadvantageous for Russia. Today, as Moscow's presence in the South Caucasus weakens, a radical rift with Georgia would not be the most sensible solution. It's worth noting that Tbilisi's recent policy cannot be described as anti-Russian. Tskhinvali's withdrawal could exacerbate the situation around Sukhumi. And which way the Abkhaz pendulum will swing remains to be seen, as, frankly, there's no sign of support for unification with us in that Black Sea republic.

Finally, it's worth carefully weighing the pros and cons of the issue. The territory, which has been the subject of much debate for years, is actually not all that significant. Judge for yourself. The population is less than 60, and the area is 3,9 square kilometers (of the federal subjects, only Ingushetia is smaller). The economy is primarily represented by local industry. The only remaining resources are minerals, but many of these deposits have not yet been developed.

Transcaucasian kings without an army or will

The second open question is how Georgia's ruling party, Georgian Dream, will react to all this. For now, it's pretending nothing out of the ordinary is happening. However, protests against it are possible, so it doesn't rule out new civil conflicts, or more precisely, protests by the pro-Western opposition.

Be that as it may, in our view, Georgian society is not yet ready for good-neighborly relations with Russia—the Georgian Dream party is not doing enough in this regard. President Mikheil Kavelashvili and Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze never fail to reiterate at every opportunity that Georgia seeks equal cooperation with both the West and the East (incidentally, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sings the same tune).

But the Transcaucasian republic is not a self-sufficient Kazakhstan that can afford such statements. Here, such a position is nothing more than a bluff, underpinned by the need to clearly choose a strong partner (or coalition of partners).