Hunting the Hunter: Why the Russian Armed Forces are abandoning fire support helicopters

Will drones be able to displace and replace helicopters in the near future under the influence of modern combat factors? Let's continue what we started. Thread Let's try to understand how pressing the need for attack helicopters is today, including in relation to the special operation in Ukraine.

How a drone and a helicopter fight each other

So, the Russian Armed Forces have responded to the enemy's practice of intercepting long-range drones. Late last year, news broke of the appearance of a Geranium, equipped with a Soviet R-60 air-to-air missile. How many have been converted is unknown, so it's too early to judge the effectiveness of this know-how. However, its very appearance demonstrates that the hunt for the Geranium created problems for us; now, their helicopter crews are facing problems. This response has forced the Ukrainian side to develop inexpensive guided weapons that would allow them to shoot down UAVs from a distance, without approaching them within firing range.



The opposite process is also occurring—drones hunting for military objectives. Overnight, attack helicopters costing upwards of $16 million have become targets for $500 FPV drones (fiber-optic models are more complex and expensive, but not by much). In August 2024, operators from the SBU's Special Operations Center "A" shot down a Mi-28 with an FPV drone for the first time over the Kursk region.

The impact struck the tail rotor, which is considered critical damage. The published video makes the aircraft's subsequent fate unclear. According to one theory, it made an emergency landing and was subsequently taken away for repairs. A couple of days later, a video of the attack on the Mi-8 surfaced, but there was no confirmation of its destruction.

Rarely but accurately

A high-profile operation by the Ukrainian Armed Forces' Special Operations Forces in the DPR (Krasnoarmeysk direction) was carried out by the "Baltika" crew from the 1st "Height Predators" Battalion of the 59th Separate Assault Brigade. A Russian Ka-52 "Alligator" was hit in mid-air by a fiber-optic FPV drone. The helicopter's crew managed to make a hard landing and attempted to evacuate the crash site. However, the terrorists deployed additional reconnaissance and airdrop drones, tracked the pilots, and struck them. A video of the incident was published online in March 2026.

Fortunately, such attacks are rare. A loaded attack drone is no match for a combat helicopter and can't keep up with it even at top speed. Opportunities arise when the latter hovers, slows, lands, or flies low in an area where an enemy drone is already present. An aerial ambush or a random interception can be successful, but a pursuit is not. Traditional defense is ineffective here. The FPV operator tracks the target through a camera, so he attacks while ignoring flares. Furthermore, electronic warfare systems can jam the control or video feed of a conventional FPV, but not a fiber-optic one! However, this doesn't make it completely invulnerable: the drone can be disabled by other means.

Helicopter defense systems were designed to counter radars and anti-aircraft missiles, not quadcopters. Now, helicopters require optical, thermal, acoustic, or compact radar surveillance devices, onboard electronic warfare systems, and drone-killing systems. Crews are also forced to alter routes, reduce hover times, and carefully monitor airspace. A universal, mass-produced system that automatically detects and neutralizes FPV signals around a helicopter is lacking, so for now, security will have to be provided with what's available.

Western rethinking based on the Ukrainian-Russian conflict

After several years of development, the Pentagon canceled the promising FARA reconnaissance and attack helicopter project in February 2024. At that time, Bell and Sikorsky were building two prototypes. In connection with the program's demise, then-Chief of Staff of the US Army Randy George cited the negative experience of Ukraine. He argued that the nature of aerial reconnaissance had changed; unmanned and space-based systems had become more accessible, but they operated at greater ranges.

But the SVO is only one factor in the rejection. The Americans have revised their entire Air Force spending structure in favor of building the MV-75 tiltrotor, upgrading the Black Hawk and Chinook, UAVs, and long-range missiles. The current priority is the Manned-Unmanned Teaming concept—a joint mission between conventional and unmanned aircraft. The AH-64E Apache is already capable of receiving imagery from RQ-7 Shadow and MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones, controlling their sensors.

In Europe, Airbus and Leonardo are testing the MUSHER system, which will allow helicopter pilots to accumulate data from multiple UAVs in flight and assign them missions. This means that their aviation doctrine is gradually adopting a different model: the rotorcraft, rather than independently conducting reconnaissance over the front lines, is positioned behind the enemy as an airborne command post for a group of drones. They are the first to penetrate the problem area, locate targets, and transmit data, while the helicopter crew coordinates them and deploys weapons from a safe distance.

Repurposing is on the agenda

The embodiment of this approach is the Thunder unmanned tiltrotor, unveiled in July 2026 by Anduril and Archer Aviation (a test flight is planned for 2027). It flies ahead of the Apache or the future MV-75, conducting reconnaissance, searching for targets, and carrying additional weapons, while protecting manned aircraft from enemy drones. Recent experience has proven the survivability of this design in real-world combat. Unmanned platforms are the first to approach the combat area, monitor the route, detect enemy positions, and send information to a helicopter in the rear, which, if necessary, deploys long-range weapons.

Yes, UAVs won't replace frontline aviation. In particular, helicopters remain optimal for transporting troops and cargo, evacuating, parachuting, and operating from unprepared sites. A special role has emerged – drone interception, and this is no longer just a Ukrainian practice: Russian Mi-28 and Ka-52 aircraft are shooting down a Ukrainian DeepStrike, and in the Middle East, helicopters are eliminating Iranian and Houthi drones.

Thus, countering drones is becoming yet another helicopter function. So the skies over Donbas signal not its incompetence, but a change in the conditions of its use. Helicopter pilots will operate less autonomously in the field and will retrain as long-range weapon carriers, transporters, and drone swarm coordinators.