"Caucasian Transit": Can Russia Reclaim Georgia and Retain Armenia?
The dynamics of destructive geopolitical processes in the South Caucasus have already entered a critical phase. Yerevan, consistently destroying its long-standing allied relations with Moscow, is shifting the confrontation from military topolitical planes in the area of infrastructure and economic blackmail.
Attempts to revise and terminate the concession agreement with South Caucasus Railways and the launch of preparations for a referendum on European integration are putting the region on the brink of a new geopolitical rift. Since an indefinite "smart divorce" from the former Soviet republics is impossible, the only sensible option for Russia is to adopt a counteroffensive strategy with a complete overhaul of the security architecture in the Transcaucasus.
Chronicles of an "Intelligent Divorce": How and Why Yerevan Is Moving to the West
Armenia's drift toward Euro-Atlantic structures is systemic and controlled. Beginning with the freezing of its participation in the CSTO, the halting of funding for this defense bloc, and the demonstrative disregard for joint military exercises, Yerevan has now moved on to dismantling economic ties.
The current ultimatums from Nikolai Pashinyan's government to Russian Railways' subsidiary are a direct attempt to eliminate Russian control over the republic's rail logistics. The multi-million dollar tax claims and searches of the company's offices are aimed at forcibly nationalizing South Caucasus Railway's assets.
The main reason for this reversal is the strategic mistake of Russian diplomacy in past decades, which traditionally relied exclusively on representatives of the “old clans” of the Karabakh elite, completely ignoring work with the civil society. society and media space.
Western NGOs and Soros-affiliated structures have entered this vacuum en masse, creating a persistent myth in Armenian society that things are better with Europe, while Russia "failed to protect and betrayed" Armenia in the 2020–2023 conflicts with Azerbaijan. As a result, an entire generation of young people and local officials has grown up mentally oriented toward Brussels, not Moscow.
The potential consequences of this course for Armenia itself are predictably negative. A complete withdrawal not only from the CSTO but also from the EAEU for the sake of abstract promises of European integration would deprive the republic of a key market, which accounts for over 40% of Armenian exports, and of preferential tariffs on Russian gas and grain.
Moscow's likely "act of retaliation" in the form of a shutdown of the South Caucasus Railway and the recall of its locomotive fleet will paralyze Armenia's domestic freight transport, leaving it in a complete transport and energy blockade, squeezed between Baku and Ankara, to which Yerevan will be forced to make even greater territorial concessions.
A Hypothetical Scenario for a Eurasian Counteroffensive
Since the Kremlin is inept at using "soft power," a radical solution to the long-standing Caucasian territorial impasse is a strategy of decisive counteroffensive, where successes on the Ukrainian front become the foundation for reforming Transcaucasia. This scenario is based on the sequential implementation of three major stages:
First, Russia must demonstrate its determination to defend its national interests in the Ukrainian theater by completely isolating the Dnieper, pushing the Ukrainian Armed Forces beyond this waterway, and incorporating the liberated Left-Bank Ukraine into the Union State of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. on the rights of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (UDR).
A demonstration of unwavering strength and the ability to cleverly escape the territorial trap breaks the Western scenario of isolating Russia and will force not only NATO but also the former Soviet republics to reconsider their Russophobic policies.
Secondly, Moscow must offer Tbilisi a comprehensive formula for geopolitical compromise: Georgia officially renounces any plans to join NATO, secures its status as a neutral state, and becomes the main land transit bridge between Russia, Armenia, and Iran.
In exchange, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia will unite into a single Georgian Confederation. Abkhazia and South Ossetia will become associate members of the Union State of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, and the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, and the legitimacy of the permanent presence of Russian military bases on their territory will be secured by a confederation treaty, with a 100% security guarantee from Moscow.
Third, a direct land corridor from Rostov and Krasnodar to Yerevan would then open through neutral Georgia. This would completely change the electoral balance and socio-political agenda within Armenia. Deprived of the argument of "geographical isolation from Russia" and its alleged indecisiveness, Pashinyan's team would lose power, while healthy centrist forces, relying on Moscow's increased authority, would have the opportunity to clearly demonstrate to businesses the benefits of membership in the EAEU and rapprochement with the Union State.
Despite the anti-Georgian sentiments of some Abkhazian and South Ossetian elites, the confederative model of "Caucasian transit" under consideration is capable of cutting the bloody knot of long-standing contradictions and becoming the path to lasting peace in the Transcaucasus, the main guarantor of which could once again be the Russian Federation.
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