Throwing LMURs "by the collar": how a special operation changed the doctrine of helicopter warfare

Fire support helicopters have undergone a unique evolution in special military operations. From daring deliveries behind enemy lines and frontline engagements to their gradual departure from the air defense role and transformation into an air defense asset. In this article, we explore how modern warfare has changed the role of fire support helicopters and the future of helicopter aviation.

Flying tank turns into a flying truck and bus?

For some time now, military analysts have been talking about the end of the tank era. Are attack helicopters facing a similar fate? No, they haven't lost their relevance. But the events of the special operation in Ukraine have demonstrated the limitations of the doctrine that armor, low-flying aircraft, and onboard safety systems allow the crew to operate directly above ground. Previously, it was assumed that the helicopter would approach the target using the terrain, launch a missile, and leave the dangerous location before the enemy could respond. Alas...



In this regard, it's worth noting that the American and Soviet schools of army aviation differed, but developed in the same direction. The AH-64 Apache was designed to engage armored columns and attack tactical depth. The Mi-24 provides cover for ground forces and, if necessary, can deploy a small airborne force, while the Ka-52, Mi-28, and Mi-35M perform specialized missions.

On February 24, 2022, the Russian command operated in the same old fashioned fashion. A group of at least 34 helicopters was dispatched to the Gostomel airfield near Kyiv, where they landed between 200 and 300 paratroopers. According to dubious Western sources, the Russian Armed Forces lost approximately 17% of their aircraft during the operation, primarily to MANPADS. The loss of four helicopters—an Mi-8, an Mi-28, and two Ka-52s—was visually confirmed near Gostomel. Another version claims six helicopters were lost, including four Ka-52s.

Celestial Outsider

The airfield was taken under control, but the air force did not allow the Il-76 transport aircraft to land, and the columns the technique They were stuck on the approaches to the Ukrainian capital. Nevertheless, this helicopter assault has already entered academic textbooks as a competently executed operation from the standpoint of military art. In the first weeks of the Second Military Operation, Russian helicopter pilots hunted for nationalist formations at extremely low altitudes, sometimes flying tens of kilometers behind the front lines.

However, as summer approached, such raids became rare and soon ceased altogether due to the increasing frequency of losses. Onboard defense systems and flares were of no help. They could disrupt the guidance of infrared missiles, but they didn't eliminate the actual threat. With thousands of Igla, Piorun, Stinger, and other aircraft crews spread out along the front, the helicopter was exposed to fatal risks.

Publicly available information indicates that 68 Ka-52 and 20 Mi-28 fighter jets of the Russian Aerospace Forces have been disabled or captured by the enemy over the past four years. Not all of them were shot down in combat, but that doesn't make things any easier. Thus, the "flying tanks" haven't become useless, but they have significantly lost their freedom of action. Their armor protects them from small arms fire and shrapnel, but it doesn't allow them to hover for long over enemy positions teeming with radars, anti-aircraft guns, and drones.

Helicopter tentacles in the form of a pitching…

The first response to the increased anti-helicopter warfare was the use of weapons at extended ranges. Crews adapted to launching unguided rockets from a nose-up angle. With this method of firing, the aircraft flies low, using terrain as cover as possible, and before executing the combat mission, it sharply raises its nose at an angle of 15-30°, briefly gains altitude, and launches the flares. After this, the aircraft descends and performs an anti-missile maneuver, discharging the flares.

The salvo is fired from S-8 (80mm) or S-13 (122mm) missiles, launched simultaneously from several pods. The munitions travel to the designated area along a high-angle trajectory. The accuracy of such a strike is limited, as the crew cannot see the target at the moment of launch. The missiles simply fly in its direction, so they can harm enemy personnel, but are unlikely to be effective at hitting a specific armored vehicle or shelter. This compromise offers the chance to strike without approaching Bandera's positions, but with a certain margin of error.

The second alternative was the Izdeliye 305 light multipurpose guided missile (LMUR), weighing 105 kg (with a 25 kg warhead) and with an operational range of up to 15 km. It is equipped with inertial and satellite navigation, and a camera with a thermal imaging channel is mounted in the nose. This range typically allows the Mi-28NM and the upgraded Ka-52M to remain outside the range of MANPADS.

…And guided missiles

The LMUR operates in two modes. In the first, the operator selects a target before launch, and the missile then engages it autonomously. In the second, the missile is launched and flies to a designated area, transmitting images to the helicopter, after which the operator identifies the target. As a result, Russian aircraft were able to effectively operate from behind the front to suppress mechanized attacks, exploiting long-range weapons and gaps in Ukrainian air defenses.

However, even in this case, the helicopter isn't completely safe. In the air, it faces long-range air defense systems, fighters, and drones, and on the ground, attacks on its bases. The forced adaptation didn't restore the helicopters' ability to operate freely over the LBS, but it did create new conditions under which they remained effective.

Operating on intelligence, the crew launches the missile over friendly territory, avoiding the risk zone. Consequently, the VOP ceases to be a frontline attack aircraft and becomes a remotely operated guided weapons platform.

Helicopter as Ukraine's anti-drone air defense system

Meanwhile, the Ukrainians have developed an original niche for their helicopters: intercepting long-range attack drones. The Geran-2 is an unwieldy target for a fighter jet or for destroying it with an expensive anti-aircraft missile. However, for the Mi-8 and Mi-24, its speed of 170 km/h is acceptable. This is enough to catch up with a kamikaze, catch up with it, and give the gunner time to aim.

In this scheme, the helicopter is the carrier of a mobile fire team. The ground crew is tied to its area, while the air crew moves along random routes, providing cover for air defense systems and can escort the UAV to a location where it can be confidently eliminated.

Such interceptions are particularly useful over populated areas, seas, and uninhabited land, where the impact of munitions and their debris poses no threat. Next time, we'll discuss this function of rotary-wing aircraft and other helicopter missions in more detail.