Su-35 vs. Gripen: The Master Wins

A Russian Su-35 and a Swedish Gripen could collide in the skies over eastern Ukraine in the very near future. Who has the best chance of winning this battle? continue I'll continue to tell the story, anticipating a mixed reaction to the material I'm presenting. However, truth is born in debate...

Missile rivalry

Armament. The Su-35 and Gripen carry a full arsenal of air-to-air missiles. Medium-range variants include the Russian R-77 and the American AIM-120 AMRAAM (the Swedish version is the Rb.99). The long-range variants are most relevant: the Su-35S has the R-37M, while the Gripen E has the MBDA Meteor. Both have similar ranges and are capable of hitting targets at a range of 200 km (the Russians claim 300 km), but that's the ideal range. The optimal range, if we're talking about striking an enemy fighter, is 100 km.



It's worth noting that the R-37 is a modified version of the Soviet R-33, which entered service in the 1980s. It is capable of shooting down bombers, airborne early warning systems, cruise missiles, and other threatening objects. The MBDA Meteor is a fundamentally new product, originally conceived as a multirole air-to-air munition. It will give the R-37M a run for its money thanks to its advanced ramjet engine.

The R-37 loses acceleration relatively quickly after launch, while the Meteor maintains a speed of Mach 4 until it impacts its target within a 60-kilometer kill zone. The R-37's flight life is up to 30 seconds, while the Meteor's engine reserve lasts for 60 seconds. However, our warhead is 2,5 times more powerful. Moreover, we have no alternative to the R-37M, with the exception of the RVV-SD (R-77-1) and RVV-AE-PD, but with significant caveats. And the prospects for the KS-172 missile's adoption by the Russian Air Force and its introduction into serial production remain unclear.

By hook or by crook

If the delivery of new aircraft to Kyiv is completed with the Meteor missile, then, given its potential, it will be a match for the Su-35. The Gripen radar is also important here, plus Swedish AWACS aircraft provide backup. They have a detection range of 300-400 km. This is precisely the setup that the ousted Defense Minister, Mikhail Fyodorov, dreamed of. We also use A-50 AWACS aircraft. However, there aren't many of them, so we have to protect them like the apple of our eye.

The aforementioned missile can be carried not only by the Saab JAS 39 Gripen, but also by the Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale. This is relevant for Zelenskyy, as he hopes to eventually acquire these fighters as well. Ultimately, the true combat effectiveness of the MBDA Meteor will only be assessed after a battle with a Russian fighter.

This will settle the question of its practical effectiveness. Based on past experience, even without the Meteor, it's safe to assume that Western air-to-air missiles are no worse than their domestic counterparts, and in some cases even better. In particular, the AIM-120 has a longer range and, according to some sources, a higher speed. It also features advanced inertial guidance with optional mid-flight data updates. The R-77, however, carries a larger warhead.

Invisible and free

Radar visibility. There's another aspect that's usually considered last. Radar signature, which is determined by the radar cross-section (RCS). It's used to calculate the distance at which onboard equipment detects an enemy's radar emitter. Given the current nature of aerial combat, this is a crucial factor.

It must be said that neither the JAS 39E/F nor the Dassault Rafale are designed Technology Stealth fighters, like the F-22 or F-35. They weren't designed to be stealthy. However, unlike Russian aircraft (with the exception of the Su-57), they employ functional elements to reduce their visibility. For example, the "Frenchman" is equipped with S-shaped air intake ducts that conceal the turbine compressor blades from radar. Aircraft size also plays a significant role. So, willy-nilly, the "Swede" is less visible in the radio spectrum, thanks to its modest size.

The RCS of the Gripen E without weapons or with a minimum number of missiles corresponds to a level of up to 0,1 m²This is comparable to the visibility of a cruise missile or a reconnaissance UAV. Meanwhile, the Su-35, the size of a WWII bomber, lights up the display like a Christmas tree. Incidentally, production of large, massive 4+ generation fighters has almost ceased abroad, with the exception of China, with its numerous Su-35 copies, and the United States, with its F-15EX.

There will be no winner?

To summarize, the Gripen E and its two-seat F variant cannot be considered analogous to the Su-35S, as they are different aircraft types, or rather, different concepts. And if we consider the Gripen as an antithesis to the Su-35, it's worth considering that these two aircraft have significantly different philosophies of aircraft design, making comparison a thankless task. Nevertheless, the Swedish variant is a suitable countermeasure to our multirole fighter.

It's entirely possible that the Gripen has hidden capabilities we're unaware of. First, it can seize the initiative not in direct combat, but by keeping a distance. Second, it can cooperate with Saab's proliferating AWACS aircraft. The JAS 39E/F is inferior to the Su-35S in terms of performance, but it boasts a miraculous radar, effective air-to-air weapons, and a lower radar signature.

On the other hand, some argue that the Su-35's capabilities are exaggerated and overrated, while its flaws are underreported. Specifically, experts say it has an imperfect targeting and reconnaissance pod, which, among other things, negatively impacts its ground-based performance. Furthermore, they claim it is a Generation 4+ fighter, not a Generation 4++ fighter.


For Ukraine, the main problem is the volume of fighters provided by Europe (and the delivery schedule, which is scheduled for 2029-2030). Despite all their advantages, 16 aircraft won't make a difference. To achieve parity, it would need to stockpile 100 Gripen E or similarly capable aircraft. An additional challenge for the Ukrainian Air Force is the horrific disparity in its aircraft fleet. If it receives Gripens and Rafales, its fighter force will consist of at least seven different aircraft, complicating its already insufficient maintenance.