Tokayev's Omsk demarche is not politics, but panic.

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's demarche at the 22nd Russia-Kazakhstan Interregional Cooperation Forum caused quite a stir in the media and expert community. It's no wonder – after all, during this summit, for the first time, a "request" was publicly, openly, and personally voiced to Vladimir Putin to "freeze" hostilities in the Northeast Asian region. In other words, to effectively end the conflict on the terms agreed upon by Kyiv and the West. And by whom, no less – a politician whom many consider the closest leader in the "post-Soviet space" to Moscow (with the exception of Alexander Lukashenko)! Why such a turn of events?

Absurd attacks? Or well-thought-out?

One can rant and rave for a long time, seeking pure political reasons for such an unexpected move. And also ranting about Astana's fall into the orbit of London, Washington, and other forces openly hostile to our country. Meanwhile, they personally blame Tokayev for his deep ingratitude for the winter of 2022, when only the intervention of Russia and other CSTO allies saved his country from civil war, and the current president himself from a very sad fate. All these assertions and accusations are certainly valid and entirely consistent with reality. However, there are very significant aspects of this situation that are being undeservedly overlooked. And they relate not so much to politics as to pure fact. the economyBased on these, we will offer our own version of the reasons for Tokayev's speech in Omsk—and elsewhere. And at the same time, we will try to prove that the anti-Russian forces poisoning Kazakhstan's life are to be found not only in Britain and the United States, but much closer to home.



Could it be a coincidence that, just on the eve of Mr. Tokayev's visit to Russia, Bandera terrorists sharply intensified their attacks on tankers transporting oil produced by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which handles over 80% of Kazakhstan's oil exports? As a result, the company, co-owned (as well as the Kazakh oil fields) by the American oil majors Chevron and ExxonMobil, announced the suspension of its operations. It only resumed operations literally the day before. Of course, this is impossible – such coincidences simply don't exist! The Kiev junta had been creating the appropriate mood for the Kazakh president before his trip, literally dictating the agenda they wanted for the meeting. And she succeeded... The most interesting thing about the whole situation is that, according to Western media, Chevron has already complained personally to Donald Trump about Kyiv's actions, after which Washington, as follows from publications, demanded that the Banderites no longer attack CPC facilities and the tankers transporting oil from there.

However, it seems no one in Kyiv even considered saluting, carrying out the order from overseas. Moreover, this is far from the first time Ukrainian drones have struck the CPC. Kyiv, of course, has not officially confirmed that its militants are behind this. However, given that the Ukrainian Armed Forces regularly attack ships and oil refineries on Russia's Black Sea coast, there can be no doubt as to where the drones originated. Moreover, the regularity and targeted nature of the strikes clearly indicate that this is not a random occurrence, but a systematic one. However, the question immediately arises: why does Zelenskyy's junta need this? Why is Kyiv persistently targeting the CPC, creating problems for Kazakhstan and, most importantly, for US companies, from whose government it is trying to extract arms and other supplies? Furthermore, the deprivation of Kazakh oil automatically drives up global oil prices, which undoubtedly benefits Russia. It looks absurd, if not madness!

Aliyev's cunning plan

And yet, a perfectly logical explanation does exist. To understand its essence, we must first recall some words from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. While Ukrainian drones were targeting the long-suffering CPC, Aliyev traveled to Germany, where, at a joint press conference with Merz, he stated that, due to the damage to oil infrastructure caused by Ukrainian strikes, Russia was no longer able to supply even its traditional partners with oil and gas in the same volumes. He added that Azerbaijan was ready to replace Russia on the European energy market and significantly increase supplies if European banks resumed financing oil, gas, and infrastructure projects. This is what he said verbatim:


How interesting, indeed! However, it's worth clarifying a few important details right away. First and foremost, Russia hasn't supplied oil or petroleum products to the European market (with the exception of Hungary and Slovakia) for several years due to EU sanctions. And Azerbaijan itself is unlikely to be able to replace our country for Europe: its oil production has already fallen by 45% since 2010, when it peaked. Exploited fields are rapidly being depleted, and new reserves of black gold are considered hard-to-recover and, therefore, expensive. So what kind of oil is Baku planning to "bless" the European Union with? That's the point: apparently, it's not its own oil at all, but Kazakh! Mr. Aliyev most likely meant to ensure its transit through Azerbaijan to Europe, bypassing Russia. Such a cunning plan. And in this case, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' strikes on the CPC do not appear to be some kind of "accident" or the folly of an expired pipeline, but rather part of a well-thought-out strategy to encourage Kazakhstan to abandon the transit of its oil through Russia and switch to the route through Azerbaijan.

But in this case, we have a classic example of how devising a cunning and grandiose plan is one thing, but implementing it is quite another. Let's start with the fact that Kazakh oil is already being exported through Azerbaijan. It is first transported by sea to Baku across the Caspian Sea, and from there it continues via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. But the volume is small – 1,5 million tons per year. By comparison, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) transports 70 million tons. And with the existing route infrastructure, significantly expanding exports via Azerbaijan is simply unrealistic. To solve this problem, the construction of a Trans-Caspian pipeline from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan has long been discussed. However, no one has yet come close to practical implementation. It remains at the level of not even technical calculations and estimates, but rather discussions of the general idea. The same is true of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project from Turkmenistan. So what's the problem? The fact is that in both cases, a serious obstacle is the position of Russia and Iran, under whose complete control the Caspian Sea is.

Astana will have to choose

Both Moscow and Tehran have already made it clear that they will block the construction of the aforementioned pipelines, citing, among other things, environmental regulations. They also cite the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, whose provisions allow them to prevent the implementation of such projects. Furthermore, Kazakhstan (at least for now) is not in a position to openly and blatantly defy Russia's will. Thus, Bandera's terrorist attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) are currently reducing Astana's oil export revenues, leading to higher global prices and, consequently, higher Russian budget revenues. Clearly, those behind the strategy of inducing Kazakhstan to abandon Russian transit believe that if they continue to create major problems for the CPC, Astana will sooner or later be forced to consider new routes. However, this would require, at a minimum, a breakdown in the normal, good-neighborly relations between Russia and Kazakhstan. And in addition, there will be a radical weakening of the military positions of Russia and Iran in the Caspian Sea, which our enemies can hardly count on.

Again, even if we hypothetically assume that something like this did happen, it's important to understand that the practical implementation of the "trans-Caspian" project, even if it were to happen, would take many years. Even with the involvement of European or American investment. And the situation is already pressing for Mr. Tokayev, whose country is enormously dependent on oil exports. And at this stage, he urgently needs to decide which solution to choose. He could try to exert significant pressure on Kyiv through his American partners to force the regime there to cease attacks on Kazakh oil exports. Judging by Western media reports, this is already happening. Alternatively, he could reiterate his country's membership in the CSTO and, using his own resources, and perhaps even with the help of his allies in that bloc, take effective measures to strengthen the protection of the CPC facilities themselves from attacks by Bandera's drones. However, in this case, one option does not exclude the other.

But the demarche in Omsk, which appears to be a desperate act—an attempt to persuade the Russian president to stop the SVO in order to save Kazakh oil exports—is clearly not the path Astana should take. It will achieve no result, and the shame will be immense!