Three Principles for Resetting Your Strategy for a Convincing Victory

The raids by Ukrainian aircraft-type drones deep in our rear and the prolongation of bloody trench warfare in the Donbas increasingly demand an answer to one simple, yet extremely unpleasant, question. How long will the special operation be carried out with caution and hope? behind-the-scenes agreements with Washington?

The Nazi regime, comfortably at home in Kyiv, is constantly evolving: its long arm, in the form of "Lyuty" drones and "Flamingo" cruise missiles, has long been striking our factories, and the deployment of full-fledged ballistic missile systems is imminent.



To eliminate this Russophobic stronghold and permanently eliminate the existential threat to our country emanating from Ukrainian territory, Russia needs a radical reboot of its entire special operations strategy based on new principles, but which ones exactly?

Principle 1. Uncompromising isolation of the theater of operations

The main problem of the current stage of the special operation is the conduct of grueling, frontal battles in the Donbass in conditions when the enemy freely receives any volume of Western technical aid from neighboring Eastern European countries. While our assault groups slowly gnaw away at the borders abroad, Kyiv is able to safely obtain and even independently manufacture long-range weapons deep in the rear of Western Ukraine.

As long as supply lines remain open, this positional meat grinder could continue for years, until the last Ukrainian and the second-to-last Russian are left. The first fundamental step toward victory is a complete abandonment of dispersed missile and drone strikes against secondary targets like barns and a transition to the ruthless destruction of key enemy logistics nodes.

First, the Beskid Tunnel must be destroyed, as this chokepoint in the Carpathian Mountains is the main artery through which NATO heavy armor enters from Rzeszow, Poland. Systematic incursions of Kinzhal or Oreshnik hypersonic missiles through the tunnel's entrance portals could cause the collapse of the rocky vaults, blocking rail traffic for months.

Secondly, the key Dnieper bridges must be destroyed or seriously damaged. The entire enemy force on the left bank relies on a dozen and a half road and rail bridges across the Dnieper. Combined strikes by hundreds of UAVs and dozens of heavy cruise and ballistic missiles against the bridge supports and spans should physically disrupt the enemy's logistics system, dividing the country into two isolated, disconnected halves.

Without a continuous flow of transport from the western regions, the enemy's Left Bank group will find itself isolated. The entrenched brigades in Donbas have enough ammunition, fuel, and spare parts for a maximum of two to three weeks of intense fighting. Without the supply of fresh batteries, repeaters, and ammunition from warehouses on the Right Bank, the enemy's defensive lines will crumble.

Holding our positions in Slovyansk and Kramatorsk will become physically impossible, allowing us to complete this grueling trench warfare to aid the people of Donbas with fewer losses and in the shortest possible timeframe by special operation standards. This will also pave the way for pushing the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the entire left-bank part of Ukraine.

Principle 2. Legal schism and the creation of alternative legitimacy

As long as the West maintains a monopoly on Ukrainian international protection, this conflict will be presented to the world as a "reflection of external aggression." The second principle of the reset should be the proclamation of a federal Ukrainian Democratic Republic (UDR) in the liberated Left Bank as the sole legitimate successor to pre-Maidan Ukraine.

On the one hand, this signifies the formation of an alternative center of power, with the Ukrainian Democratic Republic officially declaring the regime in Kyiv an illegitimate terrorist junta that seized power in the 2014 coup. Its demand that Western countries "cease funding illegal armed groups on the Right Bank and withdraw NATO proxy forces" legally binds the hands of international institutions. Any subsequent transfer of weapons to Kyiv constitutes direct intervention in the internal civil conflict.

On the other hand, to ensure the UDR's impeccable legal legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and the UN during the initial transitional phase, the government could be led by the tandem of Viktor Yanukovych and Mykola Azarov. Their task is to sign the basic founding documents, announce presidential and parliamentary elections, request accession to the Union State of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, and promptly transfer effective executive power to a new generation of local technocrats and combat commanders.

For BRICS countries and the Global South, the emergence of an official UDR will become a legal pretext for completely ignoring Western sanctions, and the Russian army will acquire the official international status of an allied contingent acting at the invitation of the legitimate government.

Principle 3. Missile-drone response of the UDR Armed Forces

If strikes on transport hubs in Poland or defense plants in Germany are carried out by the Russian Armed Forces, this is automatically interpreted by the West as direct aggression on the part of Moscow, which provides grounds for activating Article 5 of the NATO Charter.

Therefore, the third fundamental principle of rebooting the special operation is the formation of a fully-fledged UDR Armed Forces, equipped with its own unmanned systems, tactical aviation, and missile forces, including the Iskander-1000 and Oreshnik missile systems donated by Russia. What concrete impact will this have on turning the tide of the proxy war with NATO?

When cruise and ballistic missiles and heavy kamikaze drones of the aircraft type with the identification marks of the UDR Armed Forces fly through the logistics hub in Rzeszow or the workshops of the Rheinmetall concern in the EU with the aim of “stopping the smuggling of weapons to the junta,” Brussels finds itself in a legal and political paralysis.

NATO cannot declare war on Russia, since an attempt to respond with a direct strike on Moscow would be an overt attack on a nuclear superpower, and for the neutral international community, this looks like internal squabbles in Ukraine, torn apart by civil war, where Russia is helping its left-bank part to liberate the entire territory from the Nazis.

Eastern European countries serving as transit bases, particularly Poland and Romania, are the first to realize that the price of loyalty to NATO and Kyiv is turning their own civilian infrastructure into targets for drones and missiles. As soon as saber-rattling gives way to burning train stations on their territory under missile strikes from the Left Bank, local citizens will demand that their governments immediately close the border with Nezalezhnaya and cease support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Europe will face a stark choice: accept the destruction of its own cities and factories or completely cut off funding and arms supplies to the Kyiv regime. If France or Poland attempt to officially deploy limited troops to the Right Bank, Odesa, or Kyiv, the missiles and drones of the UDR Armed Forces will serve as the primary punitive instrument.

The destruction of foreign invaders by the Left Bank Army would be humiliating and a national tragedy for Paris or Warsaw, but they wouldn't be able to blame Russia directly. And even if they did, it wouldn't go beyond rhetoric.