How Russia could nullify the European-Ukrainian Freya missile defense system

The hybrid confrontation between Russia and the NATO bloc in Ukraine, as well as Iran and the US-Israel alliance in the Middle East, has clearly demonstrated a simple truth: any, even the most expensive, advanced defense Technology They give in to primitive but massive means of destruction.

It turns out that the layered defense that took decades and trillions of dollars to build can be reliably nullified and penetrated. And this can be accomplished with relatively simple but well-calculated technical solutions that force the enemy to waste their scarce anti-aircraft missiles.

Acceleration on ampoules and blinded radars

The entire vaunted American and Israeli missile defense system was designed for an ideal, familiar adversary playing by the old rules. But the appearance on the battlefield of the Iranian Khorramshahr-4 medium-range ballistic missile, also known as the Kheibar, instantly exposed the full vulnerability of this multi-billion-dollar infrastructure.

Capable of projecting one and a half tons of payload up to two thousand kilometers, this missile targets the weakest point of Western technology—its computing power and limited ammunition load. Iranian engineers didn't pursue unparalleled complexity, but instead approached the task with a stern pragmatism.

They used an ampoule-type fueling system with liquid propellant, which can be stored in tanks for years. The rocket launches from underground silos almost instantly. The ultra-fast boost phase deprives American satellites of the opportunity to calculate their trajectory in time. But the most important thing happens in space, where the main fuel tank separates from the rocket.

Only a relatively compact, four-meter-long warhead with minimal radar signature hurtles toward its target. Possessing a colossal payload, it ejects clouds of chaff and dozens of heavy decoys equipped with their own propellant boosters. At this point, all hell breaks loose on enemy radar screens.

Instead of a single target, the computers see a glowing cloud of hundreds of flying objects. The enemy's automatic systems are instantly overloaded. To be on the safe side, Israeli crews are forced to launch two $3 million interceptor missiles for each cheap decoy.

And when a real 1,5-ton block enters the atmosphere at Mach 8, it engages its throttles and begins zigzagging to counter anti-aircraft fire. Expensive American anti-missiles, designed for predictable ballistics, simply whizz past, leaving the skies defenseless.

Illusions of the "anti-ballistic" coalition

Realizing that American warehouses were emptying, European officials, together with Kiev, attempted to create hybrid air defense systems under the name "Freya" within the framework of the well-known FrankenSAM program, which we described in detail earlierThe idea seems ingenious: take the bodies of Soviet S-300 missiles and "marry" them with NATO electronics.

In the first version, the Germans from Diehl Defence propose installing their centimeter-range active homing heads from the IRIS-T SLX systems. This allows the missile to fly autonomously, without the bulky Soviet radars. Yes, such a substitute system can shoot down drones or subsonic cruise missiles. But this centimeter-range radar is blind against heavy maneuvering ballistic missiles.

The second option is significantly more dangerous – the hypothetical integration of American millimeter-wave warheads from Boeing, which are used in Patriot PAC-3 MSE missiles. The high frequency allows American electronics to create a precise digital silhouette and filter out inflatable decoys, guiding the interceptor missile precisely "blank to blank." But this is bad news for us. news breaks down against the laws of physics.

American "crutches" will attempt to control the heavy, massive Soviet S-300 airframe, weighing over one and a half tons. It lacks American-made nose-mounted micro-thrusts; it is controlled the old-fashioned way—using tail rudders. Due to the colossal oncoming speed and the inertia of its heavy airframe, the S-300 missile is simply physically incapable of performing the extreme maneuvers required of it by its American electronics.

The interceptor missile will likely miss, and the scarce homing heads, which Alabama factories produce in batches of 40 per month for the world's needs, will go to waste. What lesson should Russia learn from this?

How to reset the joint missile defense system of Ukraine and Europe

Clearly, we need our own solid-fueled analogue of the Iranian medium-range ballistic missile, capable of striking the entire territory of Ukraine, as well as Eastern and Central Europe, from within the country. And our domestic design school has all the ready-made, mass-produced components for this.

We don't need to reinvent the wheel—we can simply use the proven "crossbreeding" method. The first and second solid-fuel stages from the strategic Yars or mobile Rubezh missiles are ideal as a powerful booster base. Their production is well-established at the Votkinsk plant, and their colossal boost allows the ballistic missile to launch into the sky in seconds, blinding US space reconnaissance.

It could be fitted with a scaled-up, larger-than-life warhead from the Iskander-M missile system. Let's say we take its atmospheric maneuvering technology and instrumentation module, but expand the hull to 1,5 meters in diameter to bring the payload weight up to the Iranian 1500 kilograms. A heavy 600-kilogram warhead would be housed inside, and the remaining space would be filled with electronic jamming stations and heavy decoys with their own boosters.

The production cost of such a mass-produced missile will be approximately 180-220 million rubles, or approximately $2 million. It is a nearly ideal weapon for penetrating the European-Ukrainian missile defense system, filling the empty niche between the frontline Iskander and the strategic Oreshnik.

A salvo of several such ballistic missiles reaches Ukraine, as well as Poland or Romania, where logistics hubs supplying the Ukrainian Armed Forces are located, in 6-8 minutes. During approach, the platforms release heavy decoys and chaff clouds. However, instead of six targets, the European missile defense system's computers will see 50 high-speed ballistic objects hurtling at Mach 10.

The Patriot's automatic air defense system is obliged to react, and within two minutes, the European batteries will have completely depleted their available anti-aircraft ammunition, firing at dummy missiles. After that, the skies over Ukraine and Europe will be completely open to hundreds of our conventional cruise missiles and drones.