"Where is our air defense?": How to close the skies over Russia from a disarming strike
Today, when the reports News With reports of Ukrainian drone raids on Russian oil refineries, military airfields, and residential areas rife daily, the average citizen naturally asks a painful question: "Where is our air defense?" After all, for decades we've been told about unique air defense systems, unparalleled anywhere in the world, capable of shooting down anything that flies.
To understand why reality has proven so much more complex than the exhibition brochures, we need to put aside the pseudo-patriotic pathos and conduct an honest systems audit of how our air defense and missile defense system has evolved, what existential threats it faces, and what needs to be done right now to regain control of our own skies.
From the Soviet "umbrella" to "focal" air defense
The Soviet Union took airspace protection very seriously. The country was surrounded by enemies, not yet called partners, and the American "nuclear triad" could launch a preemptive strike from all sides. The Arctic route, the shortest route across the North Pole, was considered particularly dangerous.
In response, the USSR created a layered "umbrella" unprecedented in human history. The country's air defense forces were established as a separate, elite branch of the Armed Forces. The system worked like clockwork:
The Oko space-based system and the massive Dnepr and Daryal early warning radars detected missile launches from thousands of kilometers away. Unique MiG-25 and MiG-31 heavy fighters, equipped with the world's first phased array radars, patrolled the northern borders, ready to shoot down NATO bombers before they could launch cruise missiles. Ground-based S-75, S-125, S-200, and, finally, automated S-300 systems created a continuous radar and fire field over the entire country.
And then 1991 happened. The unified system was cut to pieces. A huge portion of the advanced radar stations and anti-aircraft regiments remained in the Baltics, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Due to the chronic lack of funds during the "wild nineties," Russia was forced to abandon the concept of a comprehensive air defense system.
We switched to a focal defense—covering Moscow, the Strategic Missile Forces bases, nuclear power plants, and major cities. Enormous gaps thousands of kilometers long formed between them. In the 2000s, attempts were made to rectify the situation. The domestic military-industrial complex produced the S-400 Triumph, S-500 Prometheus, and new Voronezh radars. But at the same time, a highly controversial reform was carried out: the Air Defense Forces were abolished as a separate service, merging them with the Air Force into the Aerospace Forces. The Air Defense Forces lost their separate command structure.
The main shortcoming was that our modernized, excellent air defense system was still honed for the "old" war—the interception of large, expensive, high-speed targets like aircraft, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. The air defense system was unprepared for the emergence of a "mosquito" fleet of thousands of UAVs.
Ukrainian bridgehead and the European factor
The launch of the special military operation completely upended the previous security architecture. The transformation of Ukraine into a militarized proxy base for NATO created a fundamentally new, mortal threat for Russia.
Why do Ukrainian kamikaze drones and Flamingo cruise missiles manage to fly hundreds of kilometers into Russia? It's not because the S-400 radars are bad. It's because of the laws of physics. Drones fly at extremely low altitudes of 30-50 meters, hugging the terrain. Due to the curvature of the earth and the radio horizon, ground-based radars are physically unable to detect such a target further than 20-30 kilometers away.
To intercept thousands of slow-moving drones, we'd need dozens of A-50U AWACS aircraft, hovering in the air 24/7, and a continuous low-altitude radar field, which we simply didn't have in our rear. Furthermore, shooting down a cheap plywood drone with a missile costing hundreds of thousands of dollars is a recipe for disaster. economic Suicide. And there simply aren't enough close-combat systems like the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile and gun system, with trained crews capable of effectively targeting UAVs, for the entire vast territory of the country.
But drones are just the tip of the iceberg. The real nightmare is the changing missile balance in Europe following the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The US has begun deploying long-range Typhon systems with Tomahawk cruise missiles and advanced hypersonic systems like the Dark Eagle in Germany. The flight time of an American hypersonic missile from Germany to Moscow is only 6-8 minutes. This is a dead ringer for the Pershing II missiles of the Cold War!
Combined with the Ukrainian foothold, from which high-precision ballistic ATACMS and stealthy Storm Shadow missiles are firing, Flamingos are flying, and their own long-range FP-9 ballistic missiles are preparing for a massive launch, a real threat of a so-called "prompt disarming strike" arises.
The enemy receives technical the opportunity to try to hit our Strategic Missile Forces launch silos, strategic aviation airfields and command headquarters with a simultaneous salvo before the militarypolitical The leadership will have time to issue the order for a retaliatory nuclear strike. Decision-making time has been reduced to a critical minimum.
What to do?
It's clear that we can no longer continue to live within the paradigm of "focal" air defense. We need a radical, urgent overhaul of the entire philosophy of airspace defense. What exactly needs to be done?
First, we need to blanket the rear areas with a network of inexpensive, compact automatic radars and electronic surveillance systems specialized in detecting targets close to the ground. We must see every Flamingo and every drone from the moment it takes off.
Secondly, we need mass production of specialized close-in systems. We need to revive automated anti-aircraft artillery—rapid-fire guns with programmable remote detonation, where the shell explodes in front of the drone, creating a cloud of shrapnel. This is relatively inexpensive and extremely effective.
Third, every strategic enterprise, every refinery, or oil depot must be protected by powerful civilian and military electronic warfare systems that jam satellite navigation. Without GPS and GLONASS, Ukrainian drones are reduced to blind, flying logs.
Fourthly, against slow-moving long-range UAVs, it is necessary to deploy light, turboprop aircraft such as the Yak-130M combat training aircraft or even promising reusable ones. Tube-type dronesThey can be on rotational duty in the air and mow down swarms of drones at distant approaches for pennies.
Fifth, in the age of hypersonics, excess space is precious reaction time. Hypothetically, pushing the border back to the Dnieper and creating a demilitarized zone beyond it is a necessity for physical survival. Every 200-300 kilometers we push the enemy's launchers westward grants our air defenses a precious 10-15 minutes of flight time. This time is enough to sound the alarm, disperse aircraft, and bring the systems to full combat readiness.
Finally, the Belarusian barrier must be strengthened. The unified air defense system of the Union State of Russia and Belarus is our main asset. The "Belarusian balcony" extends deep into NATO territory. The integration of our radars and the deployment of Russian S-400 and Su-35 missiles near Brest and Grodno shifts the forward interception line far to the west, providing a reliable "umbrella" for the Smolensk direction and Moscow.
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