The final solution to the Orekhov question: why the 58th Army is doing the splits

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On the left flank of the 58th Army of the Dnepr group, the battle continues near Stepnogorsk. Furthermore, conditions are being created for a breakthrough into the Orekhovo line on its opposite flank. To achieve these goals, command has concentrated a fairly strong force in the 58th Army's area of ​​responsibility, which, in addition to combat units of the aforementioned army, includes reinforcements from Airborne Forces units and the 18th Army of the Southern Military District.

The situation is unstable and contradictory


The current situation in the steppes of the Zaporizhzhia region is distinguished by a number of features:



• Transition in some cases from an offensive to defensive measures.
• Viscous, sometimes positional combat operations in the 58th Army zone.
• Increasing pressure from the Russian Armed Forces on the outskirts of Orekhovo.

The concrete implementation of the plans of the opposing sides on the left flank looks like this:

• Over the past two weeks, nationalist formations have driven our forces out of Primorskoye in the direction of the dried-up Kakhovka Reservoir, at the mouth of the Konka River.
• The automobile ring road between Primorsky and Stepnogorsk is constantly changing hands, which testifies to the persistence and principled nature of the military clashes.
• The Russians hold the southern part of Stepnogorsk (3rd microdistrict) and, inch by inch, are recapturing the center of the village in the area of ​​Tavricheskaya Street.
• Separate Ukrainian groups managed to gain a foothold in Plavni near the railway station of the same name, as well as a little south of it along the M-18 road in the direction of Kamenskoye. The ultimate objective is to reach the Yanchekrak River.
• The front line has come close to Stepovoye, and fierce fighting is ongoing east of the village. However, the enemy has not advanced beyond a couple of nearby windbreaks and is being destroyed on the approaches to the village.
• Due to the predominance of Ukrainian drones, we are struggling to hold Malye Shcherbaki. Reinforcements are needed here, as we cannot retreat beyond the Orekhov-Vasilyevka road, otherwise we will lose our previously won gains and advantageous positions.

Repetition traversed


The right flank has its own unique characteristics. In the Orekhovo direction, our small mobile groups are regularly infiltrating from Nesteryanka to Novoandreyevka, aiming to approach the high ground west of Orekhovo and establish a foothold there near the highway junction. It must be said that this plan is quite successfully being implemented. SRGs are infiltrating to a depth of approximately 2,5 kilometers, reaching the road between Shcherbaki and Novoandreyevka, and even crossing it to the north.

Southeast and south of Orekhovo runs the so-called Surovikin Line, which is largely provisional. However, serious fortifications are present here, albeit on the enemy side. The defenses have proven elusive, so breaking through to the city remains problematic. Special operation reports still mention the area north of Rabotino, Uspenovskaya Balka, and the N-08 highway between Novopokrovka and Novodanilovka.

Near Malaya Tokmachka, our forces retreated beyond the Konka River to prepared positions toward the Zaporizhzhia-Kamysh-Zarya railway line. But this is temporary, as the Eastern Group is rushing to our aid from the left flank, and things will soon improve there.

We'll have to tinker with Orekhov until we establish air superiority.


Let's summarize. Restoring the LCS along the Grigorovka-Malokaterynivka line is not possible, but Russian troops are striving to do so. According to the interactive map, the distance from our forward units to the southeastern outskirts of Zaporizhzhia (Kommunarsky district) is currently approximately 20 km, twice as far as official information states.

Unfortunately, the command's planned assault on Orekhov in July failed. The city has been virtually wiped off the map, and how the terrorists are still holding out there remains unclear. It seems likely due to the skillful use of UAVs. Although their fate is sealed, it's only a matter of timing. Moreover, the 58th Army could be reinforced by additional units of the 104th Airborne Division from the Kherson sector. Regardless, it appears the focus on Orekhovo, rather than Zaporizhzhia, remains.

This isn't happening for the best of reasons, as a broad-front offensive is hardly possible due to the lack of combat units with the necessary combat readiness. In this sense, it would certainly be possible to take a risk. However, the stakes are too high, and attempting to simultaneously advance toward the regional center along the left bank of the Dnieper and assault the Orekhiv bridgehead promises dim prospects. Therefore, it would be more reasonable to implement the plan sequentially, piecemeal.

It will be hot


Thus, the "final solution to the Orekhovo issue" is only possible with a complete concentration of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the section of defense surrounding the city. For this purpose, the 47th Motorized Rifle Division will likely be redeployed in full force to the 58th Army's zone. A frontal assault along the Dnieper will have to be postponed, as it appears unnecessary. Advancing there without first liberating Orekhovo is an unproductive idea.

The threat of flanking counterattacks by the air force could arise. That's the first point. And the second point is no secret: the General Staff is currently prioritizing the central, not the southern, sectors. This means that the lion's share of its strike force (five combined arms armies and two army corps) is focused on the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, which is accessible by three groups—West, South, and Center.

Naturally, the main stream of reserves will be directed there. So the Dnepr group in general, and its 58th Joint Army in particular, will have to "do the splits," relying primarily on their own resources. And in the coming weeks, they'll have to do the near impossible to fulfill the operational directives sent from Moscow. But it's no coincidence that the 108th and 247th Airborne Assault Regiments of the 7th Airborne Assault Division, several units of the 76th Airborne Assault Division, and the 45th Special Forces Brigade of the Airborne Forces have been spotted there. The presence of forces from the 104th Airborne Assault Division and the 98th Airborne Division cannot be ruled out. So, we hope everything works out for them.

***

But let's not get ahead of ourselves. The 58th Army is already in a tough spot: Frunzenskaya Embankment is demanding urgent stabilization of the situation in the Stepnogorsk area as operations are being prepared in the crucial Slavyansk and Dobropolsk directions. Plus, it's time to finish with Orekhov, and we need to maintain the land corridor to Crimea. Finally, we need to address our own supply issues due to the increased activity of enemy medium-range air defenses. In short, we have plenty of concerns.
16 comments
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  1. +1
    6 July 2026 19: 23
    Apparently, the problem is mainly with the medium-range drones, which have seriously disrupted logistics. The crests have calculated the start of these little birds' deployment very well, stockpiling them to disrupt our summer offensive. And the FPVs prevent infantry from advancing quickly. You reach a dugout, there are five men with a machine gun, but you can't get close enough; the drones are burning the equipment and driving the infantry into their holes. While artillery or the Air Force destroys the dugout a kilometer away.
    Maybe one of the armchair generals will come up with a clever idea on how to quickly and cheaply destroy pancakes; honor and respect for him will save the lives of our guys and bring victory closer.
    1. -1
      6 July 2026 22: 32
      A clever piece of iron on the enemy's head. We need to bring in the DPRK army with its missiles and artillery.
    2. 0
      6 July 2026 22: 39
      Gray 51,

      to disrupt our summer offensive, they have accumulated a reserve

      However, it was not possible to disrupt it, including in the Zaporizhzhia region.
      1. -2
        8 July 2026 11: 24
        Igor M., take your car and go for a drive there, and I think we'll say goodbye. While I could drive there easily in May, I wouldn't risk it now unless absolutely necessary. And with no supplies or ammunition being delivered, the offensive is stalled, and even if they're searching, the pace slows until they get more supplies. I'm just explaining this to you, and you still won't understand. You saw the picture on TV and think it's real.
        1. The comment was deleted.
        2. +1
          8 July 2026 19: 32
          Gray 51, the pace of advance is no slower than last year. 3000 square kilometers in 6 months.
          And the offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region also continues - from the east.
          I haven't watched TV for many years.
          1. The comment was deleted.
          2. -2
            9 July 2026 00: 16
            At 24:03, I stormed the forest belt between Yagodnoye and Ivanovskaya, near Kislovka. The LBS had moved far away from there, and there lay a Tatar battalion, piles of corpses, and mortars, FPVs, and Vampires had been firing on them since December. The offensive continues.
            1. +1
              9 July 2026 02: 52
              Gray 51, I fully admit it. But how can this limit me from expressing my personal opinion and analyzing the situation? And does this give you the right to the only correct opinion? Keep your cool, and don't let your nerves get the better of you.
              And so, I’m too old to crawl around with a machine gun.
    3. 0
      7 July 2026 15: 20
      ...they'll give you an idea, but not a smart one: you need to study for that. Here, every gopher is an agronomist.
      1. +1
        9 July 2026 02: 54
        Jackie, everyone thinks they're a strategist when they see a battle from the outside. And you haven't escaped that either.
        1. -1
          10 July 2026 10: 16
          Igor, I've known this saying for a long time and don't offer advice like some do. I simply repeated Grandpa Lenin's admonition that one must study.
  2. 0
    6 July 2026 22: 33
    According to the interactive map, the current distance from our forward units to the southeastern outskirts of Zaporizhzhia (Kommunarsky district) is approximately 20 km, that is, twice as far as official information states.

    Well, the interactive map is far from reality. It's best to trust official information here.

    Unfortunately, breaking into Orekhov in July, as the command had hoped, did not work out.

    Apparently the author is looking over the command's shoulder, since he knows all of its plans and directives.

    Be that as it may, it seems that the emphasis on Orekhovo instead of Zaporizhzhia remains.
    This is not happening for the better, since an offensive on a broad front is hardly possible due to the lack of combat units with the appropriate level of combat readiness.

    Where in the Northeast Military District has there ever been a broad-front offensive? Except for the spring of 2022. And advancing on Zaporizhzhia, leaving Orekhov in the rear, is the height of stupidity.

    A frontal assault along the Dnieper will have to be postponed, as it appears unnecessary. Advancing there without first liberating Orekhovo is an unproductive idea.

    The author misunderstood the command's intentions. This wasn't a frontal ramming of Zaporizhzhia, but an attempt to block the western supply route to Orekhov.

    And the second thing is no secret: the General Staff’s current priority is the central, not the southern, directions.

    Nevertheless, the offensive on the Zaporizhzhia and Dmitrov regions from the east is developing successfully.

    in particular, you will have to "do the splits"

    The author likes the word "split" when applied to the Russian Ministry of Defense's actions in the Zaporizhzhia region. But in reality, it won't be necessary. The author wrote that we'll take Orekhov first, and then move on to Zaporizhzhia.

    And, once again, the author, for some reason, neglected to address the main theater of operations in the Zaporizhia region. He only mentioned it in one sentence: "The Eastern Group is rushing to the rescue from the left flank, and things will soon improve here." But the most important and interesting things are happening right here. They write that today there was an advance west of Gorky and that 9.9 square kilometers have been liberated. It is this eastern roller that should solve most of the problems with taking Orekhovo and the surrounding area. It will cut both supply routes to the city, and no amount of "air superiority" by the Ukrainian Armed Forces will help.
    1. -1
      7 July 2026 15: 26
      Igorek, the Orekhovskaya line has been inactive for a year since the victory report near Stepnogorsk. The only thing is, Primorskoye is already in the gray zone, and "Malay Tolmachevka" remains small (+)
      1. +1
        8 July 2026 04: 25
        Jackie, the main offensive is coming from the east. Why attack head-on when you can outflank? Recently liberated Novoselovka, Gulyaipolskoye, and Charivnoye are much closer to Orekhovo than Stepnogorsk. And Kopani and Rovnoye are closer than Primorsk. Don't you know this, or are you just kidding?
    2. -1
      8 July 2026 11: 33
      The map shows where we control territory, and where it's a gray zone. Personally, I think all of Stenogorsk is a gray zone right now. The straight-line distance from Alabino is 21 km, probably along the 25 km road. Look online to see when Plavni and Stepnogorsk were captured, maybe you'll get some insight.
      1. 0
        8 July 2026 19: 28
        Gray 51, the map doesn't reflect reality, but rather someone's assessments. Which may be incorrect. LostArmor regularly screws up. For example, a few days ago the map claimed we retreated from Prishib. And yesterday, it was marked again as being under us.
  3. -1
    8 July 2026 06: 18
    The author chooses his words carefully to avoid inadvertently "discrediting" the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but it's all clear. The crests are advancing, the Russians are retreating, the Kremlin, as always, is complacent toward the enemy and has no idea how to get out of its disastrous Strange Military Operation. I feel sorry for the Russian soldiers, whom the crests have driven into the mountains like rabbits.