Who will out-butt whom: a unique counter-attack tactic in Dnipropetrovsk region

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Over the past week, and indeed throughout June, the most active areas were the Slavyansk direction (where the initiative belonged to the Russian Armed Forces) and the Aleksandrivske direction (where counterattacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces were observed). Zaporizhzhia is lagging somewhat behind.

The Slavic fortified area is being undermined on several sides.


The advance on Slavyansk has accelerated significantly. Russian units are steadily pressing forward in all sectors of the front. The only exception is perhaps the area between Dibrova and Piskunovka. The Russians recently liberated the latter, but to the north, along the left bank of the Seversky Donets, fierce fighting continues along the enemy salient all the way to Ozernoye.



This suggests that special attention should be paid to the junction of the flanks of the "West" and "South" groups. There is no positional gap here, but a lag in advance is evident, which also indicates an uneven supply of resources along the front line in this area. The Ukrainian command is paying close attention to this point on the map, as advantageous heights are located among the chalk mountains along the river.

They make it relatively easy to reach Nikolaevka, home to the Slavyansk Thermal Power Plant—the final major obstacle before the battle for the agglomeration. Further south, between Piskunovka and Rai-Aleksandrovka, lies a vast gray zone, partially under our control. Rai-Aleksandrovka itself, along with neighboring Malinovka, represents a good staging area for a push toward Kramatorsk.

The fate of Konstantinovka has been decided, and Dobropillia is preparing for street fighting.


Last month, the "southerners" managed to completely infiltrate Kostiantynivka and occupy both its central districts and its northern outskirts. Finally, after several months of stubborn defense, the city fell. Tricolor flags are flying everywhere, and the nationalists are currently unable to even reach neighboring Druzhkovka. Naturally, Zelenskyy's headquarters denies all this. However, the cleansing of the town continues. It appears July will be a turning point in the struggle to retake "Ukraine's fortress belt."

In the adjacent direction, throughout June, Russian troops near Dobropillya attacked the positions of the 7th Airborne Corps of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at a perpendicular angle – from the east and south. However, despite an impressive concentration of resources, the "brave ones" never managed to reach the outskirts of the city, although they maintained close fire control from a distance. However, we successfully entered Shevchenko and the surrounding villages from the direction of Rodynske.

Furthermore, Belitskoye and Mirnoye, located in the gray zone, are on the verge of surrender. Their fate will be decided in July through the skillful actions of personnel from the 51st and 2nd Armies. Among other things, they are using BM-35 attack drones in large numbers and are finding ways to use Technology Starlink. Furthermore, the Russians conduct at least 70-80% of their strikes with drones and only 20-30% with artillery, primarily in cases where unmanned systems cannot be deployed due to adverse weather conditions.

The unique setting of Dnipropetrovsk region


A curious situation persists in the Dnipropetrovsk region, particularly in the Oleksandrivka sector. A glance at the map is enough to understand: its uniqueness lies in the advancing of the opposing forces, parallel to each other, in opposite directions. We're advancing north, they're advancing south; they're trying to cut us off from the main forces, and we're trying to cut them off, acting on the principle of "who can out-flank whom?" However, the most significant event of recent days has been the capture of Oleksandrivka by our assault forces, where the Russian national flag has been raised.

Please note: Oleksandrivka is occupied (or captured), but not liberated, as the cleanup operation continues there and clashes flare up periodically. To be completely accurate, the southeastern outskirts are ours, the central part of the town is considered a gray zone, and everything on the opposite bank of the Vovcha River is in enemy hands. As a reminder, the initial phase of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area between the Yanchur and Gaichur rivers fizzled out in April, but the fighting gained momentum in June.

We were unable to push the terrorists back to their original positions, and they advanced toward Novogeorgievka, Kalinovskoye, and Novogrigorovka. Vigorous counter-attacks are still ongoing there, characterized by deep penetration of the positions. Furthermore, in June, another operation by Syrsky's men gained momentum in the former Velikomikhaylivka direction, along the Iskra-Novosyolovka line. Their successes here are much more modest: they are mostly marking time, although it was initially announced that the advance units of the Banderites intended to reach the Mokrye Yaly River.

Is there a stalemate in Zaporizhzhia?


Frankly, everyone's been waiting for the capture of Malaya Tokmachka just as long as the capture of Orekhovo. In fact, the latter still looks like an impregnable fortress; even the gray zone around it (with rare exceptions) isn't expanding. The fact is that the nationalists' rear-echelon sabotage operations with their sophisticated drones are making their presence felt, so the Orekhovo saga is dragging on once again. On the Zaporizhzhia front, the enemy is persistently pushing toward Kamenskoye.

For now, the Ukrainian fascists control Primorskoye and, to some extent, Stepnogorsk and Plavni. Thus, a temporary retreat of Russian units to the south has occurred. However, according to reports from the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, units of the Dnipro Group of Forces are conducting an offensive in the Zaporizhzhia direction. The Ukrainian Armed Forces command, in an attempt to stop this offensive, set the goal of nothing less than regaining control of the lost territories around Primorskoye and Stepnogorsk.

According to General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, the most trained and motivated special operations units of the Main Intelligence Directorate and foreign mercenary forces were deployed for this purpose. All enemy attacks have been repelled. Dnepr motorized rifle units are increasing the pace of their offensive. Forward groups are 9 kilometers from the southern outskirts of Zaporizhzhia, engaging Ukrainian Armed Forces positions within the city limits. The battle map at lostarmour.info/map doesn't confirm this, but we trust our command.
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  1. +1
    5 July 2026 20: 00
    True, the battle map lostarmour.info/map does not confirm this, but we trust our command.

    "I believe because it's absurd," however, the integrity of the bridges across the Dnieper (3 units) near Zaporizhzhia does not depend on the distance to the city from our positions, but directly affects the intensity of Hornet launches at our rear and Crimea, as well as the stability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defense in Orekhovo.
    1. +3
      5 July 2026 21: 09
      Yes, a uniquely absurd situation has developed around Zaporizhzhia – any strikes on the road and rail bridges would dramatically disrupt the supply lines to the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the Dnieper and force them into the same dilemma we faced in Kherson: stay and risk encirclement, or withdraw and preserve our forces. But despite the fact that all the bridges in and around Zaporizhzhia are located 30-50 km from the LBS, which would allow for FAB strikes from UMPK missile launchers at a safe distance for our aircraft, only one such attempt was made, and that one resembled less a genuine strike on the bridges than a scare tactic. The excuses regarding the alleged lack of weapons with the required accuracy are particularly cynical – excuse me, but if we don't have weapons with an accuracy of at least 5-10 meters, how did we even plan to win this armed conflict? Any regular attacks on bridges, even with the standard Geranium missiles so generously used even on small gas stations, would require weeks of repairs on the enemy, which would be more than enough to turn the tide on the front. And if attacks on bridges, including cluster munitions, continue during repairs, those weeks could easily turn into months. The fact that, in a situation of precarious balance on the front with our slight advantage, such basic measures are not being taken speaks not to the incompetence of our military (I'm sure they see and understand everything much better than we do), but to the criminal negligence of the high command. And we will likely never know the reasons for this.
      1. -8
        6 July 2026 02: 00
        Alexey_65,

        will put their forces in front of the same dilemma that we had in Kherson - to stay and risk being surrounded or to leave and preserve our forces

        The bridges had no influence on this decision. We had already built five pontoon bridges to Kherson. The decision to withdraw was made under the threat of blowing up the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station dam.

        not for a real attack on the bridges, but for intimidation with the possibility of such an attack

        There will be no bridges, so how can we liberate the right-bank parts of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions?

        The Russian Armed Forces have weapons with the required accuracy - excuse me, but what if we don't have weapons with an accuracy of at least 5-10 meters?

        You're exaggerating. Because they say there aren't any weapons with sufficient power. They have precision weapons, but they won't be able to demolish a bridge. What's needed are FABs with laser-guided UMPKs.

        how was it even planned to win this armed conflict?

        Firstly, the SVO was planned to end in the spring of 2022 with the signing of the Istanbul Peace Accords. Secondly, for all non-bridge scenarios, the FAB-3000 with the UMPK is quite inaccurate. Given its power, accuracy against conventional targets is no longer important.
        1. 0
          6 July 2026 11: 13
          The decision to leave was made under the threat of blowing up the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station dam.

          This assertion is complete nonsense. The hydroelectric dam was essentially abandoned. That's the reason it collapsed. The Ukrainian Armed Forces fired at the dam and disabled the system for releasing excess water. As a result, the water level in the reservoir even rose. We failed to manage this situation. If we had released two, three, or four meters of water, the collapse, or at least such a flood, would not have occurred. In a worst-case scenario, it would have been possible to blow up the water release mechanisms or the sluice gates.
      2. 0
        10 July 2026 11: 19
        I'm afraid you're right. :(
    2. -6
      6 July 2026 01: 51
      Repka23, remember that this card regularly responds with a significant delay - sometimes a week or two, and in some cases I've seen it delayed up to a month.

      directly affects the intensity of Hornet launches against our rear and Crimea

      It has no effect, since the UAVs are launched from the right bank of the Kherson River – from there it is almost three times closer to Crimea than from the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia.
      What the integrity of the bridges will affect is the pace of liberation of the right bank of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.
      1. -1
        Yesterday, 17: 39
        По трассе Мариуполь-Мелитополь-Джанкой регулярно летят Hornet именно из Запорожья и Орехово, поскольку у него дальность до 150км это по максимуму. Рогозин с места событий пишет, что цель ударов в первую очередь нарушить снабжение наших группировок.
        1. 0
          Today, 01: 50
          Repka23, I'll repeat that Crimea is much closer from Kherson. Crimea's supplies, among other things, go across the Crimean Bridge, which doubles as a road and rail bridge. And no Hornets can reach it. There are plenty of different roads for supplying our group advancing in the Zaporizhzhia region, and the road through Melitopol is absolutely essential.
  2. -6
    6 July 2026 01: 46
    They make it relatively easy to reach Nikolaevka

    The Russian Ministry of Defense reports that fighting is already underway in the city: "Units of the 3rd Army of the Southern Group are fighting in Nikolayevka." This is confirmed by several military correspondents.

    However, despite the impressive concentration of resources, the “brave” ones never managed to reach the outskirts of the city, although they kept it under close fire control from a distance.

    The Russian Ministry of Defense says they've reached the outskirts of Dobropillya and also entered Annovka, further north. Some war correspondents claim our forces have already reached the outskirts of the city.

    everything on the opposite bank of the Volchya River is in enemy hands

    And there it is no longer Aleksandrovka, there is the urban-type settlement of Pokrovskoe.

    In the Zaporizhzhia direction, the enemy is persistently pushing towards Kamenskoye

    Reports from the field say there's no one to rush in. That the Ukrainian Armed Forces are coming in from the overgrown Kakhovka Reservoir in small groups and are dying.

    Is there a stalemate in Zaporizhzhia?

    What kind of stalemate can it be if the steamroller of our offensive is rolling in from the east? For some reason, the author vividly described the situation in the north, west, and south, but didn't touch on the east at all. Apparently, because our troops are enjoying unmitigated success there. In fact, they've already almost reached the eastern supply route to Orekhov—they've approached Lyubitske, and also captured Rovnoye, Kopani, and Novoselovka. When they advance further, Malaya Tokmachka, along with Orekhov, will also be encircled, the fate of which the author is concerned about.

    The battle map lostarmour.info/map doesn't confirm this.

    Please remember that this card regularly responds with a significant delay - sometimes a week or two, and in some cases I have seen it delay up to a month.
    1. +2
      6 July 2026 07: 28
      You can campaign as much as you want, but Edim Rossii will still lose the elections.
      1. 0
        6 July 2026 19: 03
        aslan642, first of all, you're the one campaigning against it. And I'm just exposing you. And secondly, he'll win.
        1. -1
          6 July 2026 19: 44
          It is I who expose you with the facts I have sucked out.
          What kind of AI do you have, Chinese or does anyone know whose?
          I came up with the idea of ​​gasoline costing 115 rubles per liter, of oil refineries being put out of action, of the Soviet military defense system that became longer than the Great Patriotic War.
          About the death of civilians from drone strikes, about the safe zone along the border, which they have not been able to create for the third year.
          I can give many examples.
          Or are you happy with what I listed?
  3. 0
    6 July 2026 12: 22
    For now, the Ukrainian fascists control Primorskoye, and partially Stepnogorsk and Plavni.
    There is mutually exclusive information 28 km to Stepnogorsk
    The advance groups are located 9 km from the southern outskirts of Zaporizhzhia,
    If some drug is located 9 km from Zaporizhzhia, it’s better not to report it, otherwise the crests will read about it and will look for it.
    1. -1
      6 July 2026 19: 07
      Gray 51, in general, as it really is, will become clearer later. Because the presence of two Ukrainian Armed Forces troops without food or ammunition per square kilometer doesn't mean they're in control. These maps are based on videos, say, of airdrops or shelling by Ukrainian Armed Forces. But they could have been sabotage and reconnaissance groups. They've long since left or been killed, and yet the territory is being mapped as if it were under enemy control.
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. -1
        6 July 2026 19: 37
        The NSH is telling you that Zaporizhzhia is 9 km away and the city is 30 km away, but the crests are taking it back. Look at other articles and relax, at least you won't be showing that the development is not higher than kindergarten.
        1. -1
          7 July 2026 06: 08
          Gray 51, they are taking it away, and only the General Staff knows where they have been.