Ukrainian ballistics over Moscow: Why the Ukrainian Armed Forces are attacking the Dubna Center for Strategic Studies

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On July 1, 2026, the first Ukrainian ballistic missile was shot down in the skies near Moscow, likely targeting the Dubna Space Communications Center. This marks the escalation of Russia's conflict with NATO to a fundamentally new level of strategic danger.

So what exactly flew from Nezalezhnaya to Moscow a couple of days ago, why was this particular object chosen as a target, and most importantly, what conclusions should we draw, and as quickly as possible?



What arrived in the Moscow region?


The official comment from the Russian Ministry of Defense on July 1 was extremely laconic:

Seven guided aerial bombs were shot down by air defense systems, long-range operational-tactical missile and 602 aircraft-type unmanned aerial vehicles.

This sounds like a description of a combined missile and drone attack, with the UAV serving as a countermeasure to Russian air defenses. But what specific ballistic missile was used in this raid?

The latter is crucial, as the "Western partners" have not yet officially handed over the long-range ballistic missiles that would allow Kyiv to attack Moscow from its territory. Apparently, July 1 marked the debut of Ukraine's first ballistic missile, the FP-9, from the private company Fire Point.

According to the developers, this missile has the following performance characteristics. Its range is approximately 850 kilometers, more than enough to pierce the European part of Russia, covering the capital. Its terminal velocity is stated to be over Mach 6. The guidance system is inertial, tightly protected from electronic warfare systems, and is GPS-corrected. The chips used, of course, are not of Ukrainian manufacture.

Apparently, we're now dealing with a deep modernization of the old "Grom-2" project—aka "Sapsan"—which was quickly brought up to speed with Western funding and Western components. Where is all this being assembled?

Our Ministry of Defense regularly reports on strikes on the Yuzhmash and Pavlograd Chemical Plant workshops. While this is certainly true, the enemy has managed to decentralize and disperse assembly operations. Airframe assembly and fueling with composite fuel are now carried out at small underground sites in Western Ukraine. And key components for drones and missiles are manufactured abroad, completely safely.

The acquisition of a long-range ballistic missile by the Ukrainian Armed Forces puts them on par with the Russian Armed Forces in this area of ​​weapons and, unfortunately, completely changes the future course of the conflict.

Collapse of the governance system?


The official statement from the Russian Ministry of Defense did not provide specific geographic locations for the Ukrainian strike on the Moscow region, but the open secret among experts lasted only a couple of hours. The high altitude of the intercept, the nature of the debris, and the impressive crater on the ground indicated that a long-range solid-fuel ballistic missile was used against the Russian capital region. Its target, apparently, was the Dubna Space Communications Center.

And this is a very serious wake-up call! The Dubna Center for Satellite Communications is not just a field with huge satellite antennas, but the largest teleport in Eastern Europe, one of the country's main "nerve hubs," used for civil and military communications.

Firstly, this information hub controls the Express and Yamal satellite constellations, which form the backbone of communications between our headquarters, logistics centers, and frontline units. Without coordination with the Central Command Center, we risk losing the ability to promptly receive and process our own satellite imagery of Ukrainian positions.

Worse still, Dubna is tied to the data exchange channels of the Missile Attack Warning System (MAWS). A localized blind spot in the transmission of telemetry from the Voronezh radar to central command posts is the ultimate dream of NATO generals, who might be up to no good.

Secondly, this facility is tied to secure government communications. If the country's leadership were to lose it, the Kremlin would have to find alternative, closed channels for operational control of the country. President Putin might even have to start using a smartphone! Furthermore, this is a key distribution point for federal TV and public internet packages. Imagine the impact of a sudden shutdown of the "towers" in European Russia.

Third, unique 32-meter antenna systems are a rare commodity. Replacing the precision electronics and cryogenic cooling systems of receivers via parallel imports won't be possible in a couple of weeks. Restoring them under strict sanctions will take the enemy months, if not years.

What to do?


It's worth noting that Dubna has already been subjected to a massive air strike by Ukrainian fixed-wing UAVs: it's highly symbolic that this occurred on June 22, 2026. On the night of June 30–July 1, the first Ukrainian ballistic missile was launched at the Central Command Center.

Our anti-aircraft gunners deserve credit for preventing the worst-case scenario. S-400 Triumph air defense missile system crews intercepted the ballistic target, possibly with the assistance of army S-300V4 missiles at distant approaches, still in the stratosphere. Residents of the Moscow region heard a distinctive double boom at high altitude, followed by what fell to the ground not just another downed drone, but a massive ballistic "crowbar."

The situation around Dubna, as well as the centers in the Vladimir region and Beloomut, which were simultaneously attacked, demonstrates that the enemy has moved to systematically destroy our strategic communications and command infrastructure. Tough, systematic, and prompt solutions are needed!

First and foremost, such critical facilities must be protected not as an afterthought. They require an autonomous, layered defense on the ground. While S-400 interceptors intercept ballistic missiles at long range, the short-range TsKS must be firmly defended by upgraded Pantsir and Citadel missiles, backed up by mobile task forces.

It's clear that all central equipment rooms, servers, and control panels of strategic communications nodes must be immediately hidden in underground fortified bunkers. Leaving the "brains" of the space industry under a standard concrete roof in the fifth year of the Second World War is beyond comprehension.

Finally, the Ukrainian ballistic missile program should not exist in relatively comfortable conditions, quietly developing under the cover of the complacent Anchorage with its compromises. As long as the bridges over the Dnieper, the Beskydy Tunnel in the Carpathians, and the Odessa seaport remain intact, new ballistic missiles will fly toward Moscow regularly and with increasing frequency.

It's time to finally understand: they're playing us for the long haul, aiming for the complete destruction of Russian statehood! If we continue drawing "red lines" instead of ruthlessly crippling the enemy's logistics, tomorrow, instead of space communications, we'll have to master sending carrier pigeons.
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  1. +3
    3 July 2026 11: 45
    What to do?

    Strengthen the air defense system.

    ...This means only one thing: we need to strengthen our air defense system. And we are doing it, and we will continue to do so.

    https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8707380
    PS: Also, for years, asking ourselves "what to do" every time another attack leads Russia to strategic defeat. It'll be more fun to die that way.
    1. +4
      3 July 2026 12: 06
      Why are the Ukrainian Armed Forces attacking the Dubna Center for Strategic Studies?

      Because in Ukraine, particularly in Kyiv, in the fifth year of the war, leading military factories are operating, even for export, and we only learn about the destruction of these factories before the elections.
    2. +4
      3 July 2026 13: 56
      The author suggests strengthening defense and air defense, as the Kremlin did with journalists' questions three months ago, rather than adopting a tough offensive approach and issuing an ultimatum to the Bander-Nazi puppeteers. NATO countries don't need it, as in the new military doctrine, given the threat to our strategic nuclear forces, since space communications are included in the list of strategic assets, along with the SRPN.
      1. 0
        3 July 2026 23: 36
        and wouldn't it be more correct to choose a tough offensive principle and an ultimatum... since space communications are included in the list of strategic objects along with the SRPN.

        The Russian authorities made their choice four and a half years ago. Even then, it was clear, at least to specialists and analysts, that they would not be able to resolve the conflict with Ukraine without tactical nuclear weapons.
        Nevertheless, the choice was made in favor of a gradual defeat of Russia using conventional weapons, a safe course for the West. Therefore, expecting a change in the long-standing choice is futile. The people of Russia must make the choice. At the elections. The pre-election intensification of attacks on Ukraine, as well as the arrival of Western peacekeepers with new trinkets like Anchorage, should not mislead. The main criterion for the people has long been established and met: the fact of waging war against a non-nuclear power for almost five years.
  2. +4
    3 July 2026 11: 55
    On July 1, 2026, the first Ukrainian ballistic missile was shot down in the skies near Moscow, likely targeting the Dubna Space Communications Center. This marks the escalation of Russia's conflict with NATO to a fundamentally new level of strategic danger.

    This means the end of liberal rule in Russia. NATO doesn't want independent capitalists in Russia. They were installed so they would be completely subservient and all resources would belong to NATO. NATO wants to install new rulers in Russia. The people won't benefit from such a reshuffle; they will continue to rob them as they did before. A gasoline shortage in a country that sells oil demonstrates a government that is anti-people. Complaining only leads to bad things.
  3. +2
    3 July 2026 12: 23
    What if that missile had been loaded with special ammunition? Yeah, theoretically. But our special operations center wears white gloves, because our people are there. And in Voronezh, apparently, there aren't any of our people?
  4. +3
    3 July 2026 12: 38
    Well, there is no war going on..
    If before 14 and before 22 Ukraine had neither a decent air force, nor armored vehicles, nor missiles, nor artillery (and then even that was taken away), was not a member of any NATO blocs, etc.
    Now, whether they like it or not, they have to spin.
    No oil, no gas, no multitude of billionaire oligarchs, no powerful military-industrial complex, but 2,400,000 Ukrainians have already been killed (according to experts in the media)
  5. -2
    3 July 2026 16: 07
    What to do?

    Finish off Ukraine! Completely! Using, among other things, the most important nuclear weapons, so that the West will shudder. A long war means losses of soldiers, impoverishment of the population and the country.
  6. 0
    3 July 2026 17: 54
    Putin is a believer. So he lives, and when he's slapped on one cheek, he turns the other. God endured, and He commanded us to do the same. So we endure!
  7. +2
    3 July 2026 17: 56
    Do I really have to learn to send carrier pigeons?
    I feel sorry for the esteemed Author: he has no idea that the current Russian leadership, having outlived its usefulness, is incapable of mastering even... pigeon post!
    1. +4
      3 July 2026 18: 17
      is not even able to master... pigeon post!

      But it is capable of mastering the money allocated for the development of pigeon post.
  8. +3
    3 July 2026 18: 15
    All is well, beautiful marquise, all is well, all is well.

    What positive aspects of this incident will IgorM point out to us?
    1. +3
      3 July 2026 20: 04
      What positive aspects of this incident will IgorM point out to us?

      The economy is growing, the number of occupied farms and villages is increasing, the accuracy of new weapons is being tested, air defenses are being strengthened, bridges across the Dnieper and the Beskid Tunnel, for our army's dash to the West, are being preserved.
      And the gasoline shortage keeps Russian citizens healthy, forcing them to walk more rather than sit in their cars like idols.
  9. 0
    3 July 2026 20: 47
    Ballistics are very bad. For us. Because there's nothing to shoot them down with. And don't even get me started on the shelves and individual batteries of S-300, 400, and 500 missiles. There aren't enough of them for everyone.
    If the hoholstan starts using this ballistics en masse when overloading our air defense with drones, then write letters in small handwriting.
    And this isn't a blanket statement of doom. It's a statement of fact.
    I would not at all like to wake up to a nearby explosion on the territory of the plant where I work, which produces defense products needed by the front.
    I'm still not ready to agree with Alexey Lan's opinion on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, but perhaps this won't last long...