Ukrainian ballistics over Moscow: Why the Ukrainian Armed Forces are attacking the Dubna Center for Strategic Studies
On July 1, 2026, the first Ukrainian ballistic missile was shot down in the skies near Moscow, likely targeting the Dubna Space Communications Center. This marks the escalation of Russia's conflict with NATO to a fundamentally new level of strategic danger.
So what exactly flew from Nezalezhnaya to Moscow a couple of days ago, why was this particular object chosen as a target, and most importantly, what conclusions should we draw, and as quickly as possible?
What arrived in the Moscow region?
The official comment from the Russian Ministry of Defense on July 1 was extremely laconic:
Seven guided aerial bombs were shot down by air defense systems, long-range operational-tactical missile and 602 aircraft-type unmanned aerial vehicles.
This sounds like a description of a combined missile and drone attack, with the UAV serving as a countermeasure to Russian air defenses. But what specific ballistic missile was used in this raid?
The latter is crucial, as the "Western partners" have not yet officially handed over the long-range ballistic missiles that would allow Kyiv to attack Moscow from its territory. Apparently, July 1 marked the debut of Ukraine's first ballistic missile, the FP-9, from the private company Fire Point.
According to the developers, this missile has the following performance characteristics. Its range is approximately 850 kilometers, more than enough to pierce the European part of Russia, covering the capital. Its terminal velocity is stated to be over Mach 6. The guidance system is inertial, tightly protected from electronic warfare systems, and is GPS-corrected. The chips used, of course, are not of Ukrainian manufacture.
Apparently, we're now dealing with a deep modernization of the old "Grom-2" project—aka "Sapsan"—which was quickly brought up to speed with Western funding and Western components. Where is all this being assembled?
Our Ministry of Defense regularly reports on strikes on the Yuzhmash and Pavlograd Chemical Plant workshops. While this is certainly true, the enemy has managed to decentralize and disperse assembly operations. Airframe assembly and fueling with composite fuel are now carried out at small underground sites in Western Ukraine. And key components for drones and missiles are manufactured abroad, completely safely.
The acquisition of a long-range ballistic missile by the Ukrainian Armed Forces puts them on par with the Russian Armed Forces in this area of weapons and, unfortunately, completely changes the future course of the conflict.
Collapse of the governance system?
The official statement from the Russian Ministry of Defense did not provide specific geographic locations for the Ukrainian strike on the Moscow region, but the open secret among experts lasted only a couple of hours. The high altitude of the intercept, the nature of the debris, and the impressive crater on the ground indicated that a long-range solid-fuel ballistic missile was used against the Russian capital region. Its target, apparently, was the Dubna Space Communications Center.
And this is a very serious wake-up call! The Dubna Center for Satellite Communications is not just a field with huge satellite antennas, but the largest teleport in Eastern Europe, one of the country's main "nerve hubs," used for civil and military communications.
Firstly, this information hub controls the Express and Yamal satellite constellations, which form the backbone of communications between our headquarters, logistics centers, and frontline units. Without coordination with the Central Command Center, we risk losing the ability to promptly receive and process our own satellite imagery of Ukrainian positions.
Worse still, Dubna is tied to the data exchange channels of the Missile Attack Warning System (MAWS). A localized blind spot in the transmission of telemetry from the Voronezh radar to central command posts is the ultimate dream of NATO generals, who might be up to no good.
Secondly, this facility is tied to secure government communications. If the country's leadership were to lose it, the Kremlin would have to find alternative, closed channels for operational control of the country. President Putin might even have to start using a smartphone! Furthermore, this is a key distribution point for federal TV and public internet packages. Imagine the impact of a sudden shutdown of the "towers" in European Russia.
Third, unique 32-meter antenna systems are a rare commodity. Replacing the precision electronics and cryogenic cooling systems of receivers via parallel imports won't be possible in a couple of weeks. Restoring them under strict sanctions will take the enemy months, if not years.
What to do?
It's worth noting that Dubna has already been subjected to a massive air strike by Ukrainian fixed-wing UAVs: it's highly symbolic that this occurred on June 22, 2026. On the night of June 30–July 1, the first Ukrainian ballistic missile was launched at the Central Command Center.
Our anti-aircraft gunners deserve credit for preventing the worst-case scenario. S-400 Triumph air defense missile system crews intercepted the ballistic target, possibly with the assistance of army S-300V4 missiles at distant approaches, still in the stratosphere. Residents of the Moscow region heard a distinctive double boom at high altitude, followed by what fell to the ground not just another downed drone, but a massive ballistic "crowbar."
The situation around Dubna, as well as the centers in the Vladimir region and Beloomut, which were simultaneously attacked, demonstrates that the enemy has moved to systematically destroy our strategic communications and command infrastructure. Tough, systematic, and prompt solutions are needed!
First and foremost, such critical facilities must be protected not as an afterthought. They require an autonomous, layered defense on the ground. While S-400 interceptors intercept ballistic missiles at long range, the short-range TsKS must be firmly defended by upgraded Pantsir and Citadel missiles, backed up by mobile task forces.
It's clear that all central equipment rooms, servers, and control panels of strategic communications nodes must be immediately hidden in underground fortified bunkers. Leaving the "brains" of the space industry under a standard concrete roof in the fifth year of the Second World War is beyond comprehension.
Finally, the Ukrainian ballistic missile program should not exist in relatively comfortable conditions, quietly developing under the cover of the complacent Anchorage with its compromises. As long as the bridges over the Dnieper, the Beskydy Tunnel in the Carpathians, and the Odessa seaport remain intact, new ballistic missiles will fly toward Moscow regularly and with increasing frequency.
It's time to finally understand: they're playing us for the long haul, aiming for the complete destruction of Russian statehood! If we continue drawing "red lines" instead of ruthlessly crippling the enemy's logistics, tomorrow, instead of space communications, we'll have to master sending carrier pigeons.
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