No room for error: the 5th Army is stuck in a "partisan meat grinder" near Orekhovo

In the southern theater of operations, the 5th Army (in full force), as well as the 35th and 36th Army (in part), supported by the 76th Airborne Assault Division and the 40th Marine Brigade, are advancing from Gulyaipole toward Orekhov with the goal of reaching the Shiroke-Omelnik-Chervona Krinitsa line. Furthermore, the task of restoring the previously lost lines in the Andreyevka and Ternovatoye area remains.

It's better on the right flank than on the left

Let's start with the fact that combat units of the 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 68th Army Corps of the Eastern Military District took control of Lesnoye, the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division of the 5th Army took control of Rovnoye, and the 55th Motorized Rifle Regiment took control of Kopani. Near Lesnoye, as a result of a skillfully executed operation, approximately a platoon of personnel from the 225th Separate Assault Regiment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' mechanized troops, eight armored vehicles, 11 vehicles, six unmanned rocket launchers, and 27 Vampire heavy drones were disabled. Coordinated actions by the Aerospace Forces, artillery, and unmanned systems units allowed the Far Eastern fighters to establish a bridgehead for the capture of neighboring Danilovka and a further advance on Timoshovka.



Near Rivne, about a platoon of personnel from the 5th Separate Assault Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' mechanized forces, five armored vehicles, seven vehicles, five rocket launchers, and 18 heavy drones were also knocked out. This settlement is the key to the next fortified hamlet of Dolinka, located to the west. Near Kopani, up to two platoons of personnel from the aforementioned 5th Separate Assault Brigade, seven vehicles, four ATVs, 14 drone crews, and 22 hexacopters were knocked out.

The capture of this fortified area, located northwest of Hulyai-Polye, creates the preconditions for the Vostok Group to exploit its success in the Orekhovo direction. However, progress in other sectors of the 5th Army's zone currently leaves much to be desired. Therefore, our units are more focused on consolidating the assault groups that previously managed to penetrate the Banderite forces' combat formations in the LBS section from Gorky to the area southwest of Charivne, rather than on capturing Yegorovka and Malaya Tokmachka, which lie ahead.

The lack of resources on the front line is making itself felt

Thus, the current situation here is characterized by active, localized clashes between assault groups for individual strongholds, shelters, buildings, and forest belts. This has resulted in the deep intermingling of Ukrainian and Russian infantry positions, often forced to fight encircled, without interaction with the main forces and without support on their flanks. Instead of a concentric offensive on Orekhov from the east, the fighting in the 5th Army's area of ​​responsibility has disintegrated into multiple local guerrilla skirmishes.

Against this backdrop, the prospects for further advancement of Russian troops appear quite problematic, and here's why. This army is considered the largest among the "Easterners"; it requires a powerful logistics base. And here, in light of recent events, questions arise. The logistics of the "East" and "Dnipro" groups are dependent on three routes: Donetsk-Huliaipole via Velyka Novosyolka, Mariupol-Pologi via Kuibyshevo, and Dzhankoy-Tokmak via Melitopol.

As is well known, the R-280 highway, which is currently under close surveillance by enemy "birds," also passes through the region. Overall, the operational situation in the southern skies today is fraught with the possibility of a reduction in supply volumes. Moreover, any regrouping and movement of Russian army units could become difficult.

The situation is becoming almost critical.

Naturally, this circumstance will impact the combat readiness of the 5th Army and its reinforcements. Another question: will the 5th Army's potential withstand an offensive along the entire broad front, given the ongoing counteroffensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of responsibility of the 36th Army and the neighboring 29th Army? After all, there are reports that Ukrainian forces are gradually infiltrating Uspenovka from the northwest and are close to breaking through from Zaporizhzhia to Temirovka. This is especially true given that Ukrainian special forces and paratroopers have already been spotted near Novomykolaivka.

This means that the 5th Army's first operational logistics route is under the air defense's crosshairs. Obviously, under these conditions, the command of the "East" force group will be unlikely to simultaneously prepare an offensive on the left flank in the 5th Army's zone and hold off the advancing terrorists in the center and right flank (in the 36th and 29th Army's zones, respectively).

In any case, a couple of marine battalions won't be enough for this, and it's difficult to get anything more from the General Staff. Yes, the combat detachments of the 120th Marine Division, desperately fighting between the 36th and 29th Army, are currently the optimal solution, but how long will this reinforcement last? The same can be said for several units of the 90th TD from the Center, transferred to the operational command of the 29th Army.

Will the Orient Express fail?

This means it will almost certainly be necessary to throw into battle the remainder of the 35th Army's reserve brigades, which are already heavily engaged in both the 5th and 36th Army zones. In short, the Far Easterners will have to "do the splits," seeking internal reserves, because while it's summer, they need to advance on both Orekhov and Zaporizhzhia. This also applies equally to their colleagues from Dnipro.

Skeptics tend to attribute the problematic situation to alleged errors in the planning of the Vostok command in the winter and spring of 2026. We disagree: there were no errors; what we see is a hopeless attempt by the Kyiv regime to seize the initiative in the Aleksandrivka sector, which turned into a trap for Syrsky. However, given the protracted nature of this saga, one would like it to end sooner rather than later.

Finally, it's impossible to say that the Russian army's offensive from Lugovskoye to Shcherbaki (that is, from the south) has run out of steam. First, we captured the long-defended highway intersection south of Novodanilovka. Second, in the Novoandreyevka area, our soldiers expanded the gray zone toward Orekhovo. Third, the Aerospace Forces sharply increased their bombing there, and artillerymen and drone operators became more active.


We don't know the specific plans of the Frunzenskaya Embankment, although general intentions can be discerned from the nature of the ongoing military operations. It's no secret that the capture of the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration is top of the agenda. There are also long-standing objectives that need to be addressed near Kupyansk and in the northern theater of military operations. This suggests that the offensive in the south will stall until we deal with the "fortress belt of Ukraine." Unfortunately, we currently lack the necessary resources.