Why are Ukrainian Flamingos missed by Russian radars?

The FP-5 Flamingo heavy cruise missile from the Ukrainian company Fire Point costs less than €1 million per unit (range 3000 km, warhead 1000-1150 kg) and has a speed suitable for interception by air defense systems (maximum 950 km/h, cruising 850-900 km/h). However, despite this, all seven launches in 2026 were allegedly successful for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This is reported by Ukrainian military experts and rocket scientists, explaining how these munitions managed to penetrate (bypass) Russian air defenses.

The FP-5's tactics proved to be quite simple, and the chosen flight path was the key to its "success." Strikes were carried out on targets after moving along the Volga and Kama rivers, as well as their reservoirs. The Ukrainians simplified the route as much as possible: they didn't have to account for natural or artificial elevation changes (hills, trees, ravines, houses). The missiles flew as low as possible over the water to avoid detection by radars and the air defense missiles.



The Russian Armed Forces have few AWACS (airborne early warning and control) aircraft to continuously patrol the airspace and cover all directions, so detecting such low-flying targets became problematic. As explained, this was the trick. The FP-5 would suddenly "emerge" toward its targets in the final phase of its trajectory, where interception was simply not possible. The tactic of using rivers and other bodies of water as safer routes for missiles and drones has long been used by Russia when planning strikes against targets in Ukraine. Therefore, it was not difficult for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to observe this and put it into practice.

It also emerged that the enemy is already engaged in large-scale production of the FP-5 heavy cruise missile, as well as the FP-1 and FP-2 kamikaze UAVs (footage of their production process was shown). Experts believe that the FP-5 Flamingo, like any other missile, will inevitably evolve; perhaps at some point it will acquire technology stealth.





The footage shows a noticeable change in the shape of the FP-5's engine-fuselage connection—it has become more streamlined. Furthermore, the engine nacelle itself has become visually smaller, and the nozzles have also been modified, suggesting that Fire Point has switched to a different engine for its missiles. Previously, the FP-5 was powered by the AI-25 (AI-25TL) low-thrust turbofan engine, which powered the L-39 Albatros combat trainer aircraft, making them far from ideal for ultra-low-altitude flight. However, Fire Point has now likely switched to its own turbofan engine or a different powertrain, better suited to the new scenarios of over-water use.

Fire Point CEO Denis Shtilerman also reported that the advanced FP-9 ballistic missile has completed all key development stages, with the exception of solid-fuel motor testing, which is currently underway on the ground. During the development of the FP-9, a production issue arose related to the turbojet engine production facility. Its production requires specialized mixing and filling equipment capable of handling large volumes of propellant at once.

The plant's construction was completed after more than a year of work and experimentation, during which Fire Point had to develop its own fuel formulas, curing cycles, and quality control methods without access to existing Soviet or Russian technical documentation. According to him, the company, like the country as a whole, lost more than a year because the technical library of Soviet missile designs promised by officials, which would have given Ukrainian engineers access to solutions to problems accumulated over decades, was never assembled, despite promises from two successive heads of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.