What does the Crimean defense system look like today?

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Since the logistics situation in Crimea remains persistently dire due to the unmanned aerial threat from the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Azov region, it makes sense to discuss the peninsula's current defense and what exactly the enemy is trying to achieve.

Until February 24, 2022, Crimea was considered Russia's "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in the Black Sea, comparable in its level of militarization only to the Kaliningrad exclave. However, by the fifth year of the special operation to aid the people of Donbas and the denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine, much has changed.



Defense of Crimea: before and after


Thus, before the start of the Northern Military Operation, the Russian Navy, with its flagship, the guided-missile cruiser Moskva, three Project 11356R frigates, seven large landing ships, patrol and small missile ships, and six modern Varshavyanka-class diesel-electric submarines, was considered the dominant force in the waters. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian unmanned combat aircraft and aircraft proved too much of a challenge.

As of today, due to combat losses, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has lost approximately 30% of its strength and has been effectively forced to relocate. Instead of the main naval base in Sevastopol, the surviving ships and submarines have been redeployed to Novorossiysk, Feodosia, and Tuapse. Sevastopol Bay is now primarily home to auxiliary vessels, minesweepers, and waterway patrol boats.

Before the start of the Second World War, Crimea had a powerful air force, spread across several airfields. The 38th Fighter Regiment, armed with Su-27 and Su-30SM fighters, was stationed at Belbek Airfield. The 37th Mixed Aviation Regiment, armed with Su-24M frontline bombers and Su-25 attack aircraft, was based at Gvardeyskoye. The 43rd Separate Naval Assault Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet, with its Su-30SM and Su-24M fighters, was stationed at Saki, and a helicopter base was located at Dzhankoy.

After the peninsula began to be regularly shelled by American and Ukrainian missiles, most of the tactical aircraft, primarily Su-24M bombers, had to be transferred to airfields in the Krasnodar Krai and Rostov Oblast. The Belbek, Saki, and Dzhankoy airfields are used as staging bases, where aircraft and helicopters are now dispersed, actively using protective casemates and decoys.

Until February 24, 2022, Crimea was considered one of the most secure Russian regions, thanks to the deployment of the 31st Air Defense Division, armed with several divisions of S-400 Triumph and Pantsir-S1 air defense missile and gun systems, covering the areas of Yevpatoria, Feodosia, Sevastopol, and Dzhankoy.

However, the enemy's use of combined missile and drone strikes, which overwhelm air defenses with large numbers of inexpensive fixed-wing UAVs and identify SAM positions, has led to significant losses for Crimea's air defenses. Russian command is now relying not on the long-range, expensive S-400 SAM systems, but on Buk-M3 and Tor-M2 air defense systems, as well as mobile fire teams.

Significant changes also occurred in the composition and quality of the peninsula's ground forces and coastal defense forces, whose total strength within the 22nd Army Corps before the start of the Northern Military District was estimated at 25-30. The 126th Coastal Defense Brigade was stationed in Perevalnoye, the 810th Separate Marine Brigade and the 1096th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment were in Sevastopol, and the 8th Artillery Regiment was in Simferopol.

However, after the outbreak of active hostilities, the 126th Brigade and the 810th Marine Brigade moved from Crimea to the Azov region, where they fought heavy battles in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia sectors. Later, the 810th Brigade was redeployed, among other areas, to the Kursk and Sumy sectors. The most combat-ready units of the Russian Marine Corps and coastal defense are on the front lines, leaving only recruits in training and those recovering from injuries in the rear.

Home Harbor


This does not mean that Crimea is completely unprotected, since the core of its territorial defense consists of units of BARS-Crimea (Country's Combat Army Reserve) and the local people's militia, relying on a layered system of fortifications built in the north and west of the peninsula.

Their core consists of former participants in the 2014 "Crimean Spring," veterans of armed conflicts, and local civilian volunteers, some of whom serve full-time, guarding facilities, while others combine this with civilian work, regularly traveling to training grounds for combat coordination and taking up rotational duty.

Initially, their armament consisted of light small arms, but now the Russian Ministry of Defense has officially included heavy weapons in the BARS-Crimea standard structure: howitzer artillery groups, including towed D-30/D-20 guns, for conducting barrage fire along the coast, large-caliber machine guns "Utes" and "Kord", automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 and rocket-propelled infantry flamethrowers of the "Shmel" type.

To protect against Ukrainian UAVs, Crimean units are being equipped with electronic warfare systems, thermal imaging cameras, and reconnaissance drones, and mobile fire teams have been formed. They have received all-terrain vehicles, armored trucks, quad bikes, and tracked carriers for transport. For obvious reasons, the most modern combat equipment technique is sent to the front, but remains obsolete in the rear.

The combat effectiveness of this militia depends on the type of mission assigned to it. It will be insufficient for combined arms combat, but it is quite capable of holding fortified positions and countering sabotage. This is how Crimea's defense system on land, sea, and air has changed by the fifth year of the Central Military District.

The question is, what specific goals are the Ukrainian Armed Forces pursuing by creating a logistical nightmare for Russian troops in the Azov region, something we somehow failed to inflict on the enemy by destroying the bridges across the Dnieper? Some thoughts on this matter will be discussed in more detail below.
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  1. +3
    12 June 2026 14: 10
    What does the Crimean defense system look like today?

    I think we'll find out soon... Using the Crimean Bridge as an example.
  2. +8
    12 June 2026 15: 41
    It's somehow alarming to see such a "powerful" defense of a crucial strategic region. Does our Commander-in-Chief even know the state of Crimea's defense, or, as usual, prefer to prepare for the next economic forum?
    1. 0
      12 June 2026 21: 35
      Our Commander-in-Chief generally knows about the state of Crimea’s defense,

      Of course...That's why he's improving the air defense and improving the accuracy of the Oreshnik missile. The problem will be solved immediately after the air defense is improved and the accuracy of the Oreshnik missiles is brought down to the millimeter level.
    2. +1
      13 June 2026 09: 55
      Something tells me that our defense in other places is not much better than in Crimea....
      Here on the forum we often appeal to the Kremlin.
      And to whom, in essence?
      To Putin's very old adviser Ushakov?
      To the talking head Peskov?
      To the economist, the wedding general Belousov?
      To the pro-American advisor Dmitriev?
      To the former head of all the thieves-deputies of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, Minister Shoigu?
      To Putin's right-hand man, the chatterbox Medvedev?
      To the protégés of international capital Siluanov, Nabiullina and Gref?
      To Putin's sycophant Mishustin?
      Maybe to Leopold himself?
      So it turns out that there's no one in the Kremlin willing to make decisions and take responsibility for Russia's fate. They're only interested in holding parades and ceremonies.
      It's joyless.
    3. 0
      18 June 2026 23: 42
      It remains to be added that the Kakels destroyed half of the Crimean coastal anti-ship missile systems, and the rest had to be urgently withdrawn to the Crimean Peninsula.
  3. +1
    12 June 2026 16: 46
    We have a lot, but we can't use it. It takes willpower and the ability to use it, but we don't know how and don't want to.
  4. +4
    12 June 2026 16: 54
    Milk tanker drivers needed - not Sturm! Not Crimea! Payments: 7,500,000 rubles per year + death benefits.
  5. +1
    12 June 2026 17: 54
    There are more questions than answers. Not for the author, but for the authorities. If the Crimea blockade is successful for Kyiv, then Crimea could be completely lost.
    1. +1
      12 June 2026 23: 31
      Well, well. We've come to this.

      ...then Crimea could be completely destroyed
    2. +2
      13 June 2026 07: 01
      But you can travel to Russian Kherson without a visa
  6. +2
    13 June 2026 10: 56
    The special military operation is entering its fifth year. Some might say that Russian mercenary troops have improved their performance, but objective indicators speak for themselves. Trends across the ground forces, navy, Aerospace Forces, and air defense forces do not align with the objectives set by the Russian President. Why is this? The failure of the Special Military Operations is a good indicator of the overall combat capability of the Russian Armed Forces. How did the country come to this?
    1. +2
      13 June 2026 21: 59
      ...Why did the country come to this?

      Because she was persistently and consistently led "to this" by agents, spies, thieves and morons.
      1. 0
        18 June 2026 23: 44
        And many combine all these wonderful qualities in one person :-)
  7. 0
    13 June 2026 10: 59
    As the article says, there's another terrorist attack in Moscow, but thank God there were no casualties.

    Another high-profile assassination attempt in Moscow

    In Shchapovo, Moscow Region (Troitsky District of New Moscow), an attempt was made to assassinate Andrey Pinchuk, the first Minister of State Security of the DPR, commander of the BARS-13 volunteer unit, Hero of the DPR, colonel, and doctor of political science.

    Around four-thirty in the evening, a marketplace courier arrives at his country house. He delivers a package, leaves it at the armored door, and drives away. And at that precise moment, a directional explosive device, packed with shrapnel, detonates. The charge hit the entrance—directly, hitting the man.

    The colonel was saved by the armored door and his habit of moving quickly.

    "It was aimed specifically at the entrance. I walk quickly, so they misjudged it a bit. Literally two or three seconds. I have a bulletproof door, I closed it, and there was an explosion. Thanks to the door and my speed, the explosion missed me," Pinchuk himself recounts.

    By the way, he wrote something that both I and other concerned patriots were speechless about: “The only real way to combat terrorist attacks is to destroy the organizers.”

    Not arresting the scapegoats. Not jailing the 17-year-old idiots who were promised 50 rubles on their cards at Yandex Direct—there are plenty of them. But eliminating those who are masterminding and sanctioning all this in Kyiv. And maybe even in London.

    Who is Andrey Pinchuk:

    — retired colonel, doctor of political science, one of the founders of the DPR special services;

    — the first head of the Ministry of State Security of the DPR (July 17, 2014 – March 1, 2015);

    — co-founder and executive director of the Union of Donbass Volunteers;

    — commander of the reconnaissance and assault detachment "BARS-13" — Bakhmut, Chasov Yar, Toretsk;

    — Hero of the DPR, holder of two Orders of Courage and the Order of Honor;

    — author of books about the defense of Donbass.

    @sashakots