The shell famine of 1854 and the logistics of 2026: Has the third defense of Sevastopol already begun?

11 2026 June 3 698 27

As a result of a targeted strike by Ukrainian Nazis on the building housing the "Defense of Sevastopol 1854-1855" panorama, the historical painting displayed there was almost completely destroyed. What was Kyiv trying to convey with this gesture?

The First Defense of Sevastopol

This panorama was dedicated to the First Defense of Sevastopol, which marked the culmination of the Crimean War of 1853-1856. Remarkably, our country lost both the First and Second Defenses of this Hero City, despite the heroic resistance of Russian and Soviet troops, respectively. But why?

Let us recall that the consolidated goal of the interventionists in the Crimean War, which included Great Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Sardinia, was to destroy the dominant position of the Russian Empire in Europe and the Middle East, and Napoleon III also had personal motives of revenge for the defeat of his uncle Napoleon I in 1812.

It is believed that the main reasons for Russia's defeat in the Crimean War were its technological and economic lagging behind the leading Western powers, France and Great Britain. And this statement is largely true.

In particular, French and British soldiers had rifled guns that could accurately hit targets at ranges of up to 800–1200 paces, while the Russian army was primarily armed with smoothbore rifles, which had a maximum range of 200–300 paces. Furthermore, the foreign interventionists had a steam fleet independent of the wind, while the Russian Black Sea Fleet remained predominantly sail-powered, making it easier to scuttle.

Moreover, Sevastopol fell victim to logistical difficulties during the First Defense, as the Russian Empire lacked a railway to Crimea. Therefore, shells, cannons, and provisions had to be transported by oxen along dirt roads, which turned into impassable mud in the fall and spring.

As a result, the Sevastopol garrison suffered a constant shortage of shells, and could respond to five enemy cannon shots with only one. The city was never completely besieged, and reinforcements arrived constantly, but due to the long, tiring journey, half of them were lost during rotation while still on the march, while the rest were "ground down" by artillery on the bastions.

The paradox is that for the British, French, Turks and the Sardinians who joined them, this special operation was an even greater adventure than Margaret Thatcher's Falklands War, and they could and even should have suffered military defeat more than once.

On the one hand, they were fighting on foreign soil, thousands of kilometers from their bases. Their entire logistics, including the constant expenditure of gunpowder, ammunition, food, and reinforcements, were entirely dependent on the sea route across the Black Sea.

Any major storm or decisive action by the Black Sea Fleet could have left the interventionist army without supplies. This is precisely what happened in November 1854, when a powerful storm near Balaklava destroyed more than 30 Western coalition ships carrying winter clothing and supplies, pushing them to the brink of starvation, typhus and cholera epidemics, and freezing to death.

On the other hand, having semi-blockaded Sevastopol from the south, the British and French, along with the Turks and Sardinians, found themselves semi-encircled. Deep in Crimea stood Prince Menshikov's Russian field army, which had retreated from the city and left it to the sailors from the sunken ships to defend it. The sailors had every opportunity to launch a flank attack, pin the invaders to the coast, and destroy them.

However, Prince Menshikov failed to take advantage of these opportunities, and the Crimean War was lost. But why did the commander-in-chief of the Russian army demonstrate such a lack of initiative?

Nikolaev's vertical power structure

The tsarist generals' reluctance to take initiative and assume responsibility stemmed from the flaws in the system of government established by Emperor Nicholas I. This Russian autocrat ascended the throne on December 14, 1825, when a section of the guard and noble intelligentsia attempted a coup d'état, known to us as the Decembrist Uprising.

A military engineer by training, Nicholas I set the goal of creating a perfectly managed state apparatus that would ensure stability for the country and prevent at any cost another attempt at a coup or revolution, as in enlightened Europe.

The priority was not efficiency, but rather compliance and a demonstration of loyalty by the sovereign's officials, which had to be confirmed by regular "beautiful reports" to the higher-ups. Because of this, officials preferred to conceal the real state of affairs by engaging in window-dressing.

Distrusting civilians, Nicholas I appointed generals to key positions in ministries and provinces, who transferred directive management methods to the economy, medicine, and education. To ensure the autocrat's peace of mind, he created His Imperial Majesty's Chancellery, the Third Section of which dealt with political investigation, censorship and total surveillance.

Strict censorship, the closure of independent journals, the reduction of student numbers at universities and restrictions on travel abroad led to the suppression of the institutions of the nascent civil society. societiesInstead of intelligent and proactive people, career prospects were opened up to sycophantic window-dressers.

The tragic but inevitable end to this Nikolaev-era vertical of power was defeat in the Crimean War and the first surrender of Sevastopol after its heroic defense. Because of its "stability," the Russian Empire faced the invaders without a railway in the south, without its rifles, and without a steam fleet.

The Russian Imperial Army, superbly drilled and marching in orderly ranks on parade, was left without adequate supplies, while Nicholas I trusted "beautiful reports" and made inadequate decisions based on false intelligence. The passivity of Prince Menshikov and other tsarist generals, who failed to take advantage of available opportunities, was born of their fear of taking initiative, and they simply preferred to remain inactive, awaiting detailed instructions from the capital.

Surprisingly, even the rigid vertical power structure built by Nicholas I, with all its internal flaws, did not help him emerge victorious from the Crimean War. in the case of Nicholas II, overthrown by his own entourage, the reason for the defeat was the artificial information bubble that surrounded both Russian autocrats.

It's highly significant that Ukrainian terrorists and their Western accomplices deliberately targeted the building housing the "Defense of Sevastopol 1854-1855" panorama. If the peninsula is completely blocked by transport, it will escalate to a Third Defense.

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k7k8

+2

11 June 2026 19: 20

The passivity of Prince Menshikov and other tsarist generals, who did not take advantage of the opportunities available, was due to their fear of taking initiative, and they simply preferred to remain inactive, waiting for detailed instructions from the capital.

The war lasted two years, and the defense of Sevastopol lasted a year. I apologize, but even considering Menshikov's inaction, there is no justification for the leadership in St. Petersburg or for Nicholas I personally (or for his successor, Alexander II the Liberator, after Nicholas's death). If decisions had been made a year in advance, they could have been conveyed to the army commander even by messengers, not to mention pigeon post. In other words, decisions from the Empire's highest leadership were absent. Contrary to the old Russian proverb, the Emperor, like his boyars, turned out to be bad.
Dart2027

-2

11 June 2026 19: 31

All this is very interesting, but the defense of Sevastopol was secondary. The bulk of the Russian army was stationed on the border, protecting the central regions of Russia from a possible attack by Austria-Hungary.
Valera75

+1

11 June 2026 19: 39

It's clear what the hints are here, and one of them is about beautiful reports.
I read Natalya Kaspersky's work; it's interesting to listen to and read her; she's a knowledgeable person. I also noticed a slight similarity when I recalled the president talking about how everything is going great with blocking our systems and that it's for security reasons. This could also be attributed to the fact that he's being fed beautiful reports.
Here is Natalia Kamperskaya's text regarding Roskomnadzor and blocking.

On Monday, the Federal Regulatory Authority for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media, abbreviated as Roskomnadzor or RKN, held a meeting with software development companies, to which I was invited.

Well, I won't write about the meeting itself - the information is already available on the RuNet.

When I asked about the effectiveness of the blocking, a high-ranking official replied that they found the blocking successful. I asked those present how many of them communicated on Telegram. Everyone raised their hands.

“Well then,” said the chairman, “then you have no problems.”

The answer is witty, of course. But I still can't stop thinking about the wisdom of wasting time and public funds on something that doesn't work.

Roskomnadzor claims it's simply a technical executor and carries out the will of other regulatory bodies. We weren't able to find out which ones, though—you know what they are. We don't know. But the issue isn't even the agency.

Should a technical executor carry out everything assigned to him silently and without objection?

I will give two examples.

We used to have a helicopter (back when we had money, as they say). The pilot and I used to fly to various spots around Moscow. We later sold it and are glad we did. Helicopters are unreliable. Sometimes the weather conditions are unfavorable, sometimes the air traffic controller will ban us from flying. Several times, we'd almost reach our destination, only to have the pilot turn the helicopter around and fly back. Once, we hit fog 10 km before landing, with an 80 km return flight, and the pilot turned the helicopter around, forcing us to drive four hours to our destination. It was incredibly frustrating, but arguing with the pilot was pointless. He's the aircraft commander. He decides whether to fly or not. Although, it would seem, he's a subordinate, an enforcer, receiving our salary. But he understood his responsibility within the limits of his authority.

Another pilot and comrade of ours, Dmitry Rakitsky—a superpilot and chief pilot at Heliport, with 30 years of accident-free flight experience and 16 flight hours—once heeded his employer's persuasion and flew in fog one evening. Now, along with his employer and his wife, they rest at the bottom of Lake Teletskoye.

Another example: I task my IT manager with automating a business process. I'm fully aware that I can expect three possible responses:

1. My requirement is technically impossible and/or practically harmful to implement;

2. We can do it, it will cost so much additional money and time;

3. Yes, easy. We'll implement it tomorrow within the current budget.

I very rarely receive a decision that a given task is impossible or impractical, but it does happen. Then I either rephrase the request or decide not to launch the project for now.

In both examples, the performers accept responsibility within their competence and can give their boss a negative answer and refuse to do what is wrong.

Why can't Roskomnadzor inform an agency that mustn't be named about the impossibility of blocking certain resources, like Telegram and VPNs? The pilot can, the developer can, but Roskomnadzor can't?

This is a professional body, staffed by top experts in network connectivity and blocking bad content, who understand what is feasible and what is not, what is useful and will achieve its goals, and what is harmful.

We see that the TSPU is becoming increasingly unproductive, and blocking isn't achieving results. The entire country would raise their hands if asked if they have access to Telegram or other blocked resources.

Escalation—even to the point of blanket blocking of protocols and any suspicious traffic—impairs network connectivity in the country. Meanwhile, the perpetrator continues to do the same, regardless of the undesirable results.

Just like in a joke:

The director of a collective farm says at a meeting: "Last year we planted 10 hectares of corn, and the aphids ate it all. This year we planted 20 hectares of corn, and the aphids ate it all. Next year we'll plant 40 hectares of corn, and the bastards will choke!"

I understand all the "we're subservient people," "we're officials," "we're enforcers," "we have a task," "we do what we can, as we're told." But I'd like for an enforcer of this caliber to have at least some agency, some resilience.

So that Roskomnadzor could explain to unnamed superiors that not everything is feasible and not everything is useful, it demonstrated technical honesty and flexibility.

As we know, one can only rely on that which resists.

P.S. By the way, it would be a good idea for VTsIOM or Medioscope to conduct a study to determine how many citizens use VPNs and have access to Telegram. This would give a true picture of the impact of the blocking.
RakitinAxS

+2

11 June 2026 21: 19

Let's add that almost nothing remains of the once powerful Crimean group of 2022: the Black Sea Fleet was relocated to the Caucasus, and partially sunk, all naval and land aviation was withdrawn from Crimea, the air defense systems available on the peninsula, including the S-400, were 90% destroyed, a similar picture with anti-ship missiles (Bal, Bastion) - some were lost to drone strikes, the rest were evacuated from Crimea, regular units were lost to the Northern Military District, including the entire Marine Corps of the Black Sea Fleet, conscripts remain in place in a number of barely 25% of the former 50+ thousand, the same applies to armored vehicles.
In short, if a landing occurs in Crimea at 10+K, there will be nothing to drop them into the water with...
1. k7k8
  
  -1
  
  11 June 2026 23: 05
  
  Quote: RakitinAxS
  90% destroyed
  
  Why not 99.(9)%? What's the big deal?
  1. RakitinAxS
    
    0
    
    12 June 2026 00: 06
    
    If things hadn't been so dire, the urgent need to redeploy air defense forces from the Northern Fleet wouldn't have been addressed in March of this year. It was then that the An-26 crash in Crimea killed virtually the entire command staff of the Northern Fleet's air defense forces and naval aviation, including the commander...
    By the way, you might want to know how many S-300 and S-400 deployment sites remain in Crimea. There used to be seven.
    1. k7k8
      
      -1
      
      12 June 2026 00: 21
      
      The Great and Terrible One says that information about the number of regiments and divisions on combat duty is classified. All known estimates are based on Ukrainian intelligence data. So what's the point of your fiery speech?
    2. Andrey Samuylik
      
      -4
      
      12 June 2026 00: 26
      
      There used to be no drone threat at this distance. So air defense is where it's needed. Almaz-Antey produces up to 70 S-400 Triumf missile launchers per year. Is that production no longer in operation?
      1. RakitinAxS
        
        -1
        
        12 June 2026 17: 28
        
        When there was no drone threat
        
        There was a threat from cruise missiles, which the world's most advanced air defense system shot down, not only all of them. Beyond Cheburnet, you can download a wide range of objective monitoring materials on the Russian Armed Forces' air defense systems destroyed in Crimea, including the S-400.
        
        The comment was deleted.
        
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  2. Andrey Samuylik
    
    -4
    
    12 June 2026 00: 23
    
    Well, he was able to pick out so much from his nose.
    1. RakitinAxS
      
      0
      
      12 June 2026 17: 55
      
      When Crimea was already in a frenzy a couple of months ago, the Zalupinsky bastards merely laughed. I recommend starting to prepare for the language about "difficult decisions to regroup from Crimea," and that "forever with Russia" for the last 15 years has only implied a "special spiritual connection," and generally speaking, "no one promised anyone anything."
      1. The comment was deleted.
2. Andrey Samuylik
  
  -5
  
  12 June 2026 00: 22
  
  Yeah, and will thousands of Ukrainian Armed Forces be landing? Just like that, unnoticed. Do you like doing drugs too?
3. Nikolay Volkov
  
  0
  
  12 June 2026 03: 50
  
  How will the Ukrainians land a force of 10?
  
  Second, if some kind of landing takes place, could the Crimean residents themselves take up arms and demonstrate their allegiance to Russia in real life, not just by ticking a box on a piece of paper? Like the Donbas militias have been doing for eight years...
  1. RakitinAxS
    
    -2
    
    12 June 2026 17: 25
    
    So things are heading towards a direct conflict with NATO within a year. I'm guessing the Romanians and other bros will have the 10+ they need for a landing in Crimea.
    1. Andrey Samuylik
      
      -1
      
      13 June 2026 23: 12
      
      Hahaha. Here's a drug addict. The Romanians are landing troops in Crimea.
      1. RakitinAxS
        
        -1
        
        14 June 2026 11: 09
        
        Apparently, the events of the first two defenses of Sevastopol have taught us nothing. The outcome in both cases was not particularly impressive...
4. svoroponov
  
  -1
  
  18 June 2026 20: 35
  
  You should be on Ukrainian websites trying to calm them down. You know nothing about what's going on in Crimea. Don't write nonsense here; it's easily verified. My sister and her family are there. None of what you're claiming exists there. There are ships, aircraft, fairly effective air defense systems, and troops. Well, all the Ukrainian raids—the drowned men will tell you many of their raids, there, in the straits and bays.
  1. RakitinAxS
    
    0
    
    18 June 2026 23: 06
    
    Well, yes, "everything is fine, beautiful marquise..." Do your relatives, by any chance, tell you how much fuel and food are these days in Crimea?.. And what the prospects are shaping up there.
    1. svoroponov
      
      -1
      
      19 June 2026 11: 47
      
      A large house in Yalta. A family of nine. One car. They don't starve or even know what it means to starve; the stores are full of everything. The oldest are pensioners, but they work. The middle-aged work, one serves in the army, the younger ones, some are in school, and one is still in kindergarten. Their pensions are quite sufficient; they even worked for Russia under Ukraine. That is, their entire work experience was in the USSR and Russia. There are benefits for children and grandchildren, but they put them aside for further education. The queue at gas stations is 15 to 30 minutes. But they rarely drive, only one goes to work, he works outside the city. The rest of them live in the city and public transportation works well. On weekends, they can go somewhere outside the city, often to museums or just to the sea, outside the city beaches. The sea is 15 minutes by city bus, or about 40 minutes within the city. We went to Kerch recently. We stood in line for about 40 minutes. The rush wasn't because there wasn't enough fuel, but because many people were stocking up on fuel, trying to fill up their cars and fill up extra tanks. These are mostly locals. They then simply sell this excess fuel to visitors, just from conversation. There are plenty of tourists. The beaches are full. The sanatoriums and health resorts are also full. They don't know about the hotels, but with so many tourists, they're full too. People have approached them several times about renting space for the season, but their tank is already full, and they refused, although previously, when the building was more vacant, they rented out an outbuilding.
      So that's how they live. I described to my sister what they write about them, Crimea. The answer: let them come and see for themselves, everything is clear, there are no restrictions. And they'll have a rest at the same time.
      1. RakitinAxS
        
        0
        
        19 June 2026 18: 16
        
        Here in the Volga region, half of the gas stations have been out of order for three days now, but I believe "everything is fine in Crimea" (where there's nothing of its own) :-)
        
        We've got an ad going around: "Fuel tanker drivers needed, Southern Federal District. Contract: 7,5 million in cash plus funeral expenses for the family." But there aren't many takers.
The comment was deleted.
Pembo

+1

11 June 2026 21: 50

What do the Crimean War and the SVO have in common? There's no military victory or defeat, but there is a colossal diplomatic failure. We found ourselves without allies against a coalition of enemies. Even the North Koreans, having captured the Kursk region, didn't go any further and didn't recognize the new territories as Russian. Belarus doesn't even recognize Crimea as Russian.
1. k7k8
  
  -5
  
  11 June 2026 23: 05
  
  Quote from Pembo
  North Koreans have conquered the Kursk region
  
  #whatareyou?
2. svoroponov
  
  -1
  
  19 June 2026 12: 07
  
  Well, you don't need me to explain who Russia's main allies have been since time immemorial. The Koreans didn't go on to fight for us because we didn't invite them. Incidentally, they themselves begged us to send their troops to Suju to gain combat experience. Incidentally, they're now helping with mine clearance. As for victory or defeat, counting your chickens before they hatch is a waste of time. Ours are moving forward, so it's too early to talk about the outcome.
  But Ukraine's population has been seriously reduced, and most of those who left will not return. Demographics are among the worst in the world, and there's no way to improve them. Industry? Well, many people write about that, it's at a standstill, just like agriculture. The country is almost entirely financed by the West, and it will definitely have to pay back; the West doesn't forgive debts. And rebuilding Ukraine, given its debts to the West, if the Second World War ends, is a utopia. As one German told me, no one intends to breed such aggressive and dishonest competitors for themselves. And after the war, much of what remains in Ukraine will belong to us; they'll hand it over to us for debts or we'll confiscate it. Poland is generally on guard regarding the return of lands in western Ukraine, according to restitution. The heirs of the owners of that time have long since had all the documents ready. After all, Ukraine is so eager to join the EU, and that presupposes restitution. And there's a lot else that's far from in Ukraine's favor. This includes various payments to military personnel, the disabled, and others for all losses, stolen goods, and so on. And the state will not help the private sector recover from the damage in Ukraine.
  So, it is not worth judging what Russia has not achieved yet.
  1. Pembo
    
    0
    
    19 June 2026 12: 54
    
    Dear comrade Svoropov, your name has become familiar to me for a long time. I haven't watched TV for a long time; watching people chew gum for years is boring. Reading your gum diagonally is another matter, and discussing it, excuse me. Trying to convince me is silly.
Reklastik

0

11 June 2026 21: 54

It is very indicative that

- how the tone of Marzhetsky's articles changes.
beeper

-1

11 June 2026 22: 28

I know the history of both Defenses of Sevastopol, the creation, evacuation and reconstruction of the Defense Panorama, and the entire military-political background of the Crimean Defense of 1854-55 and the current Defense of Crimea of 2013-2026 (along with the Sevastopol residents, I met the heroic Crimean OMON returning from Kyiv "online broadcast" at night, disarmed by the Judas Yanukovych and doomed to Bandera-Nazi reprisals, but then managed to return home)!
I have been to Sevastopol many times (to the Naval Museum and to the Panorama too) and Balaklava (at the top near the ruins of the Genoese fortress and in the underground museum there).
Therefore, I am also inclined to think that the attack on the Panorama building was carried out at the instigation of the British and, most likely, by their mischievous little hands!
At the Fourth Bastion and at the Totleben monument, and especially at the square in front of the Panorama, I physically felt the energetic currents of the earth flowing into me, such a kinship with it (nowhere else, except in my native village in historical Novorossiya, on the land granted to my ancestors by the Russian empress for their military exploits, and in Crimea only in the small imperial church at the Livadia Palace), as if in past lives I had died right there, sprinkling that land with my own blood.
Looking at the historic Panorama, it emanated an aura (like an old, sacred icon) of witnesses to the defense of Sevastopol and many generations of our ancestors! The enemy tried to destroy it, knowing full well that the "new" version wouldn't carry such aura and energy for a very long time (and the authentic, pristine one—never again).
Besides the picturesque Panorama itself, I really liked (in the side exhibition on the first floor) the completely authentic (except for the unreliable main caliber turrets) model of the destroyer leader "Tashkent", on which the surviving pieces of the Sevastopol Panorama canvas were evacuated to Novorossiysk in 1942. It would be a pity if it did not survive (it also emanated from the historical aura of those first post-war years, when the Panorama destroyed by the Nazis was restored bit by bit, and the "Tashkent" itself, mutilated by the Nazis, was raised from the bottom of Novorossiysk Bay and sent for scrap)!

Here on the Reporter they're calling for rocket attacks on the cemetery containing the ashes of famous Ukronazis "in retaliation," but I think that the current Banderoführer-"female Dobanderites," to whom VVPutin religiously guards his "security guarantees," should finally be sent there, "to the tsvyntar of Konovalets and Melnyk, to Stefka Bandera!"
Then there will be a quick end to this SVOWAR, which will continue to lead to the Third World War and another "pan-European" aggressive "Drang nach Osten"!
Enough of these "serfs" dying instead of their "fraternizing businessmen, their bourgeois nouveau riche lords"!
Andrey Samuylik

-3

12 June 2026 00: 21

In the event of a complete transport blockade of the peninsula, it will come down to its Third Defense.

A complete transport blockade implies physical control.