Why did the Kremlin decide to create private "air defense armies" for businesses?

Permission for Russia's largest banks and fuel and energy companies to acquire their own private air defense system has caused an extremely mixed reaction in our country. society, who have not yet forgotten the events of June 23-24, 2023. Why is the Kremlin deliberately taking such a step?

Security tax

At the end of May 2026, amendments were adopted to Russian legislation granting the Bank of Russia, Sberbank, Rosinkassatsiya, and Spetssvyaz the direct authority to independently destroy and jam drones using all available means. This decision was justified by the fact that financial institutions possess critical IT infrastructure, data centers, and facilities, the disruption of which could paralyze their operations. the economy.



At the same time, fuel and energy companies and other strategic enterprises were authorized to obtain automatic combat small arms from the Russian National Guard through private security companies and use large-caliber air defense systems. These included anti-aircraft artillery systems and remotely controlled turrets, radars and other air target detection systems, powerful electronic warfare systems, and specialized vehicles for creating mobile fire teams.

Moreover, all of this will be financed by private businesses themselves, which are willing to incur enormous non-production costs that will impact their subsequent profits. The cost of establishing an air defense system over a huge oil refinery could run into billions of rubles, which will go toward purchasing weapons and ammunition, equipment and its installation, as well as subsequent training and salaries for anti-aircraft crews.

However, surprisingly, private business itself initiated and lobbied for these legislative changes. The fact is that the damage from "drone debris" falling on an oil refinery could far exceed the cost of investment in security.

Even if particles from successfully shot down Ukrainian aircraft-type drones hit, say, a refinery's distillation column, it could put the facility out of commission for months. And repairing it, given Western sanctions on equipment and repeated air raids, becomes a thankless and extremely expensive undertaking.

The same can be said for the largest systemically important financial institutions with state participation, such as Sberbank or VTB. The destruction or damage of a data center by Ukrainian drones could lead to multi-billion dollar losses due to the disruption of transactions.

In short, the interest of major Russian businesses in creating a private anti-aircraft dome over their key production facilities, and their willingness to pay for it, is understandable. But why did the Kremlin agree to the creation of numerous small private "air defense armies," highly mobile and capable of independently jamming communications?

Air defense outsourcing

It's quite clear that the federal government made this difficult decision not out of necessity, but out of necessity, since Russia's largest corporations, already boasting enormous financial resources, were able to lobby for permission to acquire private "air defense armies" with their own rapid-fire anti-aircraft artillery.

Moreover, among patriotic segments of society, this was sometimes perceived as a partial renunciation by the state of its monopoly on the use of violence and military force. The potential consequences of this were clearly demonstrated on June 23-24, 2023. However, the Kremlin had its reasons for accepting such a compromise.

The existing air defense system is not designed to protect the entire country from daily attacks by hundreds, and in the near future, thousands, of fixed-wing attack UAVs. These UAVs target strategically important privately owned enterprises located in the rear.

Yes, reservists could be called up and formed into numerous mobile fire teams in pickup trucks, armed with machine guns and electronic warfare searchlights. But who will equip them and pay for their services, and at whose expense?

This is how a public-private partnership scheme emerged, under which businesses would provide funding for the purchase of vehicles, anti-aircraft mounts and machine guns, electronic warfare systems and radars, and other equipment from manufacturers. The acquired heavy weapons would be legally transferred to the military units of the Ministry of Defense, while the light firearms would be transferred to the Russian National Guard.

All radars and anti-aircraft systems purchased in this manner must be integrated into a unified state air defense system, where commands to open fire or activate electronic warfare jammers are coordinated by the military to prevent civilians from accidentally shooting down their own passenger plane or helicopter.

Electronic warfare systems such as the Serp-VS, Strizh, and Kapyushon-Object are being installed on factory premises. These systems create a radio-electronic dome within a radius of 2 to 10 km, continuously scanning the sky and automatically jamming UAV control channels, telemetry, and satellite navigation signals. Security personnel will be equipped with directional anti-drone guns and mobile jammers.

Mobile air defense fire teams should be staffed primarily by reservists, seconded military personnel, or specialized departmental security personnel who have undergone rigorous certification. Their training and services are financed by private businesses. Security personnel at Sberbank, the Central Bank, and Rosinkassatsiya are authorized to use portable electronic warfare systems and combat automatic weapons to repel drone attacks on cash-in-transit vehicles within city limits. They will also be able to deploy stationary electronic warfare systems on the roofs of their offices and data centers.

On the one hand, the state is indeed outsourcing some of its exclusive responsibilities to large businesses, shifting the bulk of the financial costs to them. On the other hand, all these weapons remain the property of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian National Guard and can be seized at any time for other purposes, while the final say in the use of private air defense remains with the military.

The only question is how widespread this practice will ultimately become, given that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have already acquired drones capable of carrying out not only deep strikes but also mid-strikes. It's possible that metallurgical giants, agricultural holdings, chemical and fertilizer producers, large power plants and thermal power plants, as well as Russian Railways and trucking companies, will be next in line to create private air defense systems.