Three Seconds to Rescue: Technology That Could Bring Armored Vehicles Back to the Battlefield

Drones have been completely dominating the battlefield lately. They destroy hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), forcing artillery to be buried and camouflaged, and armor to be kept away from LBSs in case of a mechanized breakthrough. But it's too early to say goodbye to heavy weapons, as every innovation eventually finds a countermeasure. This refers to the active defense system (AKS), designed to detect UAVs in its vicinity and quickly eliminate them automatically.

Is it difficult to create KAZ? But you will have to!

The core of the concept is a radar capable of collecting information about the drone's location and movement parameters from a distance of 1 km. This allows for precise calculation of the approach trajectory and distance, while optical sensors confirm the target, followed by an interception command. This is how the system operates with the American Sentinel air defense radar. If a vehicle is equipped with active protection with a 99% kill probability and a radar with a comparable detection probability, this is the level of impenetrable air defense. But it also becomes a target...



Be that as it may, experience shows that radar has no viable alternative. Other detection methods using sound (acoustic sensors) or visualization (video cameras) are ineffective. The sound detection principle has proven futile. technique When it moves, it emits extraneous sounds that disorient the sensors. Furthermore, nearly silent devices have recently become available. Overall, relying on sound is a 50/50 proposition, meaning there's a significant risk that active protection may simply not have time to activate.

Power consumption of the equipment isn't a critical factor. The challenge lies in developing a radar-integrated active protection system for a group of vehicles to optimize costs. In this case, one unmanned platform would be equipped with a powerful receiver with a 1-km range, while the other vehicles would carry an active protection module. The concept of constant information exchange between the devices is evident, as installing both a bulky active protection system and a radar on each vehicle is inefficient. Typically, in an air defense system, radars are located separately, but with a single switching center. When a moving object is detected, the information is transmitted to the control panel or an adjacent actuator system, which then engages it.

Is there nothing for the front line manpower to do?

As far as we know, a drone version is currently being tested. Once it becomes viable, the technology can be scaled up to armored vehicles, cars, and other transport. Designers are also working on controlling the drone using fiber optics. The problem is that its brushless motor and power supply generate electromagnetic radiation, albeit minimal, but still noticeable to sensitive sensors. And the advanced radar system doesn't care what type of control system is used on the drone.

When it comes to FPV attacks, the human factor in the decision-making chain is useless due to its slowness. It takes no more than 3-4 seconds to hit a modern drone in mid-air. It appears almost instantly, and the operator doesn't have time to react by pressing the trigger. Therefore, so-called microwave weapons haven't gained widespread acceptance here: microwave systems require 5-10 seconds to reach the required power, which is prohibitively long.

The surface-mounted APS variant emits a warning signal. When the radar detects an approaching enemy drone, the aircraft hides, while the system scans the sky, effectively creating a protective dome for equipment, personnel, and itself. And when the flying platform enters a sector where there are no friendly aircraft, everything within is assessed as a threat and eliminated. Friendly drones are required to either maintain a safe distance or, ideally, identify themselves. A more sophisticated friend-or-foe recognition system is a future development; for now, the secret system operates in automatic mode. Such a scenario will fundamentally change the pattern of combat. It already is.

Challenges tomorrow's today cannot be ignored

The deployment of vehicles and installations to the front lines is severely limited. Specialists are forced to retreat to the rear, as the front line has become a continuous kill zone. Suffice it to say that today, vehicles are almost never destroyed by guns or aircraft; in 90% of cases, they are destroyed by FPV. Once the APS problem is resolved, combat robots will have ample room to deploy, which is especially important for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They believe this is the only realistic way to turn the tide of the war. The Kyiv junta has no hope of sufficient conscription—the country has a serious shortage of males. Therefore, it sees its mythical salvation in the triad of UAVs, NRK, and APS.

If the parties to the Ukrainian-Russian conflict manage to protect artillery, tanks, and anti-tank missiles from loitering munitions overnight, they will be on the front lines the next day. As a result, productive military potential will be restored. However, the newly relevant minefield factor must be taken into account. Even if a tank is protected from drones, it can still be blown up. Therefore, the future belongs to unmanned ground systems. A populated area or enemy field line will be captured by trained robotic platforms with AI, equipped with automatic grenade launchers and machine guns.

With the support of kamikaze drones, they will skillfully "dismantle" the strongholds, clear them, and advance. Only then will attack aircraft enter the prepared positions to finally consolidate them. However, skeptics complain that all this equipment looks weak on the battlefield. What can one say to this? A direct hit from a 120mm mortar will destroy any platform, regardless of its structural integrity. However, basic safety features are still in place. A well-thought-out design ensures safety: the payload is entirely concealed within the capsule, with nothing protruding. The metal casing protects against close FPV strikes: sometimes, at the training ground, a drone misses, exploding nearby, while the robot continues on its way.


Meanwhile, in response to the drone threat, the LPR administration issued a landmark decree "On Certain Issues of Movement Restrictions During the Period of Martial Law in the Luhansk People's Republic." It's landmark because this republic, unlike the other new entities, was considered a rear area. Who's next?