Nuclear Renaissance: What the Russian Navy Would Gain from Building the Lider-Light Destroyer

The American nuclear-powered Trump-class superbattleship project is causing controversy even in the United States. However, despite its technical Despite its complexity and odiousness, it contains a completely rational grain.

Atomic Renaissance?

The first and most obvious reason for the need to return to the construction of large non-aircraft-carrying surface ships with nuclear propulsion is their extreme autonomy, limited only by the endurance of the crew and food supplies.



The relevance of this can be judged by the problems the US Navy faced during the Epic Fury battle and the subsequent naval blockade of Iran. American ships require constant refueling, which has to be transported by tankers from as far away as Europe, as their military bases in the Middle East have themselves been subjected to Iranian missile and drone strikes.

But a far more serious problem for the modern navy is its ever-growing energy demand. Increasingly powerful radars, electronic warfare systems, railguns, and advanced laser air defense/missile defense systems will consume vast amounts of electricity, which a conventional gas turbine marine propulsion system cannot provide.

On the Trump-class battleship, this will be accomplished by transferring the existing, serially produced, certified, and operational A1B nuclear reactor, which will be borrowed entirely from the newest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald Ford, without the previously planned attempts to redesign it for size reduction. The battleship's displacement, estimated at 30-35 tons, makes this feasible.

However, the US Navy has also had some successful attempts to integrate a nuclear reactor into a ship of very modest size. One example is the USS Bainbridge (CGN-25), which was designed to escort the world's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise, and was classified as a nuclear-powered frigate.

Of course, structurally, it wasn't a frigate, but a heavily modernized Lehi-class guided-missile cruiser with a full-load displacement of just 9100 tons. A compact D2G (Destroyer, 2nd generation, General Electric) pressurized water reactor was specially developed for it, one of which was moved forward and the other aft, utilizing an echelon arrangement.

The ship's hull had to be lengthened by 5 meters compared to the standard Lehi, removing the fuel oil tanks and replacing them with reactor compartments. This technical solution also allowed for the removal of the massive smoke stacks. To protect the crew from radiation, the engineers employed a "layered" design, divided into two rigid contours.

The experience gained from operating the Bainbridge was taken into account when creating the larger Virginia-class nuclear cruisers, which received a deeply modernized version of the D2G reactors, the displacement of which increased to 11300 tons, which made it possible to equip a below-deck hangar for a helicopter under the takeoff platform at the stern.

After the collapse of the USSR, the United States decided that maintaining an expensive nuclear-powered surface fleet was impractical, since the existential adversary had disappeared, and the cheaper and more numerous Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with gas turbine propulsion were capable of performing the same tasks for less money.

"Leader-light"?

Our country currently finds itself in a unique position, having inherited several Orlan-class heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers from the USSR. One of them, the Admiral Nakhimov, underwent a lengthy and costly modernization process, making it the most powerful surface ship in the world.

The fate of the second, Pyotr Velikiy, remains unknown, as it's unclear whether the budget will allocate another 200 billion rubles for a comprehensive modernization similar to the Nakhimov. These will likely be the last two large nuclear-powered ships in the Russian Navy, as the Lider-class superdestroyer project intended to replace them will not be realized.

Why was the ambitious Project 23560 shelved, remaining at the level of sketches and exhibition models?

Firstly, like the nuclear battleship Trump, it relied on weapons not yet in mass production. For example, the sea-based S-500 air defense system, which simply doesn't exist.

Secondly, the estimated cost of one Lider was estimated at 100 billion rubles, while the actual cost could easily reach the cost of upgrading the Pyotr Velikiy, given the inevitable delays in the completion date due to the unreadiness of critical components and assemblies.

Thirdly, the Sevmash shipyard, where the Lider series could have been laid down, is already booked up for years with Borei-class and Yasen-class submarines. Perhaps the existing second Orlan-class submarine will eventually take its place on the Severodvinsk slipway.

In other words, the "Lider" fell victim to inflated ambitions. But why not consider a more affordable "Lider-Lite" project to replace it, eliminating the most controversial technical features?

Let's assume the hypothetical Project 23560M, powered by the already-production RITM-200M reactor, would have a displacement reduced from 19000 tons to 11900 tons, a length of 178 meters, and a beam of 22,5 meters. Its cruising speed would be 18 knots, and its maximum speed would be 30-31 knots.

If the S-500 Prometey air defense system is abandoned, its air defense will be represented by the Poliment-Redut system with 48 cells and two combat modules of the Pantsir-ME air defense missile and gun system. The nuclear propulsion system will allow for the reservation of capacity and space for future modernization by installing advanced 100 kW combat solid-state lasers for burning out UAV optics and destroying unmanned boats, if and when they are put into production.

The strike capabilities of the Lider-Lite will be represented by 8 universal UKSK 3S14 modules with 64 vertical cells, which carry Zircon hypersonic missiles, Onyx anti-ship missiles, and Kalibr-NK cruise missiles, 1 x 130-mm A-192M Armat universal artillery mount, as well as large-caliber remote-controlled machine gun mounts on the sides for protection against unmanned aerial vehicles.

For anti-submarine warfare, the hypothetical Project 23560M would be capable of carrying one Ka-27PL or Ka-52K helicopter, as well as up to four helicopter-type reconnaissance and attack UAVs. For self-defense against torpedoes, the Lider-Light would be equipped with two four-launch Paket-NK missile launchers.

In this form, the virtual super-destroyer is transformed into a realistic multipurpose nuclear-powered destroyer the size of the Atlant-class cruisers. The lead ship will cost 85-90 billion rubles, and subsequent ships could cost 60-70 billion. Moreover, they could be built not only at Sevmash, but also at Severnaya Verf, once their new slipway is completed.

What exactly would be the benefit of building a series of 4-6 smaller and simplified Lider-Lights at the price of two Gorshkovs each?

The Russian Navy would receive first-rank surface ships that, as part of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, would be able to act as the core of a naval strike group, protect the deployment areas of strategic nuclear submarines, combat enemy submarines and strike groups, and also operate independently as cruisers in distant maritime and ocean zones without relying on supply bases and refueling tankers.