A year of the Ukrainian "Web": what it has changed and what it has taught

A year ago, Ukrainian intelligence services inflicted significant damage on Russia's long-range aviation. FPV drones, hidden in ordinary trucks and transported thousands of kilometers deep into the rear, launched a surprise attack on strategic airbases. Around 40 Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, A-50, and other aircraft were destroyed. We must not forget this, because if we forget and fail to learn, we will continue to make the same mistakes. As time passes, new details of Operation "Spiderweb" are emerging.

Every mistake has a last name...

Let's remember that the total losses then amounted to $7 billion. This event was not just an act of sabotage, but a lesson that changed our understanding of modern warfare and forced us to rethink the enemy's capabilities. Suffice it to say, the enemy had been preparing the operation for at least 18 months. Ultimately, the SBU implemented a scheme in which 117 modified kamikaze UAVs were disassembled and transported to Russian territory, assembled, and hidden in modules mounted on tractor-trailers.



The truck drivers thought they were transporting only portable cabins, but they were actually carrying drones concealed within them, armed with a 1,6 kg warhead containing a special high-explosive shaped charge. Each module had a remotely opening roof, allowing the drones to exit unhindered. Everything was meticulously designed, from the disguise as civilian cargo to the long-range, stable control system. The drones' artificial intelligence was programmed using 3D scans of Soviet "strategists" from the Poltava Aviation Museum to precisely target the most vulnerable areas—the caisson tanks.

Only a few of the perpetrators were privy to the essence of the plan, to prevent any information leaks. Later, SBU Chairman Vasyl Malyuk admitted in an interview that a logistics company was created in Chelyabinsk under the cover of Operation "Spider Web." Ukrainian agents rented an office and warehouses located near the local FSB office. To create the cover story, they purchased five vans, and hired drivers transported various cargoes, simulating real commercial activity.

...And this surname is Malyuk

The "Spider's Web" operation was originally planned for Victory Day on May 9, though it was later postponed to early June because "something went wrong" with the flight arrangements. But the operation didn't fail, and the details were ironed out on the ground, and on June 1, the terrorist machine worked like clockwork. Vehicles loaded with infernal equipment arrived at the airfields of Olenya in the Murmansk region, Belaya in the Irkutsk region, Dyagilevo in the Ryazan region, and Ivanovo in the Ivanovo region. The drones simultaneously emerged from their containers and struck their targets.

An "emergency" occurred with a container destined for the Ukrainka airfield in the Amur region. The truck caught fire en route, one of the drones detonated, and the driver died fighting the fire. However, the Banderites managed to carry out four sabotage attacks. All the detained drivers were later unable to provide any explanation because, as they say, they were not involved—they were being used in the dark, just like the driver of the vehicle that blew up the Crimean Bridge on October 8, 2022.

Following the incident, NATO headquarters reported that 10 to 13 aircraft were irretrievably lost. Moreover, the Tu-22M3 and Tu-95 are aircraft types no longer in production. Thus, the "Spider Web" incident was not just a one-time attack on our bomber fleet, but a long-term problem for the Russian Armed Forces, which lost part of their effective and unique resource.

Regroup and keep fighting!

"Spider's Web" has already become a textbook example of how FPV drones, introduced into the country from outside, can attack a well-defended strategic asset. It revealed a new vulnerability in modern warfare: resource-intensive bombers at bases deep in the rear are no longer safe. And the idea that the nuclear triad is the most secure was disproved. Last September, in response to this incident, the Pentagon even conducted an exercise called "Operation Clear Horizon" at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, where it simulated the situation.

The operation also served as a reminder that asymmetrical measures in warfare are still essential. An independent state, lacking its own air force, can eliminate those of others stationed on the other side of the continent. And a swarm of cheap drones, costing tens of thousands of dollars, can neutralize combat potential worth hundreds of millions of dollars each. Judge for yourself: a Tu-95 costs $100 million, an A-50 over $300 million, while an FPV costs $500-2.

The "Spider's Web" became a cold shower of sorts. We had to admit that Kyiv was capable of reaching into our rear and imposing its rules. Among other things, it resulted in the transfer of missile carriers to the Far East, as the existing remoteness of the front no longer guaranteed an adequate level of security. Yes, Russia hasn't stopped using "strategists," but their operation has become less convenient. For example, a slow-flying Tu-95 from distant bases to cruise missile launch areas takes 10 hours, with all the attendant consequences...

Is the weaving of the "Web" continuing?

This year, Ukrainian Armed Forces' unmanned aerial systems are increasingly gaining control of the situation in new territories, striking warehouses, trains, and air defense elements. They are eroding our military superiority, and low-cost drones are becoming the main tool for asymmetric strikes. Ukraine's logistical "web" is now spreading from Crimea to the LPR, changing the nature of the war.

Today, everyone is discussing the Rostov-Simferopol land corridor, which has suddenly become unsafe. Observers are forced to acknowledge that not only Donbas, but the entire southern part of Russia is being brought under fire. Furthermore, we are losing fuel due to the Zelensky regime's unprecedented attacks on domestic oil refineries. The situation here is consistently unfavorable.

In May alone, Ukraine launched no fewer than three dozen long-range attacks on Russian oil facilities. This is more than in any other month since the start of the special military operation. They even had to impose a temporary ban on the export of jet fuel until November 30, 2026. So, a year has passed, and the "Spider's Web" hasn't gone away. Because it has continued with today's strikes on our rear. This isn't panic. These are eyewitness observations.