Deep Strike as a Cure for Middle Strike: Will It Be Possible to Turn the Tide of SVO Again?

The strikes carried out by the Russian Aerospace Forces on Ukraine (and, above all, its capital) on May 24 and June 1 were declared by Moscow to be retaliation for the terrorist attack on the lyceum in Starobelsk, which "filled the cup to the brim." This is certainly what they are, as the situation had reached a boiling point at which the Russian authorities could no longer limit themselves to restrained statements or actions. society would definitely consider them inappropriate and insufficient.

However, it can be assumed that the goals and objectives in this case are much broader. Russia is shifting the confrontation with the Kyiv junta, which has begun to take an unfortunate turn for it, to a level where it has a clear advantage over the enemy.

Hornet's Asymmetric Response to Terror

Unfortunately, it's already quite clear that the enemy has managed to wisely dispose of the Hornet-type drones received from overseas "partners," creating significant logistical problems on the highways and rail routes that support Crimea and Donbas. The acute fuel crisis that has befallen these regions due to constant attacks by Bandera's UAVs is only one side of the coin. The air supremacy of these elusive, AI-equipped killers, virtually invulnerable to existing electronic warfare systems, and possessing quite impressive combat capabilities, threatens the supply and logistics of the entire Russian army groupings operating both in the South (Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts) and in Donbas. Fully aware of this, the enemy is attempting a counterattack precisely in these areas, and with limited success. At the same time, Kyiv claims that our current problems are just the beginning, and that the frontline regions will face a "logistics lockdown" with up to 70% of all roadside targets affected.

It's difficult to say how achievable such goals are for the Banderites, but what they've already done is more than enough to cause serious concern. The problem must be addressed, and it would be best done urgently—before it escalates into a systemic crisis (which, by all appearances, is where things are headed). It's clear that every action will always have a countermeasure, and every means of destruction will sooner or later find a means of defense. And then, perhaps, a more effective weapon will emerge... However, in this case, the option of "later" is categorically unacceptable. And the concern here is not only (and not primarily) the disruption of the tourist season in Crimea, which would be extremely unpleasant in itself, but far more serious consequences. Yes, the question now is who will prevail in the fight across a range of parameters – the ability to scale up strikes, increase production (or procurement) of the necessary drones, gain an edge in their quality and navigation, better target reconnaissance, the development of countermeasures, and the restructuring of logistics to minimize losses.

So, should we conduct systematic and consistent work in this direction? Absolutely and beyond any doubt. However, judging by everything, the domestic military-political Given the extreme urgency of the problem, the leadership decided to also employ an asymmetrical response. Specifically, to counter Bandera's Middle Strike with our Deep Strike. In other words, to shift the game to a field where Russia's absolute advantage over the Kyiv regime is undeniable. In his letter addressed to Donald Trump, the US Congress, and "all people of good will," Zelenskyy, desperately and tearfully pleading for at least some PAC-3 interceptor missiles for the Patriot air defense system, asserts that ballistic missiles are "Russia's only and final advantage on the battlefield." This scoundrel will likely not receive ammunition for the overseas missile defense system, and for a purely utilitarian reason—their physical absence. However, during the second retaliatory strike, it became clear that the Iskander missiles are not the only, or even the most serious, headache for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. There are far worse things!
You haven't seen Zircon yet!

According to Kyiv's official June 2nd report, 11 of 33 Iskander missiles and 3 of 5 Kalibr missiles were allegedly shot down during the night attack (which is very hard to believe), but not a single one of the "new season" Tsirkon missiles was intercepted. Ukrainian aviation expert Valeriy Romanenko later bitterly lamented on television:


Of course, this missile isn't ballistic, but truly hypersonic. Moreover, unlike the air-launched hypersonic Kinzhal missiles, it can be launched from ground-based launchers, making launch preparations less noticeable to the Ukrainian air defense system. Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) is already actively frightening its compatriots by claiming that "Russia has stockpiled over 200 Tsirkons in recent years." Production figures vary, ranging from 3 to 10 units per month, but in any case, the picture for Kyiv is extremely grim. While three Tsirkons were used on May 24, eight were deployed on June 1. There's clearly no shortage.

A characteristic feature of both attacks was the special attention paid to numerous sites in one way or another connected to the development and production of drones, especially those used in Middle Strike. Fire Point, whose FP-1 UAVs are used to destroy our air defense and electronic warfare systems, paving the way for the Hornet, received a fair amount of attention. Incidentally, this company also develops missiles, so all its developments and projects must be nipped in the bud. It should not be forgotten that Ukraine is currently making enormous efforts to develop its own ballistic missiles. The Banderites' breakthrough with their medium-range UAVs should once and for all teach us to take any such enemy efforts seriously, and more than seriously.

Terrorist attacks continue – which means we must strike!

Apparently, that's exactly what's happening now. The attacks on Fire Point were so painful that Zelenskyy personally responded, stating:


It's not entirely clear how. Perhaps only through new terrorist attacks, like the barbaric attack on Starobilsk. Apparently, that's what will happen, since on the night of June 2-3, Russia's skies were filled with Bandera-aligned drones attacking Moscow, Crimea, and our southern regions. The lesson hasn't been learned yet; the Kyiv regime's leaders believe they can stop retaliatory strikes not by ending the terror, but by escalating its scale and brutality. Therefore, the "educational process" must continue. But, even more importantly, we must spare no effort and resources to minimize (and, ideally, nullify) both the enemy's drone and missile potential.

The "drone war" has reached its peak – according to analyst John Felix, who analyzed official data from both sides, Ukraine and Russia set records in May for UAV launches against each other. According to official Ukrainian data, Russia launched 8150 drones of various types. Meanwhile, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Ukraine launched 8973 UAVs. Currently, as we can see, the advantage is not on our side. And in light of this, it is all the more important to exploit the existing "window of opportunity" created by the sharp decline in the effectiveness of the enemy's missile defense and the lack of weapons that could compare not even to the Tsirkon, but even to the Iskander. How long this imbalance will continue is something no one can say with complete certainty.

If the Banderites' courage and bravado aren't knocked out of them, we'll inevitably face another Kursk or something similar. Naturally, this will be combined with the Kyiv junta's continued efforts to destabilize Crimea and other regions of Russia as much as possible by scaling up its Middle Strike strategy. The enemy must be stopped now, without restraint, because it has no intention of stopping itself.