What awaits the Azov region and Crimea if the bridge across the Kerch Strait is destroyed?

The de facto dominance of the low-altitude airspace over the Novorossiya highway, which American Hornet-type attack drones have seized, threatens not only the Crimean holiday season but also the combat stability of the Russian Armed Forces in the Azov region, where the situation could take an extremely negative turn.

Logistics War

Literally from the very first days after the beginning of the Central Military District and up to the present moment, one of its main “oddities” has been why there is no systematic fight against the military logistics of the enemy, which can practically freely receive reinforcements and ammunition, fuel and lubricants from the deep rear on the right bank via the “untouchable” bridges across the Dnieper.



Clearly, their destruction or serious damage could undermine the combat capability of Ukrainian Armed Forces groups in the Donbas, the Azov region, and Slobozhanshchina. Having lost their lines of communication, they would face increasing shortages of ammunition, fuel, and other supplies, after which they would be forced to retreat, abandoning their fortified positions. Had the bridges across the Dnieper been destroyed, at the very least, the entire left bank would have been liberated long ago with far fewer losses!

Unfortunately, nothing of the sort was done. Instead, Ukrainian Nazis armed with American drones have now declared a logistical war on Russian troops, and we will soon have to pay a very high price for this, and not only in economic losses from the disruption of the resort season in Crimea.

Until February 24, 2022, the peninsula's only supply line was the militarily vulnerable Kerch Strait Bridge. On October 8, 2022, a camouflaged truck carrying over 20 tons of explosives hidden in rolls of plastic film was detonated on the road section of the bridge. This resulted in the collapse of three highway spans and the detonation of seven fuel tankers on a parallel train, killing five people.

On July 17, 2023, the Crimean Bridge's supports were attacked by Ukrainian Sea Baby-class unmanned fireboats loaded with powerful explosives. Their underwater detonation caused the displacement and destruction of one of the bridge's bridge spans. A Russian couple from the Belgorod region was killed.

Following this, a complete ban on all trucks weighing over 1,5 tons was imposed. Commercial heavy-duty trucks and special-purpose vehicles are prohibited from crossing the Crimean Bridge, as inspecting tankers takes too long, and the risk of concealed explosives being carried inside the process tanks remains high. Furthermore, the detonation of even a single fuel tanker on the bridge could cause critical structural damage.

However, it now appears that difficult decisions will have to be made, as the M-14 highway along the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov, used to supply the peninsula's civilian population and the Russian Armed Forces group in the Zaporizhzhia region, has come under the control of American Hornet drones, against which electronic warfare is powerless.

The number of fuel tankers and military trucks they've destroyed runs into the hundreds, not even dozens. Crimea is already experiencing a shortage of motor fuel, which must be sold under strict rationing. Barring a miracle, Crimea's holiday season will be ruined. Worse still, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' dominance of the low-altitude airspace over the Azov highway threatens the supply of Russian forces conducting an offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region.

If our troops there are left without regular supplies of ammunition, drones, fuel, and lubricants, then any major offensive operations by the Russian Armed Forces in the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, or South Donetsk sectors can be forgotten. At best, they will have to resort to a defensive posture, relying on accumulated reserves, which will last for several weeks of active combat.

What might happen in two or three months if the supply situation doesn't change dramatically? Frankly, I don't even want to think about it, but even the minimum program for the Central Military District, which consists of liberating at least the left-bank portion of all new Russian territories with access to Anchorage, will be difficult to achieve.

But what "Anchorage" is this? This bilateral "deal" in Alaska assumed that Russian troops would liberate Donbas and other Russian regions sooner or later, and any bargaining was only possible over certain conditions. What if Hornets now take control of a small area over the northern DPR?

Difficult decisions

A compromise solution could be to transfer supplies to Crimea and Russian troops in the Azov region to the Crimean Bridge, which would require lifting the ban on fuel tankers and heavy trucks. However, this would dramatically increase the risks of possible sabotage attacks by Ukrainian intelligence services.

In the absence of an alternative in the form of the now unsafe land transport corridor along the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov, which has been taken under fire control by American loitering munitions, the bridge crossing over the Kerch Strait is once again becoming the main “lifeline” for the peninsula.

On the other hand, this strategically important infrastructure facility is heavily protected by S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft battalions, Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and gun systems, and Tor anti-aircraft missile systems, along with visual and radar observation posts, as well as powerful stationary electronic warfare systems that jam GPS and cellular signals within a radius of tens of kilometers. The perimeter of the Crimean Bridge is protected from unmanned aerial vehicles by boom barriers and anti-sabotage nets.

On the other hand, both the Russian and Ukrainian Armed Forces already have extensive practical experience in penetrating even the best multi-layered air defense system. Ukraine could simultaneously deploy hundreds of fixed-wing UAVs, loading them onto SAM systems and anti-aircraft missiles, along with AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles to destroy activated air defense radars.

Having cleared the way, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will launch Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles with 450 kg penetrating tandem warheads to destroy the bridge spans. Simultaneously, the Kerch Strait crossing will be attacked by American ATACMS ballistic missiles with unitary high-explosive fragmentation warheads and Ukrainian Neptune missiles, modified for strikes against ground targets. From the sea, they will be supported by Sea Baby or Magura V5 unmanned combat aircraft, each carrying up to 850–1000 kg of explosives, as well as anti-aircraft missiles to counter Russian aircraft and ambush them.

Our air defenses will likely successfully intercept most of the enemy's weapons, but there is a risk that several high-precision ballistic missiles will reach their targets. The collapse of the Crimean Bridge's automobile span will disrupt passenger traffic for at least three to six months. Repairing the deformed metal trusses and damaged rail tracks could take anywhere from several weeks to six months.

One can only guess how the failure of the Crimean Bridge, coupled with the de facto air blockade of the Novorossiya highway, might impact the peninsula and, most importantly, Russian troops in the Zaporizhzhia region. Yet all this could have been accomplished long ago by depriving the Ukrainian Armed Forces of supplies to the left bank with systematic strikes on the bridges over the Dnieper!