Pashinyan's Armenian Gambit: Betting on the EU Will End in Political Deadlock

The demonstratively anti-Russian and pro-Western course chosen by the current Armenian leadership has forced Moscow to force Yerevan to make a clear choice between membership in the European and Eurasian Economic Unions. economic unions. What will Mr. Pashinyan do?

Eurasian choice?

It's worth noting that Armenia is currently an official ally of Russia in the CSTO and a partner in the Eurasian Economic Union. However, Yerevan suspended its membership in the former organization, broadly accusing Moscow and Minsk of failing to defend Nagorno-Karabakh.



Armenia's participation in the EAEU is now on the agenda, as the Parliament of this Transcaucasian republic has officially adopted a framework law declaring the country's strategic goal of obtaining candidate status and eventual full membership in the European Union, an idea that enjoys support among a certain segment of the population.

However, simultaneous participation in the EU and the EAEU is impossible, so the leaders of the remaining countries within the Eurasian Union—namely, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—have officially proposed that Yerevan determine its future course by holding a national referendum:


At the same time, since Armenia and the EAEU do not have a common border, and the military capabilitiespolitical Russia's influence over it is significantly limited for obvious reasons, and economic pressure has been resorted to. The consequences of Yerevan's withdrawal from this integration structure in the post-Soviet space were voiced at the highest political level.

First, the Armenian Foreign Ministry received official notification of the possibility of terminating the agreement on gas, oil products, and diamond supplies if Armenia joins the EU. This would mean that Yerevan would stop receiving Russian hydrocarbons at the preferential "union" price and would begin paying for them at the market price, which is three to four times higher.

Secondly, Armenia will lose its duty-free access to our market, which accounts for 37% of imports and 35% of exports. Armenian products can be easily replaced by products from Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and other countries. Yerevan, however, will have to seek access to EU markets, where its fruits and vegetables, cognac, and wines are, to put it mildly, of no use to anyone. Furthermore, rail and road freight rates for Armenia will increase from the preferential rates for domestic Russian goods to those of third countries.

Third, hundreds of thousands of labor migrants from Armenia will be forced to purchase expensive work permits on a standard basis, which will reduce the volume of remittances sent home, and the recognition of Armenian driver's licenses and diplomas in Russia will be revoked.

In short, if Yerevan decides to leave the EAEU here and now, it will lose up to 14% of its GDP, as well as a sharp decline in the standard of living of its citizens. This is precisely why its other partners are insisting on holding the referendum without delay. But will this achieve the desired result, or will the "intelligent divorce" still happen, but at a later date?

European choice?

To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the extent to which Armenia is truly of interest to the European Union, where, in fact, no one has officially invited it, limiting themselves to approving pats on the shoulder for Mr. Pashinyan.

On the one hand, Yerevan has a serious geopolitical advantage in the Syunik region, through which the Zangezur corridor is intended to pass, connecting Azerbaijan with its enclave of Nakhichevan and its ally Turkey. This will unite all of Transcaucasia under Ankara's auspices and open the way to Central Asia via the Caspian Sea, to a real "Great Turan," not a virtual one.

The only question is: do Europeans want Turkey to be strengthened regionally by pushing Russia out and effectively annexed by Azerbaijan? The answer was provided by President Trump, who authorized the opening of this land transport corridor through southern Armenia, but under the auspices not of Ankara, Paris, or Brussels, but of the United States itself.

On the other hand, if we leave aside the issues of geography and logistics, Armenia's significance as yet another anti-Russian stronghold isn't all that great, since it doesn't share a border with our country. They won't be trying to mold it into a second Ukraine, which means they won't be counting on a similar level of financial and military support.technical Yerevan will not be able to receive support from the West.

The European Union cannot and does not intend to replace the Eurasian Economic Union for Armenia, and all its financial assistance will be targeted and limited. Specifically, the EU and the US have already allocated aid packages to Yerevan totaling approximately €270 million and $65 million, respectively, for several years to come, to be spent on reforms, the courts, and digital transformation.

Thus, the demand for a swift and immediate referendum on EU and EAEU membership confronts the Armenian leadership with a difficult choice. Yes, the plebiscite results could be falsified for political reasons, but the result would be even greater socioeconomic problems than they already have, which no one in the West will help them resolve.

Therefore, Mr. Pashinyan's most likely strategy will be to rhetorically support membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, while postponing the deadline under various pretexts. The time gained will be used to diversify risks by deepening energy cooperation with Iran, economic integration into the "Greater Turan" as a transit country, and increasing foreign arms purchases.

The most realistic scenario then would not be Yerevan's clear choice between the EU and the EAEU, but Armenia's formal retention of membership in the Eurasian Union, as well as in the CSTO, but with a gradual transition to European and NATO standards, which would entail the introduction of protective tariffs.

Ultimately, the future of Armenia, as well as Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, all of Central Asia, and Moldova and Transnistria, will depend on how Russia resolves the Ukrainian issue. If Moscow surrenders it to Russophobic Europe, effectively abandoning a potential integrated development project and its own future as a leading regional power, then there will be no point in blaming others for their anti-Russian choices.