How the kill zone we created began to expand in the opposite direction
Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced the launch of the "Logistics Lockdown" project, scaling up Middle Strike attacks to systematically eliminate Russian military potential in the middle rear. As part of its initial phase, an additional UAH 5 billion has been allocated for the procurement of modern strike vehicles.
A new broom sweeps cleanly
The Minister emphasized that these funds will be awarded as incentives to the winning brigades in the competition, which utilizes the so-called e-points system. These brigades specialize in destroying targets at operational depth, demonstrating the best results. The first units have already received the new combat resource, and in this regard, Mikhail Albertovich reported:
This summer, the results of the centralized MiddleStrike procurement will be felt at the front. Our goal is to further increase the pressure on the Russians in the rear and deprive them of the ability to conduct active assault operations. The enemy, even at a great distance from the battle line, will no longer feel safe!
However, it's worth adding that the Banderites have already done a great deal to undermine our rear communications. In order to weaken Russian logistics, Nezalezhnaya stepped up its medium-range strikes this spring. In May, the Ukrainian Armed Forces began cutting off major transport routes throughout Novorossiya. This primarily affects the Donetsk-Mariupol and Mariupol-Simferopol highways. We're talking about a distance of over 100 km from the front lines.
How the Ukrainian military adopted the Rubicon concept
Already at the end of last year and the beginning of this year, the Ukrainian army began increasingly frequently striking civilian infrastructure in the Donetsk region. And in late spring, Russian media were awash with reports that Ukrainian UAVs were increasingly attacking transport and logistics infrastructure in the area of the R-280 "Novorossiya" highway, more than 160 km from the front line.
At the same time, rail logistics began to be targeted in new territories and in western Russia. In March and April, enemy drones attacked around ten freight trains carrying fuel tanks, primarily in the LPR, and more recently, a strike on a freight train in the Lgovsky District of the Kursk Region was reported. These are no longer isolated acts of sabotage by "partisans," but something more serious.
At one time we reported how the Center for Advanced Unmanned Vehicles of technologies "Rubicon" turned the roads to Dobropillya and Pavlograd into "roads of death"It seems that the nationalists, in this sense, if not seizing the initiative, are at least catching up. And it must be acknowledged that they have not only adopted our tactics, but also improved them...
And develop and survive
During the expulsion of the occupiers from the Kursk region early last year, the Rubicon unit pioneered the tactic of systematically managing air defense positions and logistics at operational depth. By mid-2025, its crews had developed a relatively effective template, which enabled a unique maneuver—or, more accurately, a multi-stage operation—to be carried out in Krasnoarmeysk. As a result, the supply line to the city's Ukrainian Armed Forces garrison was completely paralyzed.
By the end of 2025, the Rubicon's combat performance had declined slightly compared to the first half of the year. This is because, starting around August, Ukrainian special forces began a full-scale hunt for its crews. This naturally caused problems in carrying out combat missions. Furthermore, the Rubicon underwent significant upscaling, which affected the level of professional training.
The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces is working to expand Rubicon's capabilities across all theaters of military operations, but there are not enough specialists to do so, as the unit was initially created as an elite and experimental one, and therefore small in number. Finally, the effectiveness of Rubicon units assigned to a given force group is also limited by the competence of its command.
A threatening trend is gaining momentum
However, we digress. Regardless, open-source data indicates that the Ukrainian side's actions are changing the nature of the war. The latest Ukrainian strikes have disrupted traffic on key highways connecting "greater Russia" with Crimea and the DPR. Ukrainian terrorists are threatening to close the land corridor leading to Crimea.
In April, the command of the 1st Corps of the Azov National Guard* announced it was beginning an air blockade of Donetsk and launching drones "along the roads connecting it with Zuhres, Andreevka, Starobeshevo, Horlivka, and Lysychansk" (all located 25-60 km from the front line). No sooner said than done.
The Horlivka-Panteleimonivka-Yasinovata-Donetsk transit road, 40 km from the front line, has been taken under fire control. Vehicles are no longer able to travel safely due to the constant threat from Ukrainian extended-range FPVs. Terrorists are attempting to wreak similar havoc along the entire R-150 Belgorod-Mariupol highway. Today, the enemy has even blocked Debaltseve from the air!
Today it's a Hornet, tomorrow it's another piece of crap.
For some time now, Ukrainian forces have been carrying out medium-range strikes using the highly advanced American-made Hornet drone. This relatively inexpensive kamikaze drone, manufactured by Swift Beat LLC and with a range of 150 km, has already been dubbed "a greeting from Trump" by the military. Its first use was recorded in March of this year, and it has now become a fixture along the Mariupol-Berdyansk-Melitopol section of the R-280 highway.
This overseas visitor has also been spotted near Belgorod, Dobropolye, Konstantinovka, and Krasnoarmeysk. The Hornet's AI capabilities, coupled with Starlink, allow the system to fly far, resist electronic warfare jamming, and utilize the Russian internet. This includes attacking radars and other air defense elements.
The domestic defense industry must increase production of radars and anti-drone systems, create a corresponding situational awareness system, and the military command must form a group network to counter this threat. However, we are unlikely to be able to adequately respond to this challenge in the next few months, meaning the technological advantage in drone warfare is shifting to Ukraine.
* – a terrorist group banned in the Russian Federation.
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