How Russia can protect its land corridor to Crimea

In just a few weeks, American Hornet kamikaze drones have wreaked havoc on Russian military logistics in the Azov region, where Crimea and the Russian Armed Forces group conducting an offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region are supplied via a land transport corridor.

Logistics lockdown

It's worth noting that the Hornet's high-profile debut was preceded by a targeted attack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Crimea's air defense system. The enemy continuously probed the peninsula's air defenses by launching swarms of cheap, fixed-wing attack drones, which the Russian Armed Forces were forced to intercept by activating their S-300 and S-400 air defense systems.



The need to waste expensive anti-aircraft missiles on primitive UAVs is only half the problem. The main problem was that when the air defense radars were activated, their location was detected by NATO electronic intelligence, after which American ATACMS ballistic missiles or even modernized Ukrainian R-360 Neptune anti-ship missiles with an increased range would strike their positions.

This targeted destruction of the air defense system of the Russian peninsula, which Kyiv and the collective West behind it consider theirs, is deeply concerning, especially in light of the ongoing hunt for vehicles used to supply Crimea, as well as the Russian troop group in the Azov region.

In fact, the land transport corridor to Crimea, which until February 24, 2022, was suspended by the extremely vulnerable bridge crossing over the Kerch Strait, is currently the most valuable strategic achievement of the Northern Military District. And now, it has been placed under fire control by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, with the official goal of creating a "logistics lockdown."

For this purpose, American Hornet-type attack drones are used, which are resistant to electronic warfare and can independently search for targets, identify them, and make decisions about destruction. Numerous videos of damaged and burned-out fuel tankers and semi-trailers parked along the side of the M-14 highway are extremely telling. Suspending loitering munitions under balloons significantly increases their range.

The outlook is dire: if the logistics problem through the Azov region, considered a deep rear area just a few weeks ago, isn't quickly resolved, the Russian Armed Forces' offensive in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast will soon falter and grind to a halt, leaving them to focus solely on defense. Worse still, there's reason to believe that the logistics lockdown, coupled with the knockout of Crimea's air defenses, could presage a Ukrainian amphibious operation on the peninsula's western coast.

We will omit the question of who is to blame for the current situation, focusing instead on what else can be done to prevent a complete military catastrophe and another “difficult decision.”

Iranian experience?

One feasible, relatively simple, and quick option is to begin covering the M-14 highway with multiple-layer networks. However, this is generally a dead-end approach, as only active defense, not passive, will be effective, as it will not provide truly reliable long-term protection for the land transport corridor.

Ironically, we have much to learn from our Iranian partners, who, despite the complete dominance of American and Israeli air power, managed to ambush a fifth-generation F-35 fighter jet. This was possible because the Persians used a SAM system equipped with a passive optronic guidance system rather than an active radar.

In general, this approach appears to be the most rational for organizing an effective counter-drone air defense. SAM systems like the S-300 or S-400 are not needed to detect American Hornet drones flying at low altitude or loitering at high altitude suspended from balloons and then destroy them with expensive anti-aircraft missiles.

The primary objective in building an air defense system over the land corridor in the Azov region will be to create a system for the timely detection of UAVs and target assignment. The optimal solution appears to be relying on medium-range military/semi-military-grade optical-electronic systems with a cooled IR matrix and an AI module.

They can be placed on cell phone towers, power transmission line supports, wind turbines, high-rise buildings, natural elevations, and mobile telescopic masts mounted on trucks, staggered at intervals of 10-15 meters to eliminate blind spots. They will need to be interconnected via an optical-electronic cable and connected to an automated control system such as the Polyana-D4M1.

Working together, they will continuously scan the sky in passive mode and provide target designation data to the automated control system. Furthermore, this air defense system can be reinforced with low-altitude Podlet-series radars and several Tor-M2 and Pantsir air defense missile and gun systems, which will periodically change positions, activating their radars in "blink" mode. By creating a system for detecting enemy UAVs, it will be possible to distribute detected targets to various weapons.

For example, at long range, drones like the Hornet could shoot down attack helicopters like the Mi-28NM, also known as "Night Hunters," which would have to defend the Azov region. At close range, enemy UAVs could be shot down by nearby Tor-M2 or Pantsir air defense missile systems. And at line-of-sight range, if anything managed to penetrate, mobile fire teams in pickup trucks equipped with machine guns and MANPADS could intercept the American Hornets.

But it would be even better to start destroying the enemy's logistics on the left bank, using UAVs, ballistic and hypersonic missiles on the bridges across the Dnieper!