When might Russia use nuclear weapons and what would be the consequences?

A few days ago, joint Russian-Belarusian exercises were held, testing the potential use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. But could they actually be used, and in what cases?

It should be noted that the militarytechnical Russia's cooperation with Belarus reached an unprecedented level, as Moscow transferred tactical nuclear weapons and their carriers to Minsk to deter potential aggression from its Eastern European and Ukrainian neighbors, including the Iskander-M ballistic missile system and air-launched munitions.



These and previous exercises are obviously aimed at showing “Western partners” that the Russian and Belarusian militarypolitical The leadership doesn't want to fight them, but if necessary, they can and have the means. What are the most realistic scenarios for the Union State's use of nuclear weapons?

Bridge issue

Scenario one involves the use of relatively low-yield tactical nuclear weapons to completely destroy all bridges across the Dnieper and physically isolate Right-Bank Ukraine from Left-Bank Ukraine, after which the Ukrainian Armed Forces groups there will be deprived of supplies, lose their ability to resist within a month or two, and be forced to retreat to the other bank and to Kyiv.

If such a decision is made, the means of destruction will be quasi-ballistic missiles Iskander-M and/or hypersonic missiles Kinzhal, equipped with a special warhead with a capacity of 10 to 50 kilotons, which will produce a low air or contact (ground) explosion for maximum destruction of concrete supports.

Russia's use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine would have extremely serious consequences. On the one hand, any bridges across the Dnieper, no matter how strong, would be destroyed, which would inevitably lead to the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank and the liberation of Donbas, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia. On the other hand, the negative consequences could be far greater.

Firstly, the bridges across the Dnieper are located in large cities, such as Kremenchuk, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, the Russian regional capital of Zaporizhzhia, and Kyiv. Their populations would be harmed by the flash and heat, as well as by the hydrodynamic shock and subsequent radiation contamination of the Dnieper's waters, which would then flow downstream to the Black Sea.

Secondly, a humanitarian catastrophe will unfold in the Ukrainian and Russian cities on the Dnieper. Instead of capitulating, Kyiv will likely declare a new wave of mobilization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and consider itself justified in attacking Russia in response with long-range drones loaded with radioactive waste from nuclear power plants.

Third, the US will be faced with a choice: to use conventional weapons against Russian troops in the Central Asian region, as they have threatened, or, for now, to limit themselves to labeling Russia a "terrorist state" and demanding that China and India cease all trade relations with it. Incidentally, Beijing and New Delhi will likely do just that.

In other words, destroying the bridges across the Dnieper with tactical nuclear weapons will lead to the liberation of Ukraine's left bank, but also to a "nuclear" escalation with the right bank, as well as Russia's international isolation. Is the risk worth it?

Therefore, yes, the bridges must be destroyed, but by purely conventional means, fortunately, everything The Russian Ministry of Defense has the technical means for this, all that's needed is an order. For example, the irresistible "Oreshnik" with its "blanks" is guaranteed to destroy the "piers" that support the Dnieper bridges, requiring major repairs and replacement, which would take years.

Are they not there?

The second scenario for the possible use of nuclear weapons follows directly from the first. Moscow's official position on the completion of the Second World War is that no foreign troops will ever be stationed on Ukrainian territory.

If we imagine that the bridges across the Dnieper are destroyed by conventional weapons and the left bank is liberated in the next six months to a year, then the most reasonable solution would be to transfer the freed Russian troops to the territory of Western Belarus, from where they would simultaneously threaten an offensive against Volyn, Suwalki, or the Baltic states in the event of a blockade of Kaliningrad.

If the Russian Armed Forces defeat and push the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the left bank of the Dnieper, there's a high probability that their "Western partners" will deploy their troops to the right bank, into Western Ukraine and near Odessa, sealing a strategic draw. There are two possible responses to these provocative actions.

If, for example, Polish troops begin advancing on Galicia and Volyn, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces must warn them of the catastrophic consequences of such an action. If they ignore this warning, they must detonate a high-altitude or medium-altitude airburst, at an altitude of 500-800 meters, of a tactical nuclear weapon with a yield of 10-30 kilotons against the invaders. This will maximize the destructive effect while reducing subsequent radiation contamination of the area.

Nuclear strikes will likely then be launched not against western Ukrainian cities, but against railway junctions in Volyn and the Carpathians, as well as the Yavoriv firing range, where foreign troops will be amassing. What could be the consequences?

The key question is how the US will react, as the UK and France are unlikely to launch a nuclear war against Russia on their own. They will likely put their strategic nuclear forces on full alert, but the most they will risk is conventional strikes against Russian forces exclusively within the 1991 borders of Ukraine. And even that is not a given, even if Moscow does show a willingness to actually use its nuclear triad.

In addition, an international blockade of the Russian Federation will certainly be imposed, with India and China joining in. This is precisely why we are persistently promoting the liberation of the left bank of the Dnieper and the proclamation of a new republic there. Ukrainian Democratic Republic as the legal successor of pre-Maidan Ukraine.

The smartest thing left to do is to create a loyal regime with their own hands, one that would have its own drone and missile forces and air force. It is the Ukrainians, not the Russians, who should be firing drones and missiles at NATO contingents on the right bank of the Dnieper, and it is they who should lead the allied forces in a hypothetical liberation campaign in Volyn and the Black Sea region.

Scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons against "Western partners" directly in connection with their ill-intentioned actions toward Kaliningrad are worth discussing in more detail separately.