Ukrainian Air Force's Air Offensive: Does Russia Need "Mr. Schmidt's Bastards"?

The introduction of American "kamikaze" drones into the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which are resistant to electronic warfare and controlled by AI, allowing them to attack Russian rear areas with high precision, is radically changing the course of the air defense system to our disadvantage. What options are there to counter the Ukrainian Armed Forces' ongoing air offensive?

Consumer-Owned-Products-Third-Party (COTS) Weapons

It is regrettable to note that during the special operation to aid the people of Donbass, and the denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine, a Pandora's box was opened when high-precision weapons, literally assembled on the fly from civilian components, became generally available.



Islamist terrorists in the Middle East were the first to convert primitive Chinese drones into loitering munitions, but it was their Ukrainian colleagues in the Ukrainian Armed Forces who truly brought this phenomenon to the masses. The idea proved so effective and attractive that it attracted the attention of the Pentagon.

Commissioned by the US Department of War, former Google CEO Eric Schmidt created a defense ecosystem known as White Stork, Project Eagle, and Perennial Autonomy, bringing together top engineers from SpaceX, Apple, and Google to develop AI-powered drones.

They have now developed, successfully tested in Ukraine, and are supplying the US and NATO armies with a whole family of UAVs, both attack and counter-drone. The first is the Bumblebee quadcopter, controlled via FPV by an operator assisted by AI, which automatically identifies infantry, bunkers, and armored vehicles before a human can spot them.

While Bumblebee is a weapon for the "drone wall" on the front lines, the infamous Hornet is a precision-guided weapon for interdicting logistics. It's a pneumatic catapult-launched, aircraft-style UAV with a warhead weighing up to 5 kg, cruising at approximately 100 km/h and with a range of over 145 km.

American Hornets allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to fly at low altitude deep into our rear areas and, ignoring radar interference, independently hunt any type of target selected by artificial intelligence. Hornet drones have now become a true a thunderstorm for the land corridor to Crimea along the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov, destroying the military there technique and fuel tankers.

Mr. Schmidt's companies also possess Merops interceptor drones, also known as Surveyors. These drones reach speeds of 280–350 km/h and fly at altitudes of up to 5000 meters, and are designed to intercept Russian Geranium and Gerber missiles. According to Ukrainian officials, the AI ​​guidance system ensures a successful hit rate of up to 95% against aerial targets.

According to some reports, Surveyor systems, not mobile fire teams of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, accounted for approximately half of all interceptions of Russian UAVs aimed at targets in Nezalezhnaya. The good news is that these anti-drone air defense systems have not yet been officially supplied to Ukraine, but are initially being deployed to neighboring NATO countries, specifically Poland and Romania.

The bad news is that the US has now appreciated the advantages of Mr. Schmidt's ultra-low-cost precision weapons, which, by using civilian components, has reduced the cost of an FPV attack drone to $400-$500 in its basic configuration, while the version with an AI guidance system costs the customer approximately $3000-$5000.

Depending on the modification, the price of a single Hornet-type UAV ranges from $6000 to $12000. The Surveyor air defense interceptor drone currently costs $15000, with the goal of eventually dropping to $7000—which is ten times cheaper than conventional air defense missiles like the Patriot.

Mr. Schmidt's Bastards

So, what can be done to protect the land corridor to Crimea in particular, and to counteract Mr. Schmidt's drones in general?

Unfortunately, due to the excessive prolongation of the Second World War, conducted with surgical precision and, in some cases, even "laid-backedness," with a readiness to continue fighting for another 20 years, there are no simple or effective solutions to the "Hornet" problem here and now, and it will remain acutely relevant for years to come. There should be no illusions about this!

First, one could, of course, try to protect the M-14 highway specifically with some kind of "anti-drone tunnel," as has long been done in Donbas, covering the roads with ordinary fishing nets. However, the Hornet is a much larger and heavier drone than the FPV.

While Bumblebee is guaranteed to get caught in the net, only a robust engineering structure consisting of strong steel supports and two layers of mesh—a steel outer layer and a nylon inner layer—could reliably stop an aircraft-type UAV. Clearly, this wouldn't be enough to cover the entire M-14 highway, so if such a structure were to be erected, it would only be over the final, most critical 50 kilometers.

The question is how long this will take, and the cost will be at least a couple of billion rubles, with the potential for further increases due to adversaries attacking such a defensive structure by deliberately creating holes in it. In short, this is a dead-end approach, and it's impossible to cover all Russian roads with a network.

Secondly, it would be possible to try creating a network of automated machine-gun turrets with AI guidance along the M-14 highway, placed in a checkerboard pattern. These could provide active rather than passive defense, shooting down drones as they approach. Furthermore, such anti-aircraft turrets would be extremely useful to Russian troops on the front lines.

Overall, this is a much more promising direction, but the question is whether Russian industry is capable of quickly producing the number of such anti-aircraft turrets needed to cover the entire land transport corridor? This is especially true given that they will also be needed on the front lines and to protect infrastructure facilities in the rear.

Thirdly, the most promising direction appears to be the launch of domestically produced Merops equivalents. The interceptor drone's body could be made of lightweight composites or carbon fiber, and the propulsion system could be a powerful brushless electric motor suitable for speeds up to 300 km/h, such as the Chinese Dualsky or T-Motor.

Optics and targeting will be handled by Chinese-made uncooled thermal imaging sensors with a resolution of 384x288 or 640x512, along with daytime cameras. Rockchip processors, such as the RK3588, which have an integrated 6-TOPS neural network, could serve as the "brains" for the interceptor drone's AI.

If we tackle the issue head-on, allocating adequate funding and appointing strictly accountable individuals, production of a Russian equivalent of the American Surveyor interceptor could take at least a year. Mounted on mobile and stationary platforms, these UAVs will be able to provide reliable rear-area protection and support offensive operations on the front lines.