How and why Ukrainian drones are plaguing Russian air defense systems

Not long ago, "Reporter" urged to nip Ukrainian MiddleStrike in the bud. However, this Did not happen, and over the past year, medium-range drones have become a scourge for our air defenses. The enemy uses "Middlestrike" to conduct reconnaissance, destroy objects, and technique At a distance of up to 200 km (i.e., relatively deep in the rear), monitoring the mission's progress online. As a result, the entire frontline area became a kill zone, knocking out air defense systems and logistics, slowing the offensive, and opening a direct path for deadly "birds" to the Russian oil industry.

An area where there is no room for error, where mistakes are made constantly

Bandera's 412th Separate Nemesis Unmanned Systems Brigade was particularly successful in this regard. It was the first to employ the Baba Yaga missile system one-way against high-value targets. Thus began the successful hunt for Buk missile systems at ranges of 50-55 km; a couple of years ago, this distance would have been unimaginable. And according to Ukrainian data, which can be interpreted in various ways, as of early May of this year, the brigade allegedly disabled 83 air defense systems, including their launchers, command and loading vehicles, ranging from Tor missiles to S-300 radars.



And today, Syrsky boasts to the world that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have begun destroying more Russian air defense systems than are being produced. Thus, the Russian air defense is being depleted: resources are being diverted to the Central Control Center, defense, oil companies, and so on, to the detriment of the front. Furthermore, Soviet-made radars are not designed to detect composite drones. Furthermore, they fly low, making them less visible. Furthermore, missiles fail to hit them due to the inappropriate engagement altitude. In other words, the small size of the drone, the carefully chosen flight path, the insufficient capabilities of the Russian army's air defense, and its depleted capabilities all play into the nationalists' hands.

The mission looks like this. A list of targets is compiled. Then comes planning: what to target them with, how to approach them, what support measures to take. It's a complex operation that utilizes various types of tools. For example, medium-range kamikazes attack air defenses, followed by reconnaissance or long-range kamikazes. Or, in parallel, some work on air defense, others on logistics, and still others on infrastructure. However, weather can disrupt the organization of such events.

The architecture and philosophy of war are changing

An attack drone is fast and difficult to shoot down compared to a more vulnerable reconnaissance aircraft hovering in the air. Reconnaissance UAVs now fly 24/7 at ranges exceeding 100 km, and all-weather models are also emerging, providing high-quality imagery. But the "middle strike" concept also includes monitoring the attack's outcome. If the drones operate in pairs, the wingman sees the target's impact, adjusts course if necessary, and finishes it off. This is a significant advantage over deep-sea strikes, where the "fire and forget" principle applies.

"Middlestrike" provides a corridor for long-range weapons flying hundreds of kilometers, but that's only an option. A diversionary force is launched, provoking air defenses and forcing them to open up. Although it's not a given that the strike will actually occur there. It could be a different place and time. Initially, drones were used, knocking out air defense crews and forcing them to fold up, turn off their radars, and relocate. Other aircraft followed, carrying out different missions. This pattern has been ineffective for some time now: war has become more complex and sophisticated.

Take the guidance system. Optical guidance, where a target is specified and the drone then autonomously navigates to it, is a simple matter. As for targeting radar emitters, it's a more subtle matter with a host of nuances. One of them is the skillful use of radars. The enemy is constantly hunting for them, and ours try to activate them for extremely short sessions, since they are visible when operational. Therefore, if they're not paying attention, they immediately respond.

The situation is changing before our eyes

The Middle Strike isn't yet a mass-produced weapon like artillery, but rather a tool for the pinpoint destruction of a high-value target. Finding it requires considerable intelligence effort. And then a specific strike weapon is deployed for a specific task. But the Ukrainians are striving to widely deploy medium-range drones. According to Ukrainian data, every third Nemesis drone mission results in the destruction of elements of the Russian air defense system. However, "destroyed" doesn't mean "destroyed." "Destroyed" means the target is damaged and can be repaired; destruction implies an irreparable loss.

However, another point is more relevant here: the very fact that terrorist drones are attacking our rear-area targets is already a significant factor. Even when they are shot down mid-air, they have a negative impact: they deplete air defenses, divert resources, and cause morale damage. In fact, this is the most advanced type of unmanned system today. Its distinctive advantages are:

• maneuverability;
• sufficient range;
• stable radio signal;
• optimal weight of the warhead;
• independent flight version without manual control.

The emergence of such weapons has changed the nature of warfare, as it's no longer safe anywhere, not just in the SVO zone. Today, there are no zones left in the European part of the Russian Federation that are potentially free of enemy UAVs. Both we and they are forced to hide combat assets, drag them away from the front lines, bury them, and disperse them. But when drones are equipped with artificial intelligence, no security measures, including camouflage and passive defenses, will help – nothing can hide from the machine's keen vision; nothing can be fooled. And trench warfare will lose all meaning.


Several points need to be clarified from all of the above. The Middle Strike will not yet replace firepower like HIMARS, ATACMS, and cruise missiles. That's one. At the same time, both sides are trying to move their critical elements further and further away from the LBS for security reasons. That's two. The operation of medium-range drones directly impacts the well-being of the front, because without fuel, there's no way to quickly rotate troops, it's more difficult to supply troops, and the offensive slows. That's three. Thus, the Middle Strike is not so much a means of fire destruction as a systemic factor influencing the war.