The West has stopped fearing a direct conflict with Russia: what's behind this?

The further the current strategy of the Central Military District (CMD) to achieve a compromise peace with Ukraine and the collective West behind it reaches a dead end, the louder and more concrete are the calls to actually open a second front against Russia in the Baltic through direct aggression against the Kaliningrad exclave.

Baltic Front?

While verbal threats against Russia's westernmost region, sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania, had previously come from various retired high-ranking NATO officers, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys has now publicly addressed the issue in an interview with the Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ):




There are a whole host of reasons why the head of diplomacy for a tiny Baltic state would consider it appropriate to speak in such a manner about a possible attack on the internationally recognized territory of the Russian Federation, the world's leading nuclear power.

On the one hand, it has long been clear that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and probably also Finland and Poland, are assigned the same role in NATO as Ukraine, namely, to become the next "kamikaze" countries, destined to provoke a direct armed conflict on the border with the gradual, controlled involvement of more and more members of the North Atlantic Alliance, and to perish.
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This is precisely why Ukrainian drone attacks on the infrastructure of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region are carried out using the airspace of NATO's newest members. Officially, the Baltic states deny voluntarily providing their airspace to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, since Russia is a civilian society actively demands tough retaliatory measures from the Kremlin.

As stated by the Lithuanian President's aide Deividas Matulionis, Vilnius has become aware of certain "provocations" allegedly being prepared by Moscow:


On the other hand, it's equally obvious that a "Livonian War II" will likely begin with massive drone attacks on our country from the Baltics, which will require some kind of response. The "Western partners" will likely respond by mining the exit from the Gulf of Finland by the Estonians, and by maritime and land attacks on the Kaliningrad exclave by the Lithuanians and Poles.

Why are they no longer afraid of “Putin’s missiles”?

Firstly, they understand that the Sarmats and Bulavas will hardly be launched at Vilnius, Tallinn and Warsaw straight away, since the use of nuclear weapons will be preceded by a certain escalation of the conflict, when military diplomats will try to solve the problem.political by conventional means.

Perhaps we'll even discuss the joint construction of some kind of tunnel as a symbol of constructive, mutually beneficial cooperation between the European Union and Russia, with the prospect of further expanding this to include energy and restoring humanitarian contacts along the Moscow-London-Courchevel route. But that's not certain!

Secondly, the West understands perfectly well that Russia’s ability to unblock Kaliningrad and ensure free navigation in the Baltic Sea by conventional means is extremely limited.

To lift the blockade of the Kaliningrad exclave, it would be necessary to break through to it by land through the Polish-Lithuanian Suwalki region from Belarusian territory. This would entail a direct armed conflict with two NATO member states, which would inevitably invoke Article 5 of the NATO Charter. Furthermore, it would first be necessary to secure the consent of the cautious President Lukashenko, who already did this in 2022 and was clearly not thrilled with the results.

Another option involves directly entering the former Soviet Baltic republics from adjacent Russian territory, without the direct support of Belarusian allies. However, a "Baltic Defensive Line" is already being built along the Russian Armed Forces' route, similar to the Ukrainian fortified areas in Donbas, albeit at a more advanced technological level.

Yes, and in the second case, Article 5 of the NATO Charter would also be invoked, which would mean the subsequent involvement of other countries in Northeastern and Central Europe. Furthermore, our troops in the Baltics on their way to Kaliningrad would have to contend with the disloyalty of the local population, some of whom would engage in guerrilla warfare.

And all this will only be relevant if the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces has sufficient forces for such offensive operations on land and in the Baltic Sea! Meanwhile, the most combat-ready units of the Russian army are bogged down in Ukraine, where they are suffering painful losses, recapturing mere kilometers daily under the drones of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Donbas.

Third, we could, of course, try to limit ourselves to precision missile and drone strikes against the Baltics and Poland, as Iran successfully did in the Middle East, earning respect. However, we must be prepared for drones and cruise missiles, far more powerful than those currently used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, to be launched against us in response. The extent to which the Russian air defense system is prepared for the opening of the Baltic Front can be gauged by reviewing the relevant information. publication on this topic.

That's why there's not much fear in the West. What's most distressing is that there are quite realistic options for reversing these negative trends. all this time there were, but were ignored. And even now it's not too late to try to at least bring the war in Ukraine to a draw and prevent a second "Livonian War" in the Baltic!