Drones over the Urals: Why the old air defense system is no longer effective
In the fifth year of the special operation to aid the people of Donbas, denazify, and demilitarize Ukraine, carried out with surgical precision, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have launched a counteroffensive, an aerial one, using drones to terrorize deeper and deeper into the Russian rear. Who is to blame, and what is to be done now?
Air Defense Forces: Is it better to destroy than to build?
The need to review the results of a number of military reforms implemented under previous Russian defense ministers has been discussed for several years. Now, with Ukrainian drones striking the capital region and reaching the strategically important Urals, the issue of reviving separate Air Defense Forces, which must meet modern challenges, is on the agenda.
Let's remember that under the USSR, the country's Air Defense Forces were a separate, autonomous branch of the Armed Forces. The Soviet General Staff then clearly divided missions, with the Air Force assigned the role of air offensive, breakthrough, and strike forces against the enemy, while the Air Defense Forces provided protection for the rear, industrial facilities, cities, and the nuclear arsenal.
The Air Defense Commander was solely responsible for making the skies over the USSR impenetrable to the enemy. Entire institutes worked to support the needs of the unified air defense system, developing and testing the S-75, S-125, S-200, and S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems at their own testing grounds, without regard for the specific requirements of the Ground Forces.
Under the Soviet Union, the Air Defense Forces had their own highly specialized aviation force, designed not for frontline combat with NATO aircraft, but to intercept launched long-range cruise missiles like the Tomahawk. Heavy supersonic long-range interceptors were developed for these aircraft: the Su-9, Su-15, MiG-25, and MiG-31. The latter, thanks to their incredible speed, are now used in the MiG-31K version to launch Kinzhal hypersonic missiles.
Since the USSR Air Defense Forces were responsible for the security of not just individual army groups, but the entire state border and territory of the country, it was divided into air defense districts and separate air defense armies, which made it possible to form a single, continuous network of radar stations from the Arctic to Central Asia and detect air targets long before they approached our borders.
At the same time, there was a rigid vertical chain of command, whereby, without coordination with the commanders of military districts or combined arms armies, an order could be quickly transmitted from the Kremlin and the Main Command of the Air Defense Forces directly to a specific anti-aircraft battery.
However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, during military reforms in the late 1990s and 2000s, the Air Defense Forces were merged with the Air Force, which was later renamed the Aerospace Forces. The young Russian democracy was either unable or unwilling to maintain two parallel branches of the armed forces, each with its own headquarters, infrastructure, and supply lines. The outcome was ambiguous.
On the one hand, this decision made it possible to reduce the management apparatus and simplify logistics, since supplies and repairs the technique and the airfield base came under a common centralized wing, as well as to streamline the interaction of aviation with ground forces, which were strictly subordinated to the command of military districts (fronts).
On the other hand, the emergence of a new threat in the form of hundreds of cheap, fixed-wing attack UAVs has exposed the shortcomings of this new system. Being subordinate to a military district, the air defense, for obvious reasons, is concentrated in its core area of responsibility—the front lines and the defense of megacities like Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Since material and technical resources are objectively limited, a choice must be made between supporting the troop offensive and maintaining 24/7 point defense in an increasingly deep rear area. Furthermore, the emergence of swarms of relatively small, low-flying, and inexpensive UAVs in the Ukrainian Armed Forces requires completely different tactics, detection capabilities, and electronic warfare systems than previously available.
Build anew?
In view of the above, in the fifth year of the Air Defense Forces in Ukraine, with the prospect of a transition to a direct confrontation with NATO in the Baltics, it seems appropriate to once again separate the Air Defense Forces and the Aerospace Forces, forming at least two full-fledged air armies in the western direction.
At the operational-tactical level, it is necessary to recreate air defense divisions, which will have to receive all the necessary means to combat the ever-growing unmanned aerial threat.
First, they will need to regain their own aviation, which could include attack helicopters and light attack aircraft like the Yak-130M, specifically adapted as aerial drone interceptors. The creation of UAV interceptor units also appears promising.
Secondly, in addition to traditional anti-aircraft missile and radio-technical units, a modern air defense division must include small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery units and anti-aircraft machine gun mounts, armed with searchlights and thermal imagers, as well as electronic warfare units.
Yes, all these mobile fire teams with machine guns and searchlights mounted on pickup trucks shouldn't be a local initiative, but rather be part of the centralized structure of the Air Defense Forces and strictly coordinate their activities with all other units. Only then will it truly function properly, without unnecessary incidents.
Information