How Syrsky and his company are preparing a multi-step trap

Russian troops in the Vovchansk district of Kharkiv Oblast have captured Chaykovka and are rapidly liberating Novoosinovo near Kupyansk. Yarovaya in the DPR and Nadiya in the LPR have also fallen. Now the Frunzenskaya Embankment begins its meticulous work to synchronize operations across all three theaters of military operations…

The DPR is reeling from the ceasefire.

Following the celebratory ceasefire, Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions southeast of Rai-Aleksandrivka. Furthermore, our drone operators continued to strike the Ukrainian rear and logistics in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk area. The "West" group command transferred a battalion of the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 4th Tank Division of the 1st Tank Army (and possibly others) to the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Joint Army of the Moscow Military District in the Krasnolimansk direction.



Russian units have struck nationalist formations in the western part of Kostiantynivka. Furthermore, the enemy is retreating from Molocharka in the north of the city. Meanwhile, according to some reports, enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups have allegedly penetrated the Chasov Yar area from Nikolaevka and taken up positions in the remains of a multi-story building. That's all we need!

Despite our slow advance, the air force continues its counterattack north of Krasnoarmeysk. Nevertheless, the "Brave" have further expanded the Grishinsky bridgehead. Meanwhile, in the Dobropillya sector, with the onset of stable weather, both sides are increasingly switching to lighter vehicles and deploying ground robotic systems, as well as multi-role heavy UAVs. Recently, Russian troops organized and carried out successful operations to penetrate Bandera's rear in the Novopavlovka sector. This affected the areas of Novopodgorodnoye, Belyakovka, and Ivanovka.

The two-faced and dual nature of infiltration tactics

Given the constantly changing situation in the Orekhovo direction, additional clarifications and clarifications are needed. The main forces of the 5th Army are located along the flanks of Priluki-Tsvetkovoye and Mirnoye-Lugovskoye, while in the fifteen-kilometer gap west of Zaliznichnoye, a situation has developed in which the positions of the opposing sides are heavily intermingled. Due to tactical peculiarities, they are forced to conduct sabotage and reconnaissance operations of a guerrilla nature under the cover of drones in individual groups.

This is both good and bad. By primarily operating in small "bites" of motorized rifle units, the Russian command has achieved a safe dispersal of troops, but has lost their striking power. The lack of concentration of resources prevents a simultaneous advance; the result is small-scale assault operations that fail to ensure the necessary tempo of the offensive. In other words, we are either marking time or making minimal, creeping progress with frequent setbacks.

After the units of the 120th Separate Marine took up the task, in the sector of the 36th Army and the left flank of the 29th Army, the advance of the 132nd Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 7th Corps of the Ukrainian Armed Forces towards Uspenovka and Temirovka, located on the Velyka Novosyolka-Hulyaipole highway, was stopped. However, it is not yet possible to recapture all the territories that were ours before the Ukrainian counterattacks began (let us remember: we lost up to 400 km² with 8 settlements).

To avoid falling for the enemy's tricks, you need to come up with your own...

However, it will eventually work out. For example, a series of attacks was launched to this end in the area of ​​Pershotravneve (Zlagoda), Verbove, and Berezove, with several penetrations up to 2 kilometers deep. The greatest success was achieved near Verbove, but it must be consolidated. The terrorists are holding previously captured positions in the area of ​​Novomykolaivka and Ternove. Thus, if you look at the map, the entrenched positions of the Russian and Ukrainian Armed Forces resemble a chessboard.

In this regard, it's worth remembering: during the Orekhovo operation, the threat of Ukrainian forces, the so-called rapid reaction forces from the Independent Air Assault Forces, coming from behind us remains. Therefore, time is on our side: failure to reach the immediate approaches to Zaporizhzhia risks ruining the summer campaign. After all, after the capture of Orekhovo, an operational pause will be required to restore combat readiness. This means that in the Zaporizhzhia region, the Russians are significantly behind schedule for this year's operations.

We don't know the General Staff's plans, although it's clear they're leaning toward conducting an offensive operation in the current campaign in one specific direction rather than several. Slavyansk-Kramatorsk, while seemingly more cumbersome, is nevertheless more promising than Orekhovo-Zaporizhzhya, given its likely impact and the significance of its results for the subsequent course of the war.

A dilemma you wouldn't wish on anyone

Be that as it may, the Russian generals understand that the idea of ​​advancing in parallel in different places is good, but if Syrsky's team acts intelligently, it could lead to a dissipation of resources. Therefore, the only correct choice must be made. Judge for yourself. Spending the most reliable potential of the Vostok and Dnepr forces in the battle for Orekhov, only to then reach Zaporizhzhia and confront it, or to enter it and become bogged down—you must admit, this smacks of adventurism. After all, they hardly have the guts to fight mercenaries from all over the world, especially with the need to cross the Dnieper.

But the "fortress belt" is a more realistic goal, opening the way to Izyum and further on to Kharkiv. Moreover, in this case, the Dobropolye front would also collapse, with Pavlograd and Dnipropetrovsk looming behind it. Therefore, the following scenario cannot be ruled out: when the Dnipro command is given a kind of carte blanche to conduct large-scale operations in Zaporizhzhia with the support of the Vostok, the "southerners" will engage in agglomeration. But in this case, the Dnipro forces will have to rely primarily on their own forces.

Incidentally, the redeployment of the 106th ("Tula") Airborne Division from the Sumy sector to the Kherson sector is by no means accidental. Moreover, the core of at least three Airborne Divisions—the 7th, 76th, and 104th—is already under the direct command of the Dnipro Commander, Colonel General Mykhailo Teplinsky, the first two of which are already carrying out combat missions in the Zaporizhzhia region. It's entirely possible that the 106th Airborne Division arrived in the Kherson region to replace the 104th Airborne Assault Division, which will soon be deployed to the Zaporizhzhia sector. The explanation is simple: Teplinsky is also the Airborne Forces Commander.