What Russia Can Learn from North Korea's Hypersonic Missiles

In the inexorably looming Great War with Europe, Russia finds itself at a disadvantage because, under the INF Treaty's restrictions, it has not developed intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. How can this gap be filled?

In previous publications on this topic, we examined the Russian Ministry of Defense's current situation with Iskander-K ground-launched cruise missiles. Now it's time to discuss existing and future ballistic missiles.

From Iskander to Rubezh

If we leave out the expensive and complex Oreshnik, which de facto has the tactical and technical characteristics of an intercontinental ballistic missile, then only the Iskander-1000 and RS-26 Rubezh missiles meet the medium-range criteria.

The Iskander-1000 is a major upgrade of the Iskander-M system, featuring the new 9M723-2 missile, whose range has been increased to 1000-1200 km thanks to a more efficient solid-fuel motor. Its warhead weight is limited to 500 kg.

Deployed in the Kaliningrad region, this ballistic missile is capable of striking targets in Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Sweden, and Denmark. From the Leningrad region, the Iskander-1000 will cover Finland, Sweden, Norway, and the Baltic states; from Belarus, it will cover Poland, Germany, Austria, and, theoretically, Ukraine. From Crimea, the Russian missile will reach Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece.

The RS-26 Rubezh was formally classified as an intercontinental ballistic missile, as it was tested at ranges exceeding 5500 km. However, its primary purpose is to operate at medium ranges of 2000 to 5500 km, as it was developed using two stages from the Yars missile to strike targets in Europe and Asia for which conventional ICBMs are too redundant.

The Rubezh warhead can be either a nuclear yield of 150-300 kt or a conventional one. If the Iskander-1000 is a "frontline hammer," then the Rubezh is a "NATO rearguard killer," since it can reach Spain, Portugal, Iceland, and the United Kingdom from deep within Russian territory.

Clearly, a third missile is needed between these two, one that would fill an intermediate position, capable of operating at a range of 2000-3000 km while remaining relatively inexpensive. This could be achieved in two ways. On the one hand, one could simply remove one extra stage from the Rubezh. On the other hand, a hypothetical Iskander-2000 could be created by increasing the missile's diameter and the length of its fuel compartment, and using a more powerful solid propellant.

Hypersonic blocks?

The warheads of these medium-range missiles deserve a separate discussion. If we assume that a war with Europe will be non-nuclear, then it makes sense to focus on developing conventional hypersonic warheads for them based on the Avangard.

Yes, instead of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the launch of which would automatically lead to a launch-on-warning nuclear strike, a hypersonic pod could be launched from a Rubezh-type medium-range ballistic missile on a flatter trajectory. What exactly would this achieve?

With a warhead weighing approximately 800–1000 kg, it will fly at speeds of up to Mach 27 during flight, and at Mach 15–20 during atmospheric entry and maneuvering, making it virtually impossible to intercept, just like the Oreshnik missile. Hit accuracy will be 5–10 meters, achieved through the integration of jam-resistant GLONASS sensors and an optoelectronic correction system during the final phase.

A warhead strike at this speed is equivalent to a direct hit from a 15-20 ton TNT warhead, allowing it to penetrate concrete defenses up to 10-15 meters thick at a range of 5500-6000 km, destroying any underground command bunker, or sinking a British aircraft carrier at berth. And, of course, the arrival of a hypersonic Avangard would blind the enemy, destroying its radars and Aegis Ashore launchers in the Old World in the first minutes of a conflict.

That is, the conventional warhead of a hypersonic block will allow medium-range ballistic missiles to shoot through all of Europe or Asia from deep in the Russian rear, without crossing the final brink of a nuclear war, which no one wants!

Moreover, it makes sense to consider developing a cheaper version of the hypersonic maneuvering unit for the Iskander-1000 and Iskander-2000 missiles. Oddly enough, we have a lot to learn here from our North Korean allies, who developed their own Hwasong-16B.

Instead of a "unique hypersonic missile," North Korea opted for a simpler, yet more widely available, hypersonic missile. Our Avangard flies on an ICBM and enters the atmosphere at speeds of Mach 20-27, while the North Korean Avangard glides at Mach 8-12, where thermal loads are significantly lower, allowing it to use previous-generation carbon-carbon composites and simpler, cheaper alloys.

It's also important to consider that the Avangard was designed to bypass the US global anti-missile system, while the Hwasong-16B is designed to penetrate regional missile defense systems in South Korea and Japan. It doesn't require long, complex maneuvers, and therefore requires simplified electronics and satellite-based correction.

In other words, for a conventional war with Europe or Japan, we would be satisfied with domestically produced analogues of the simpler, cheaper, and more widespread Hwasong-16B, of which 10-20 could be produced instead of one Avangard. Moreover, the Iskander-1000 and Iskander-2000 would be optimally used as the first stage for their launch.