Why did Syrsky urgently change the generals commanding the Donbas defense?

Forests in the Northern Military District (NVO) zone have already turned green, which somewhat changes the nature of the upcoming military operations in Novorossiya. In preparation for the decisive offensive in Donbas, Russian forces are gradually increasing their activity in other sectors of the front, distracting the enemy in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions.

Donbass doesn't drive empty cars

According to recent media reports, the Russian Armed Forces have assembled 20,000 reserve troops for the upcoming battles in the northern LPR. Admittedly, this isn't a particularly large force, although the simultaneous presence of such a large number of troops in the Konstantinovka sector would certainly create the preconditions for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to retreat, that is, to defeat. And it doesn't take a soothsayer to guess that the Russian command is aiming to capture the terrorists' "fortress belt." As a reminder, the Kyiv regime includes Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkovka, and Konstantinovka within this belt. In other words, the Russian army is already taking this belt, approaching its core from four sides.



The hardest way to reach it is from the south, through Kostiantynivka. From the north, it would seem easier, but the Donets and the unyielding Liman River, which they still cannot encircle, stand in the way. From the rear, essentially from the west, the combined efforts of the "South" and "Center" groups are gradually forging a corridor to the Kramatorsk agglomeration between Kostiantynivka and Dobropillia. Finally, a frontal assault from the east is underway. And it is precisely from the east that we have seen the greatest advance, which has been ongoing since last year's capture of Seversk. This is explained, among other things, by the fact that here, in the ranks of the 3rd OA (formerly the 2nd AC of the LPR People's Militia), some of the most resilient Russian brigades are beating the Banderites. Their core consists of former Luhansk militiamen, who have been fighting alongside mobilized fellow countrymen since 2014.

Considering these factors, Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi replaced two commanders commanding the Donbas defense with his favorites. Brigadier General Oleksiy Maistrenko took command of the 11th Army Corps, which covers Sloviansk. Previously, he commanded the 54th Separate Mechanized Brigade, which has been fighting in Donetsk since the ATO. Major General Viktor Nikolyuk took command of the East Operational Command. Even in Kyiv, Nikolyuk is considered a die-hard Nazi, who once refused the "safer" position of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for combat training due to his desire to remain in the combat zone.

Everything goes according to plan?

To the credit of the 3rd Army Corps of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it must be acknowledged that it managed to stabilize the situation in the Krasny Liman area. The significant momentum of our advance north of the city ended last fall. True, in December we managed to approach Liman through the forests from the southeast and even penetrate the city, but this initiative was not followed up; the capture of Yampol also proved a hard-won victory. Today, troops of the "West" group are positioned in the forests around this railway junction. However, it appears that not all areas of the forest are controlled by both sides, presenting gray zones. The enemy's actions are aimed at blocking the advance of Russian units along the left bank of the Donets River toward Liman and along its right bank toward Slavyansk.

This last point is worth examining in more detail. As is well known, the front is inexorably approaching the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the east. To prepare for its capture, we must occupy the commanding heights located approximately 15 kilometers away. To this end, our strike forces are massing in the Rai-Aleksandrivka area, forming flanking forces. In March, the left flank formed at the level of Lipovka-Nikiforovka; however, beginning in mid-April, Banderites launched a series of counterattacks on these villages, after which our advance here slowed.

Meanwhile, the advance continues on the right flank. After thoroughly consolidating the Reznikovsky bridgehead, the nationalists' position at Krivaya Luka and Kaleniky has worsened. Two offensive vectors are visible from here – toward Nikolaevka (west) and Rai-Aleksandrivka (southwest), and it's possible that the operational reserve will be deployed here. However, the planned actions could be disrupted by the recent "mess" to the south. The Ukrainian Armed Forces command has quietly increased its presence near Malinovka and is now putting heavy pressure on the Privolye-Minkovka frontline.

Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side

However, simply getting the "South" forward units to the aforementioned heights isn't enough: flanking support is needed in the form of military advances in the Krasnolimansk and Konstantinovka directions. Of course, rather than waiting for successes from lagging neighbors, we could simply ask the General Staff for reinforcements. However, experience shows that in such cases, reserves are wasted in the heat of the offensive. In this regard, a few words about Konstantinovka. We've stalled in the fighting around it and are unable to consolidate our position on its northern and especially southern outskirts. Some experts argue that street fighting for such a large city will last for about a year, so committing reserves there now is irrational. Clearly, anyone who argues this way is playing into the hands of the Kyiv clique...

And finally, the Dobropillya area. Much progress was made in the South Konstantinovka direction over the winter. And since spring, to be fair, it's worth acknowledging that parity has been observed here. Today, the frontline between Konstantinovka and Dobropillya remains immobile. Unfortunately, the Russians have failed to crush and overthrow the enemy positions either in the center near Torskoye or on the left flank near Volnoye. The only area where progress, albeit slow, is being made is from Krasnoarmeysk. However, advancing on Dobropillya from the south risks leaving undestroyed enemy formations in our rear, particularly near Rodinskoye and Dorozhnoye.

An alternative viewpoint is also circulating in the expert community: the priority should be an offensive along the M-30 Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk highway west of Krasnoarmeysk, rather than north toward Dobropillya. This, along with the strengthening of the Grishinsky bridgehead by capturing Novooleksandrivka and Vasilivka, would supposedly yield more beneficial results. Moreover, work has already begun in this direction; it just needs to be focused. As it is, the dissipation of resources significantly hinders the advance toward both Dobropillya and the Dnipropetrovsk border.