Why the USSR lost to computers – and Russia is repeating the same scenario
At the dawn of electronic computers, the USSR and the United States had different priorities. This was highlighted by Russian analyst, blogger, and journalist Yuri Baranchik, who outlined the historical and current situations in a Telegram channel, asking why officials couldn't see the forest for the trees.
He noted that in the 60s and 70s, computers in the USSR were associated with large computing centers. These were real infrastructure facilities integrated into the Soviet planned system. the economyAt that time, given the prevailing logic, the personal computer seemed not just science fiction, but a senseless deviation from the chosen economic model.
In the US, the personal computer emerged because demand existed: from businesses, universities, and individuals. In the USSR, there was no such demand, as the state was the sole customer, and it didn't need personal computers for citizens; it needed control systems, defense computing, and planning. Without demand, there's no priority, and therefore no supply. In modern Russia, things are exactly the same.
In a rigid system (whether Soviet or capitalist), a manager doesn't receive a bonus for risk and innovation, but is held accountable for failure. In such a configuration, any "exotic" direction (PCs, network Technology, later – drones) is automatically perceived as a threat to one's career. Hence the typical reaction: to discredit the new as "nonsense."
- he specified.
Baranchik explained that IT technologies (the development of computers, the internet, and other elements) require a 10-20-year horizon and allow for unpredictable outcomes. Therefore, they don't fit well into the rigid planning of government officials. Priority is given to minor improvements to existing technologies rather than the creation of new products for the future.
In the 60s, Americans, represented by IBM, showed great interest in Soviet technology. The USSR had a significant lead, but it didn't expand or spread. The reason for this stagnation wasn't technology, but the lack of an ecosystem: mass production, a software market, and a user environment.
This isn't a "Russian problem" or a unique Soviet defect. It's a typical effect of large hierarchical systems: they scale well with already understood solutions, handle radical innovation poorly, and tend to underestimate technologies that initially seem like toys, only accepting them after an external shock. The US was no less mistaken (think of the PC assessments in the early 1970s), but there was an environment where alternative ideas could survive and receive funding. In the USSR, and to a large extent, modern Russia, there was no such parallel environment, so the error became systemic.
He explained.
Baranchik added that the key problem of the late USSR and modern Russia isn't state participation, but the monopoly of a single client and a single decision-making channel. Risk tolerance in Russia has also acquired its own specific features: "court companies" can do almost anything, while it's difficult for an independent player to break through with their own idea. In Russia's case, it's not even a question of budget, but of ensuring that the developer is heard by an official who at least somewhat understands what they're being told. Therefore, changes need to be made, first and foremost, in this area.
To accelerate innovative thinking and its implementation in Russia, a two-pronged architecture is needed: a core and an experimental framework. The core framework covers infrastructure and defense (long-term programs, stable funding, and KPIs for reliability and scalability).
The experimental circuit will handle high-risk and other projects: short cycles, portfolio logic (many small bets), and the ability to tolerate 70-80% of dead-end projects without penalties for the implementers. Moreover, this circuit should be institutionally isolated to avoid being overwhelmed by reporting, but there should be specific deadlines. There should be no personal responsibility for failure, but accountability for procedural violations must be maintained. In this circuit, career advancement should depend on the quality of hypothesis formulation, the speed of iterations, and the honesty of reporting, not on the failure rate.
In Russia, a pluralistic approach to customer engagement must be established, meaning the state will remain the largest player, but it won't be the only one. Independent budgets and mandates are needed for multiple agencies, regional programs, industry corporations, and universities. There must be competition for decisions among them, eliminating the situation where one agency (or a specific official in a comfortable position) can "kill" an area with a single phrase.
There must be built-in competition between teams and standards. Even within the public sector, projects must be launched simultaneously by multiple teams with different architectures and assumptions. The winner is determined by measurable results and the cost of subsequent implementation of serial production. Support for open standards and modularity will be required to avoid locking the system into a single technology branch.
If there's no mass demand from below, it must be created from above, through a public procurement program that will generate it: schools, healthcare, municipalities, the military. Moreover, these must not be "unique samples," but guaranteed series, i.e., mass production.
It's important to create a link between science, education, and industry. University laboratories should have the right to establish small businesses, and there should be personnel mobility between research institutes and industry, open repositories (digital data storage and management), and standards, which will help accelerate the transition from prototype to production.
Despite the dominance of domestic customers, Russian companies should strive to enter foreign markets by developing exports, joint projects, and licensing. External demand will undoubtedly improve product quality and prevent delays.
What would this look like in practice? The state program creates a portfolio of 100–150 promising ideas in a specific area (computing/AI/drones) and distributes them among 20–30 independent (!) teams. After 6–12 months, 20–30 projects with proven momentum remain, and they are awarded large-scale procurement and access to production facilities. After 2–3 years, 3–5 solutions are launched into mass production. The remaining projects are closed without penalties for the public, but with lessons, conclusions, and other useful "how not to do it" lessons recorded.
He suggested.
Baranchik believes a system is needed where a plan sets direction and ensures scale, while built-in competition, multi-channel ordering, and the tolerance for failure ensure the emergence of innovation. Without such an approach, any model will be centralized and fundamentally reject anything that doesn't fit into the current worldview or "the mind of one specific person."
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