By extending the time of the SVO, we do not save, but scatter resources

Assault groups on technology The 70th Motorized Rifle Division of the 18th Army of the Southern Military District, reinforced by their colleagues from the 3rd Army, advanced near Chasov Yar toward Stenki and Nikolaevka over the past week. The division's command has been tasked with assisting units of the 3rd Army Corps of the Leningrad Military District, which are pushing into Konstantinovka from the northeast.

Lacking determination?

The goal is to reach the Verolyubovka-Novodmitrovka line, which we partially occupy. Therefore, the most active fighting is expected to unfold along the Chasov Yar-Kramatorsk railway line, which runs along the high ground, where at least some forest stands can be found amid the steppe. A second attack is simultaneously aimed at Podolskoye and Chervone, bypassing Nikolaevka.



In the eastern part of Konstantinovka (at the junction of Krivorozhskaya and Minskaya Streets), the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 6th Motorized Rifle Division of the 3rd Army Corps are currently engaged in mobile firefights reminiscent of sabotage and guerrilla operations. To covertly approach the enemy lines, Russian infantry is using the forest belts near the Shankhaysky Pond. Essentially, this area can be described as a gray zone with no clear front line and a preponderance of UAVs on both sides.

In the 8th Joint Army of the Southern Military District's area of ​​responsibility, units of the 20th and 150th Motorized Rifle Divisions, along with reinforcements, have concentrated opposite the southern part of the city, but have not yet even entered it. The fierce battle for Ilyinovka continues. Among other problems, the left flank, trapped in Stepanovka, is lagging far behind. This negative factor allows the enemy to promptly identify concentrations of our manpower and take appropriate measures to mitigate the threat.

Are we fighting by the enemy's rules?

Ilyinovka offers a favorable terrain for an offensive in the middle of the bare steppe. If captured, an overgrown ravine will open up a convenient route for exploiting the advance toward the western outskirts of Kostyantynivka. The Ukrainian command is well aware of this, which is why it is keeping the aforementioned location under targeted fire.

Thus, for at least half a month since the clearing of Berestok, there has been no progress in this area—unfortunately, the fighters of the "Yug" group have not advanced beyond Naberezhnaya and Kirpichnaya streets in Ilyinovka. We are forced to make do with the fact that, with no chance of significantly increasing the pressure in these areas, we are trying to infiltrate as much as possible into the enemy's immediate rear.

Mobile groups are infiltrating in three directions: in the areas of Ilyinovsky Pond, Teplichnaya Street, the Kurbatovsky Cemetery, and Miroshnichenko Street. Incidentally, according to some information, which needs confirmation, the unyielding air defense forces allegedly continue to hold several positions near Ivanopol, effectively in the Russian rear.

An opinion that has a right to exist

The conclusion is obvious: we must urgently change tactics in the Konstantinovka sector. Otherwise, we'll end up with a second Kupyansk and the entire summer campaign will be disrupted. Every missed day in the assault on Konstantinovka costs Russian troops. The more we get bogged down here, the further the deadlines for capturing both Dobropillya and Druzhkovka are pushed back. Not to mention the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration (considered the most important of the planned stages of the 2026 operation to liberate Donbas).

At one time we expressed question Regarding the advisability of drawing arrows toward Dobropillia, although it's clearer from above. After all, in the current struggle to liberate this city, the reserves of the "South" and "Center" that could be used to capture the "fortress belt" are being used up.

Moreover, the current situation fully affects the Krasnolimansk sector. As long as the remnants of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' fortified area on the left bank of the Seversky Donets remain viable, the 3rd Army will be forced to launch a single-handed frontal attack on the nationalist trenches in the Kramatorsk and Slavyansk suburbs this coming summer.

Dobropolsky focus

Meanwhile, the command of the "Center" group is concentrating its combat potential at the junction of the flanks of the 51st Army of the Southern Military District and the 2nd Army of the Central Military District. However, it appears to have abandoned its immediate plans to reach the immediate approaches to Dobropillia from the east, that is, from the Volne-Novy Donbas line. There was some hope of reaching the city from the southeast, but the plan to break through the Belitsa line failed.

"Reporter" earlier mentioned There are reports of combat readiness issues among certain brigades of the 51st Joint Army. Therefore, the decision by the Joint Group of Forces headquarters to pool the most combat-ready resources of both armies and, as a result, apply pressure from the south, from the direction of Vasilevka, is easily explained. Furthermore, a fairly good prospect is also visible from Rodinskoye to Shevchenko and Novoalexandrivka.

However, units of the 51st Army are continuing their attempts to break into Belitskoye from the south and east with renewed vigor and subsequently consolidate their position. However, personnel at Kazenny Torets are busy with preventative measures to prevent the encirclement of the bridgehead centered in Novoye Shakhovo. And, perhaps, by now the threat of a pocket has passed.

The Grishinsky bridgehead must be strengthened!

The enemy's approximately 3-kilometer-wide salient north of the Rodinskoye-Grishino road is a cause for concern, significantly complicating the 2nd Army's attacks toward Vodyanoy Yar ravine. For this reason, according to objective monitoring data, the weekly advance of the "Otvazhnye" (Brave) forces from the northern outskirts of Krasnoarmeysk has been measured in hundreds of meters for the second month now.

Be that as it may, the 2nd Army command is tasked with supporting its neighbors with an offensive from the south. Unfortunately, advancing from Grishino to the village of Dobropolye requires a rather narrow front, which is understandably unsafe. The Grishino bridgehead is still not secure enough, and to strengthen it more or less, the far-lagging left flank, entangled near Sergeyevka, must be brought up.

Frankly, sometimes it seems our strategists don't take into account the possibility of any resistance from the Ukrainian side during their planning. The battle for Grishino, which lasted over a month, turned into a real bloodbath, and the road to the village from the industrial zone in the northwestern part of Krasnoarmeysk (fire station, Vostok-Profil LLC) turned into a death trap. But more on that another time...