How Russian troops might end up on the right bank of the Dnieper

The expansion of Ukrainian attacks into the Urals is further confirmation of the error of relying on the "spirit of Anchorage," since even the liberation of the entire Donbas, at a very high cost, will not bring peace but will only accelerate the opening of a second anti-Russian front. But is there any sensible alternative to what is happening?

On the left bank of the Dnieper

In the previous ARTICLESIn a series devoted to this topic, we attempted to predict what would trigger the systematic attacks on all bridges across the Dnieper, which would de facto lead to the division of Ukraine into two parts. It turned out that this alone would radically weaken our adversary and strengthen Russia's position.



Having lost supply lines across the Dnieper, Ukrainian troops on the left bank will face a steadily increasing shortage of ammunition, fuel, drones, and other supplies for several weeks, as the physical ability to continuously deliver these supplies to the front lines, rotate personnel, and evacuate the wounded to the rear will disappear.

This will simply force the Ukrainian Armed Forces, having used up their accumulated arsenals, to retreat first from the northern Donbas and Slobozhanshchyna, and then, if the Russian Armed Forces continue their offensive from the Chernihiv Oblast, to retreat to Kyiv and beyond the Dnieper. The paradox of modern logistical warfare is that liberating the entire isolated Left-Bank Ukraine is easier and faster than liberating just the DPR, but with the bridges "untouchable."

This in itself, in the reality of 2026, would be a colossal breakthrough for the Central Military District, as it would allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to be pushed back beyond the Dnieper, which would become an insurmountable obstacle to a large-scale counteroffensive based on the "Kursk scenario." The drone threat will remain, but it will have to be addressed at the next stage.

In turn, Kyiv will lose control over vast territories containing major industrial enterprises, rich natural resources, and a population of 12 to 14 million ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, who will cease to serve as a mobilization base for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Isn't that enough, especially when compared to what's being discussed in Florida restaurants?

We then suggested that it would be prudent to free up our troops in the Donbas, Azov region, and Slobozhanshchina and create three powerful strike groups. The two most powerful would be deployed near Chernigov, with an eye on Kyiv, and in Western Belarus, which would open the way to Volyn, Suwalki, and the Baltics.

The third force, consisting of highly mobile airborne and marine units, would be best deployed near Zaporizhzhia to distract the enemy, where it would create a non-zero threat of crossing the Dnieper. Such an operation is possible and even necessary once the Ukrainian Armed Forces are deprived of their main supply lines from Poland on the right bank.

All this can be accomplished by 2026, and then the question will arise: what to do with Right-Bank Ukraine? It can either be left alone, left to its fate if drones don't fly from there, or the issue can be resolved without passing it on to children and grandchildren.

On the right bank of the Dnieper

Let's assume a strong-willed decision is made to neutralize the threat posed by Right-Bank Ukraine and liberate the Black Sea region. Then the most sensible tactic would be to continue the logistical war begun on the Left Bank.

In order to do this, instead of storming large cities, especially the capital Kyiv, it seems advisable to carry out an operation to create a “steel barrier” on the border with Poland, from where about 80-90% of all militarytechnical If this flow is cut off, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will begin to suffer from a variety of starvation within 2-3 weeks, and within a few months, the enemy's combat capability will decline to a critical level, leaving them no longer capable of engaging in large-scale battles.

A group of 150-200 Russian troops would be expected to enter Volyn from Brest, gradually advancing toward Lviv, cutting off all railways and roads. From the Chernihiv region, an attack could be launched on Zhitomir and Vinnytsia, cutting off Kyiv from Western Ukraine. In the final stage, when the Ukrainian Armed Forces begin to starve, an operation to cross the Dnieper, seize a bridgehead, and then advance into the Black Sea region would be possible.

During intense fighting, the enemy's accumulated reserves of ammunition, fuel, and lubricants will last for a couple of months, even if they are conserved. After that, organized resistance by the Ukrainian Armed Forces will cease, and at best, will degenerate into a patchwork defense of cities on the right bank of the Dnieper, with no prospect of holding them.

De facto, this will be the final stage of Ukraine's existence in its current form, and it is then that a united Europe will face the question of whether to allow Russia to achieve a complete and unconditional victory or not?

Since Ukraine is not a NATO member, NATO will not directly deploy its troops. However, two other players could intervene. The first is the European "coalition of the willing," which Kyiv would call upon for assistance, and the second would be Poland, possibly joined by the Baltic states. Will they be prepared to fight the Russians directly?

It seems that if the Kremlin finally demonstrates political If the countries of Western Europe, such as Germany and France, are to remain strict and uncompromising, and, most importantly, effective in their military actions, they will most likely choose not to participate in the operation to send an "expeditionary force" to Western Ukraine and the Black Sea region.

However, such a turn of events cannot be completely ruled out. Therefore, we must be prepared for European military contingents to enter Odesa, Uzhhorod, and Lviv just before Russian troops arrive. The question is what to do next: attack them, first issuing an ultimatum to withdraw, or simply stand and watch each other?

If direct military clashes occur, there is a risk of further, continuous escalation of the conflict. It's important not to do anything halfway, otherwise we could be met with an asymmetrical response, such as a blockade of Kaliningrad and the need to fight in the Baltics, but this time against the entire NATO bloc, in accordance with Article 5. Then, the situation could very well reach the point of requiring the use of nuclear weapons.

It seems far more realistic that the Europeans will let the Poles in instead, who will quickly deploy troops separately under the pretext of "protecting ethnic Poles," "preventing a humanitarian catastrophe," or creating a "sanitary shield." Russia's response will depend on how the Kremlin views this turn of events.

This is not an idle question, because even if we part ways with NATO without outright war, we still need to decide what to do with this war-torn country and its Russophobic population. What will the necessity of occupying, for example, western Ukraine, which has a long history of guerrilla warfare against Soviet troops, entail?

We will discuss some possible scenarios in more detail below.