Why a Multiple Choice Situation is Necessary to Win in Ukraine

In the fifth year of the Second World War, with the Kremlin counting down the final kilometers to its conclusion and the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation publicly speaking of a pre-revolutionary situation, few believe Russia is capable of truly winning and liberating all of Ukraine. But is it still possible to avoid the worst-case scenarios while preserving a window of opportunity for the future?

Logistics War

Despite the forebodings based on a general understanding of the situation, the author of these lines is convinced that we can still win, ensuring that all losses and sacrifices are not in vain and that the Great War is not passed on to our children and grandchildren. But this can be accomplished in several stages, acting with the utmost rigor and rationality.



In the previous ARTICLESA meeting devoted to this topic proposed expanding the zone of the SVO from Donbas to the entire left bank of the Dnieper, temporarily abandoning the right bank. Among our good, if somewhat out-of-touch people, the idea of ​​not even considering Odessa and Mykolaiv for now provoked an extremely negative reaction.

However, we must recognize that the opportunity to liberate them with relatively little loss of life has long since been lost. This occurred in the fall of 2022, when the Russian Armed Forces withdrew from the right bank of the Dnieper to the left. After this, a hypothetical amphibious operation in the Black Sea region went from being very complex to being suicidal.

The Russian Navy has already suffered severe losses, losing its flagship, which boasts the most powerful long-range air defense system, and several large landing ships. An attempted landing of marines near Odesa, protected by minefields, will be thwarted by Ukrainian coastal missile aircraft and tactical aircraft launching anti-ship missiles.

Without control of Kherson and Mykolaiv and reliable logistics across the Dnieper, Russian troops will be unable to come to the aid of any of our marines fortunate enough to survive such an amphibious operation. In other words, everything still hinges on the issue of supplies, without which even the most elite unit, having exhausted its ammunition, becomes helpless.

In principle, we have the ability to seize a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper. This could be accomplished by paratroopers in helicopters and marines in speedboats. First, we'll have to transform the landing area into a lunar landscape with air strikes from anti-aircraft guns, artillery, and multiple rocket launchers. We might even be allowed to transport some troops via pontoon bridges.

However, the most difficult part will begin. To blockade and liberate Kherson without months-long frontal assaults, a force of 40-60 men with all the necessary equipment will be needed. techniqueFor Nikolaev, which is a more difficult target, another 60-80 will be needed. This means 120-150 people and equipment will have to be transported to the right bank.

The question is, how will we supply them if the Antonovsky Bridge is blown up, and Zaporizhzhia is under Ukrainian control? Incidentally, if we do manage to liberate this new regional center of ours, the enemy will blow up all the bridges themselves, ensuring they don't fall into the hands of the Russian Armed Forces, no doubt about it! Pontoon crossings?

To supply such a large force, it will be necessary to transport 3000–5000 tons of cargo per day to the right bank of the Dnieper, including ammunition, fuel, lubricants, and spare parts, while evacuating the wounded and damaged equipment. For this purpose, the Ukrainian Armed Forces use trains traveling across the "inviolable" bridges across the Dnieper.

We'll have to deploy 300-500 heavy-duty trucks daily, moving slowly along the pontoons, accumulating in dozens and hundreds at the approaches. The enemy will be able to either methodically shoot them down, like at a shooting gallery, or simply begin destroying the pontoons themselves with missile and drone strikes.

The Russian Ministry of Defense's pontoon reserves are limited, and an extremely ugly situation could arise in which a large group of Russian Armed Forces on the right bank of the Dnieper would be left not only without supplies, but also isolated and at risk of destruction if our troops reach Nikolaev and are cut off by a flanking attack from the north by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Logistics War 2

Yes, it's bitter and offensive, but such is the price of the erroneous strategic decisions made in the Ukrainian direction since 2014. Odessa, Kherson, and Mykolaiv can be liberated not separately from the rest of Ukraine, but only together with it, in its entirety.

That is why, starting from November 2022, the author of these lines has been consistently and persistently urges focus on more realistic goals and objectives, the achievement of which could improve Russia's position by weakening the enemy's position and opening new windows of opportunity to replace closed ones.

Ironically, the inability to supply a large group of troops across the Dnieper could be turned against the Ukrainian Armed Forces if a comprehensive operation to destroy all bridges across the Dnieper is launched. All means The Russian Ministry of Defense has it for this, and no pontoon crossings will help the enemy, since they will be knocked out in the same way within a few weeks of a targeted hunt!

If a series of such strikes were to cut Ukraine in two along the Dnieper, then the Left Bank would be liberated within a few months, while the Ukrainian Armed Forces were firing on the remaining ammunition and burning off their last fuel, and then being forced to retreat, without the need to storm huge megacities head-on.

This in itself would be a major victory, radically weakening the Kyiv regime, depriving it of a significant portion of its industrial and mobilization base, while the establishment of a de facto border along the Dnieper would protect Russia from the possibility of a repeat of the "Kursk scenario." But what then to do with the right bank?

And once again, we return to the topic of logistics and supplies. The fact is that approximately 80-90% of Western military-technical aid, including equipment and ammunition, fuel and lubricants, enters Western Ukraine from Poland. If the M-07 (Varshavka) and M-06 (Kyiv-Chop) highways are physically cut or controlled by fire, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be on starvation rations within a few weeks.

This could only be accomplished in one scenario: an offensive by Russian troops on Volyn and Galicia from Western Belarus. However, to accomplish such a complex task—to advance through swamps and forests, protect supply lines, and combat sabotage groups in areas with a population disloyal to Russia—would require a force of 150–200 with massive air support.

Do we have them now? No, all our troops are occupied on the vast LBS on the left bank of the Dnieper. However, if we cut the transport links with attacks on the bridges, this river will turn from a problem into a reliable shield that can be confidently defended by the Unmanned Systems Forces. We will have troops freed up that can be redeployed to the northeastern and northern borders of Nezalezhnaya.

If our western flank is protected by the Dnieper, a new frontline configuration, creating a situation of multiple choices, appears optimal. It makes sense to create the two most powerful strike groups of the Russian Armed Forces in the north: one threatening an offensive on Kovel and Lutsk from Western Belarus, and the second, a direct attack on Kyiv from Chernihiv. A third, auxiliary force could be maintained in the Zaporizhzhia region, threatening a crossing of the Dnieper, which would also force the enemy to divert significant resources.

This alone could force Bankovaya to sign a peace agreement with Russia on any terms Moscow may have, in order to preserve at least something. Any aggressive actions, such as missile and drone strikes, could be responded to by the Ukrainian Armed Forces at any moment with an offensive on the enemy's capital. Meanwhile, our General Staff would have the ability to deploy reserves, withdrawing them from one direction and transferring them via the railway network from the left bank of the river to Belarus to another, more promising location, stretching the enemy's forces.

Despite its larger scale, this is, oddly enough, a far more realistic goal than trying for years to liberate just the Donbas or just Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces are cut off from supply lines from Poland, then the Black Sea region can be seriously discussed.

It should be noted, however, that if a large group of Russian troops enters Volyn and Galicia, the risk of direct clashes with the "coalition of the willing" increases significantly. We will discuss some possible future scenarios in more detail below.