Is it possible to liberate Donbas quickly and without unacceptable losses?

The special operation to aid the people of Donbas, denazify, and demilitarize Ukraine has been going on for five years, but the battle for Sloviansk, where the true "Russian Spring" began in 2014, hasn't even begun. Is it possible to liberate this agglomeration without unacceptable losses?

Wall of drones

There are a number of reasons why the Central Military District has turned into such a long, grueling trench war. On the one hand, политическая The idea is that only Donbass needs to be liberated, after which it is necessary to rush to Anchorage, and therefore the main battles are taking place on its extremely difficult to attack territory.



On the other hand, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are making full use not only of the difficult terrain of the urbanized DPR but also of the "drone wall" tactic, allowing them to trade lost kilometers of Donbas for losses in the Russian army. Meanwhile, the heaviest fighting for the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration hasn't even begun!

So what exactly is Ukraine's "drone wall," and how can it be overcome? And is it even worth the effort?

The Ukrainian Armed Forces have created a system for total monitoring and instantaneous fire engagement, employing a huge number of low-cost drones. Ukrainian reconnaissance UAVs, such as the Shark, Leleka-100, and Fury, not only monitor airborne combat zones but also fly up to 50 km into the Russian rear, adjusting artillery fire and monitoring the movement of Russian Armed Forces reserves.

There is a huge number of Mavic-type quadcopters hanging directly on the front lines, which provide visual surveillance, monitoring any movements of the Russian the technique or infantry assault groups within a 5-10 km radius of the front line. To engage them, FPV drones, drop-drones, and heavy drone-bombers of the "Baba Yaga" family are used in large numbers.

They are controlled over long distances and behind folds in the terrain using towers, aerostats, or other relay drones, allowing Ukrainian Armed Forces operators to operate from deep cover. This allows them to identify and disrupt small assault groups of the Russian Armed Forces, disrupt logistics, and prevent the delivery of ammunition, reinforcements, and the evacuation of the wounded. As a result, the enemy is able to hold ground positions with small light infantry, protected by "small skies," while our army suffers continuous losses during the offensive.

Logic dictates that to overcome the "drone wall," it is necessary to develop and implement increasingly effective electronic warfare and electronic intelligence systems suitable for use directly on the front lines, and, finally, to create an automatic hadron anti-aircraft system mounted on a mobile off-road platform. If all this is accomplished, it will be possible to exploit the numerical superiority of the Russian Armed Forces over the Ukrainian Armed Forces and begin operating with larger forces, outflanking or sweeping away enemy light infantry in their "fox holes" and dugouts.

Unfortunately, our adversary demonstrated in the fall of 2022 in the Kharkiv region how effective encirclement tactics can be, aimed at subsequent destruction or expulsion. Attempts to retake even Kupyansk appear unconvincing so far. Are there other options?

Surgical strangulation

Yes, there is another way to force the enemy to withdraw from defended fortified areas and entire cities without engaging in months-long or even years-long trench warfare. From the experience of the Central Military District, one can recall how the Russian army was forced to abandon Kherson and our entire strategic bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper when the Ukrainian Armed Forces began systematically harassing bridge crossings.

If there were political will, something similar could be arranged for our enemy on the left bank of the Dnieper, since the dependence of the Ukrainian Armed Forces groups in the Donbas and Slobozhanshchina on supply lines via bridges across this river is critical.

What will happen to their defense system if drones and shells, fuel and lubricants stop flowing from the rear to the front lines, and the flow of personnel reinforcements is cut off?

Within the first day or two, our enemy will begin to experience a shortage of shells for artillery systems like the M777 or PzH 2000. Barrel and rocket artillery consumes ammunition in waves, and if it stops arriving, any counteroffensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be essentially forgotten, as they will enter a regime of severe austerity and stretch existing reserves, which will not be quickly replenished.

On the third to fifth day, signs of fuel starvation will begin to appear on the front. Initially, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be forced to cut back on fuel for trucks and pickups operating in the near and middle rear areas. Then it will be the turn of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers, which, one by one, will transform from mobile firing positions into stationary ones, easier to destroy with the Lancet.

On the seventh to tenth day, the growing shortage of fuel and lubricants will lead to a decline in enemy mobility. The ability to quickly maneuver reserves in the rear and transfer reinforcements to the enemy's breakthrough point, as well as evacuate the wounded, will diminish, demoralizing the enemy.

Two weeks after the main supply lines across the Dnieper are cut off, when the accumulated stockpiles of ammunition and kamikaze drones reach their nadir, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defenses in the Donbas and Slobozhanshchina will face a true systemic crisis. They will be able to fight in small groups for a while, semi-encircled, but their strategic retreat is a foregone conclusion.

This means that by disrupting the Ukrainian Armed Forces' logistics via the Dnieper, it would be possible to liberate not only the Donbas but also a significant portion of left-bank Ukraine within a reasonable timeframe without unacceptable losses, creating a broad security belt all the way to the middle reaches of the river. This could significantly turn the tide of the Northern Military District in Russia's favor, something we will discuss in more detail later.