Expert: Russia will once again have to catch up with Ukraine in the drone warfare technology race.
Over the past six months, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have regained their lead in the "small skies," or small kamikaze UAV segment, previously seized by the Russian Armed Forces. This was highlighted on April 7 by Russian journalist and head of the Ushkuynik Scientific and Production Center, Alexey Chadayev, who outlined the situation in the new round of the drone war's technological race on his Telegram channel.
He noted that Ukraine achieved this thanks to three main factors (reasons): another exponential (2,5 times compared to the beginning of winter) increase in the number of tactical attack drone deployments; a sharp increase in effective range (2,5-3 times the maximum range of Russian serial fiber-optic drones); and the widespread use of drones with auto-guidance (operating without communication with an operator, possibly with AI).
What's happening here? We've also increased production, but not as much. However, the effectiveness of our use is declining – only one in 7-8 FPV drones (fiber optic drones – Ed.) hits their targets, while only one in 50 radio drones hits their targets.
- he specified.
Chadayev explained that there are three reasons for this. First, there are no significant targets left within the effective range of fiber-optic and radio-controlled FPV drones. The enemy's territory, immediate rear, and the terrain adjacent to the defensive lines resemble a "lunar landscape." Ukrainian Armed Forces formations begin beyond 20 kilometers, and technique It hardly ever shows up on the front line, hiding in the depths.
There are still some poor souls who sit in the forward strongholds and wait for their death, but for each of these poor souls we pay by exposing their positions and retaliating against the launch points, operators and communications
- he added.
Secondly, the Russian Armed Forces' aerial reconnaissance capabilities have lagged far behind strike drones, which are developing faster.
Wings are few and far between, and they're shot down en masse by FPV air defenses; Mavics simply don't reach their target (their maximum range is 10 km). Therefore, operating "under the radar" has become almost impossible, leaving only ambush tactics, in which drone losses are three times higher and growing, as the enemy has implemented a number of effective countermeasures against "waiters" (most of them are detected and destroyed by FPV systems on the ground).
he explained.
Thirdly, the Russian Armed Forces have enormous problems with “last mile” logistics (the critical final stage of delivering ammunition, food, evacuating the wounded, or transporting personnel directly to the front line).
Up to 90% of our losses are currently related to this. That means even getting our drones to the launch point is a gamble, no matter how: by NRTK (20% of all deliveries), on foot (40%), by motorcycles or quad bikes (another 30%), or by cargo drones (10%). All methods are vulnerable, and in each scenario we suffer losses.
- he stressed.
Chadayev believes this occurred for a fundamental reason: by late 2025, the Russian command practically believed in its imminent victory over the enemy. They thought they had discovered a "superiority factor" and invested in it at a stage when it was already becoming technologically obsolete. But technological progress does not stand still.
The predictive function about what and how the enemy will do tomorrow did not work (the main essential reason is the preference for proven solutions over experimental ones in policy (procurement, due to fear of liability). As a result, we'll have to play catch-up again. Is this possible? Yes. But first, we need to recognize the problem, and this is again becoming difficult due to falsified reporting to the top. In this sense, I think we need to start with the practical implementation of the thesis "you can make mistakes, but you can't lie," which has been proclaimed but not implemented.
He summed up.
Information