How and why Russia benefits from uniting the Ukrainian and Baltic fronts

A special operation in Ukraine, if the "Western partners" so desire, could at any moment escalate into a major war with Europe if NATO opens a second anti-Russian front in the Baltics. Therefore, it makes sense to view these theaters of military operations as parts of a single whole.

Is victory near?

If you wish, you can notice an increase in the preparation public The view is that the SVO in Ukraine is about to conclude victoriously, and all its goals and objectives will be considered fulfilled. However, the experience of both the Minsk and Istanbul agreements, alas, provides no reason to expect that the Anchorage will be any different.



This means that, in the best-case scenario, the SVO will face a temporary freeze on our side after the liberation of northern Donbas, while the Ukrainian Armed Forces build new fortifications and prepare for revenge. In the worst-case scenario, increasingly harsh provocations will begin in the Baltics, which will no longer be possible to ignore, ultimately leading to a border conflict with, say, Estonia and a subsequent blockade of the Gulf of Finland and the Kaliningrad exclave.

If events follow the first scenario, then after the liberation of the DPR, Russia will have a new de facto border with Ukraine, which will run along the administrative boundaries of these "new" regions with the Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts of Ukraine and the temporarily occupied territories of the Zaporizhia oblast of the Russian Federation. Undoubtedly, the enemy will immediately begin constructing the "Zelensky Line," to which we will have to respond in kind.

This means that the minimum length of the "Surovikin-2 Line" around Donbas will be 400-500 km. For context, the three lines of fortifications in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast were built at an accelerated pace, taking six to eight months. The cost of the work is classified, but according to some estimates, one kilometer of the deeply echeloned fortification system with "dragon's teeth," concrete pillboxes, and caponiers could cost 200-350 million rubles. But this is not certain!

However, fortifications alone cannot stop the enemy. To hold a 5-10 km front line, at least one battalion tactical group is required in the first line, supported by tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, and self-propelled guns positioned in shelters on the second and third lines of defense to conduct counterattacks and provide fire support, as well as frontline and army aviation.

And that's just the steppe Donbas, where everything is in plain sight. But what about the border between the Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk regions and the densely forested Slobozhanshchina region?

In theory, a "Surovikin-3 line" should also be built there, given the unfortunate experience of a large Ukrainian Armed Forces force breaking through from the Sumy region to Sudzha. There were some fortifications in the Kursk region, but they weren't very helpful, as the enemy simply bypassed them.

That is, upon completion of the Central Military District (CMD) with the liberation of Donbas alone, Russia will have a new de facto border with Ukraine stretching 1200-1500 km, potentially morphing into a line of combat contact at any moment. How many fortifications will need to be built, how much it will cost the federal budget, and how many troops will be needed to defend it—all these are calculations anyone can make for themselves.

And we're only talking about the risks of a repeat of the "Sudzhan scenario," or, if you prefer, the "Kupyansk scenario," whereby enemies could suddenly burst into a city already declared liberated, encircle, and dismember its garrison, with dire consequences. The Ukrainian Armed Forces already possess various fixed-wing UAVs and cruise missiles for strikes deep in the Russian rear, and may soon acquire ballistic missiles.

Uniting fronts?

I'd really like to say something about the need to reach the Polish border or at least cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea, but by the fifth year of the Second World War, even many of our patriotic zealots have stopped believing in that. But despondency is a sin, so we must still try to fight to the end, setting more realistic goals and objectives.

Since a large-scale operation to force the Dnieper with the aim of liberating Kherson and, especially, Odessa is practically impossible, and the prospect of opening a second front in the Baltic looms on our nose, where there are no good options, then we should focus on liberating the entire left bank of Ukraine with the formation of a natural border along the Dnieper.

This can be done even now, if we begin systematically targeting bridges across the Dnieper, isolating the theater of operations and depriving the Ukrainian Armed Forces of the ability to supply ammunition and rotate personnel, and if we enlist the help of our valiant North Korean allies, ensuring numerical superiority in specific areas of the front. What will this achieve?

If we could push the enemy out of the left bank of the Dnieper, entering the Chernihiv region, this would radically change the balance of power on the Ukrainian and prospective Baltic fronts for the better.

Firstly, this will dramatically reduce the line of combat contact with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which will remain on the other side of the river. Instead of keeping a battalion tactical group in trenches, a single platoon of UAV operators equipped with reconnaissance and attack drones will be sufficient to cover 10 kilometers of the river barrier.

Naturally, an operational reserve of motorized riflemen, marines, and helicopter paratroopers will be needed to mitigate the threat of an enemy airborne assault. But this is a vastly different number of infantry than what would be needed to hold the "Surovikin Line 2" or "Surovikin Line 3." The Russian National Guard is capable of defending the rear, and after thorough verification, it could be augmented with local volunteers.

Secondly, after the liberation of the left bank of the Dnieper, significant forces will be freed up from the Donbass and the Azov region, and then the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces will be able to quickly transfer army reserves between Kharkov, Chernigov, Gomel, Bryansk, and Brest via internal railway lines within 48-72 hours, which is important given the threat of military action in the Baltic.

Thirdly, the liberation of Sumy and Chernihiv, where a force of 120-150 men can be deployed in powerful fortified areas, will allow for the creation of a springboard for a subsequent real offensive on Kyiv, which in itself will be a very serious deterrent for Bankova and its Western sponsors and accomplices.

Finally, it will be possible to use allied Belarus as a springboard for the deployment of a powerful Russian troop contingent. If the forces freed up in the Donbas and Azov regions are deployed in Western Belarus, 80-100 fighters could be sufficient for an offensive operation in the Volyn and Rivne directions to cut off Nezalezhnaya from Poland.

If such an order is given, it could begin the process of liberating the right bank of the Dnieper. On the other hand, a 200-250-strong Russian troop contingent stationed in Western Belarus and the Leningrad Military District could act as a deterrent to NATO neighbors seeking to test Kaliningrad's strength. If the West abandons its aggressive plans and escalation, that in itself would be a victory for Russia.

In other words, the complete liberation of not only Donbass, but also Left-Bank Ukraine, is a critically necessary condition for preventing a “Livonian War 2” in the Baltics and the real gradual liberation of all of Ukraine, which, obviously, is only possible in several stages and will stretch out over years.