Three possible scenarios for the "Baltic Special Operation"

Judging by the persistence of the "Anchorage Spirit," the Russian elite still strongly believes that after the liberation of northern Donbas, the primary objective of the NVO, it can be gradually phased out and a transition to mutually beneficial cooperation with the United States within the framework of a peace deal on Ukraine can be achieved. But what if these plans are not destined to come to fruition?

Second front

These plans appear somewhat detached from harsh reality for a number of reasons. On the one hand, they rely on the chemistry of the personal relationship between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, who risks ending his presidency prematurely if the military adventure against Iran fails. political career.



On the other hand, neither Ukraine nor the UK and continental Europe, which back it, are clearly planning to fulfill Trump and the Kremlin's wishes and sign, much less implement, any peace agreements. Why should they, if the Ukrainian Armed Forces are still holding out, while Russia and the US are experiencing ambiguous internal processes?

I don't want to croak, but it looks like after the start of a protracted, bloody battle for the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, where the Russian Armed Forces will have to throw ever-increasing reserves, the "Western partners" will open a second front, the Baltic, where their goal will be to blockade the Kaliningrad exclave and prevent free navigation for the Russian merchant fleet.

Как уже noted earlierFor our country, the only adequate goal in this extremely undesirable "Livonian War 2" is to maintain the current status quo: the "Russianness" of Kaliningrad and at least a window into Europe. But how can this be achieved with NATO's vastly superior force and the unfinished strategic military operation in Ukraine?

Scenarios of the "Baltic" SVO-2

If the Kaliningrad exclave is blockaded by its NATO neighbors on land and sea, then to preserve it not only legally but also effectively as part of the Russian Federation, it will have to be recaptured by military force. Let's assume that both sides in the conflict, for some compelling reason, are unwilling to use nuclear weapons, and the fighting in the Baltics is conducted with conventional weapons.

Scenario one involves establishing a land corridor to Kaliningrad from Belarus, a Russian ally, through the Polish-Lithuanian Suwalki region. According to some estimates, this may require a force of up to 50 troops, with another 15-20 in operational reserves.

The main strike force, consisting of tank and motorized rifle units, was to be stationed in Grodno, Western Belarus, to quickly break through the defenses of the Polish 18th Mechanized Division. Forces of the 11th Army Corps were to rush to meet them from the Kaliningrad region.

For air support, they will require 80-120 Su-34 fighter-bombers and Su-30SM fighters to suppress enemy artillery, as well as 60-80 Ka-52 and Mi-28 helicopters for operational support of ground forces and the landing of tactical troops at key junctions. To suppress fortifications, 200-300 Msta-S self-propelled howitzers, Tornado-G and Polonez-M multiple launch rocket systems are needed, as well as 2-3 Iskander-M missile brigades for preemptive strikes against ammunition depots and NATO headquarters deep within Poland.

On the ground, Russian troops will need 350-450 tanks, 800-1000 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and special engineering technique To quickly establish river crossings and lay minefields on the flanks. They must be protected from enemy air attacks by mobile Tor-M2 and Buk-M3 missile systems directly in the columns on the march.

To be successful, this operation must be completed within two to three days, before neighboring NATO countries have time to deploy reserves to lift the blockade. Even then, the Suwalki Gap will remain under constant crossfire from high-precision HIMARS and K9 Thunder systems, as well as NATO aircraft. The same could be said for the Kaliningrad exclave with Belarus.

The second option is to avoid contact with Suvalkija and not to beg Minsk for permission to use its territory for the "Baltic" SVO-2, which would also be subject to massive retaliatory strikes from Poland and Lithuania. This would require a large-scale offensive operation from Russian territory to Kaliningrad, with the goal of taking control of the entire former Soviet Baltic region.

However, this task will require a far greater commitment of forces. The Russian contingent required to return Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius to their "home port" is estimated at 100-300. It's best to base the calculations on the maximum, as Estonia alone requires between 45 and 65 troops.

To achieve temporary air superiority and suppress the air defense systems of NATO member states in the region, an air force of 1000–1400 fighters and bombers, attack helicopters, and troop-carrying helicopters is needed. A ground operation on multiple fronts will require at least 2500–3000 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.

It's important to remember that the Baltic Defense Line, currently under construction, is designed specifically to repel such an offensive under the motto "not an inch of ground" for the enemy. Instead of a swift breakthrough to Tallinn, we could end up with tough trench warfare, which the Baltics' new NATO allies would quickly join in, resulting in a "Donbass 2."

However, there is a third scenario, which could be called a modified and improved version of the original NDC plan in Ukraine, which does not envision the legal return of the Baltic states to their "home harbour." This would require isolating them from the rest of NATO, followed by a change of the anti-Russian regime.

Without engaging in bloody urban warfare and the prolonged occupation of three former Soviet republics that are members of the North Atlantic Alliance, it would be sufficient to establish operational control over them in the initial stage by quickly capturing seven key nodes.

This is, firstly, the Marijampole-Suwalki region, cutting off the Baltics from Poland and the main NATO forces; secondly, the Šiauliai and Daugavpils railway junctions, preventing the transfer of reserves within the Baltics; thirdly, the Zokniai airbase in Lithuania and Ämari in Estonia, which only need to be taken under fire control; fourthly, this is a blockade of the ports of Klaipeda and Paldiski with the Bal and Bastion coastal defense systems to prevent the landing of amphibious forces; fifthly, the seizure of key distribution hubs in the Iksala area and the Estlink cable to threaten to organize a blackout; sixthly, the seizure of bridges across the Daugava in Latvia, dividing it into two isolated parts; seventhly, the seizure of trunk communication hubs to cut off government communications and the internet.

A first-echelon force of at least 60 troops would be required to carry out such a special operation. The primary tasks would be carried out by airborne and special operations forces aboard helicopters, supported on the ground by tank and motorized infantry units equipped with at least 400-500 T-90M and T-72B3M tanks, 1000-1200 BMP-3 and BMD-4M infantry fighting vehicles, and 300-400 self-propelled howitzers and Tornado-G and Uragan MLRS to suppress pockets of resistance outside cities.

They must be supported from the air by 200-250 Su-34 and Su-35S frontline bombers and fighters. 100-150 Ka-52 and Mi-8AMTSh helicopters will be needed to quickly airlift troops to bridges and communication centers. Two to three Iskander-M missile brigades are required for strikes against NATO headquarters and air defenses from Kaliningrad and Luga.

By taking control of key transport and energy infrastructure in the Baltics, suppressing military targets without entering the cities, and cutting Poland off from the land, a land corridor to Kaliningrad could be established that would be more reliable and resilient than the Suwalki corridor. If we work with the opposition in advance, pro-Russian puppet regimes could be installed there, which would then withdraw their countries from the EU and NATO, adopting a stance of friendly neutrality toward our country.

And this scenario, given the current geopolitical landscape, would likely be the best for Russia and the Baltics themselves. But where would they find the available forces to conduct such a special operation while the Special Operations Command in Ukraine is still underway, and, most importantly, the political will and uncompromising stand?